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Foreword
Twenty-five years ago. In his The Roots of the Modem American Empire.
William Appleman Williams wrote of the late 19th-century American
farmer whose "export-dominated relationship with the world marketplace
led him to develop and advocate a vigorously assertive and expansionist
foreign policy, or to support such a policy formulated by others."

While

Williams devoted years of research to this monumental discussion of
agrarian support for American expansionism, he expressed a sense of regret
that the nation’s farm population all-too infrequently opposed American
empire. Williams, in fact, wrote enthusiastically of periods of time when
American farmers reacted "against various efforts by the United States to
reform, remake, or control large portions of the globe." These "delightful
moments of history," as Williams described them, included the decade
before World War I, the twenty years between the world wars, and the
opposition of some Iowa farmers to American Intervention in Korea In the
1950's.1
Williams’ reference to lowa farmers and the Korean War led me to the
1William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modem American
Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social ConsciousnessJ n ja
Marketplace Society f% w York: Random House, Inc., 1969), pp. xxiii-xxiv.
v
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Iowa Farmers Union and to its parent organization, the National Farmers
Union, and served as the starting point for this dissertation. That beginning
was followed by a year of travel across the United States that produced, in
this final form, the story of an agrarian group that, in the firs t five years
following the end of World War II, fit well Williams* image of a "delightful
moment of history." Unlike the two larger agricultural organizations of the
time period, the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Grange,
the Farmers Union devoted little energy toward arguing for expanded foreign
markets for agricultural products and even less time toward appeals for
protective tariffs. Instead, Farmers Union policy statements, congressional
testimony, and verbal and written commentary berated the Truman
administration for its advancement of American imperialism and for its
denial of the rights of other nations to seek their own courses of action in
world affairs.

From the national organization, headquartered in both

Washington, D.C. and in Denver, Colorado, to the dozens of regional, state,
and local affiliates ranging from coast to coast, the membership of the
Farmers Union adopted a consistent anti-im perialist approach to world
affairs. This included a rejection of what the organization perceived as
the inaccurate and potentially damaging view that Soviet Communism
vi
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represented the world’s major threat to peace.
While some of the state organizations flirted with isolationism, the
national headquarters and the majority of the affiliates embraced their
foreign policy stands with a profound enthusiasm for international
cooperation. Believing strongly in the possibility for world peace inherent
in the newly-created United Nations, the National Farmers Union opposed
unilateral American policies that it believed negated United Nations
initiatives, reversed the internationalism of Franklin Roosevelt, and often
were predicated upon contrived situations designed to promote an American
agenda. After a brief honeymoon of support for President Truman in which
it defended the postwar loan to Great Britain and silently acquiesced in
Winston Churchill’s "iron curtain" speech, the Farmers Union joined the
small but vocal ranks of Cold War critics in rejecting as dangerous and
misguided policies the Baruch Plan for atomic energy, the Truman Doctrine,
the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and administration calls for universal m ilitary
training and a peacetime draft.

With the exception of the Point Four

program, to which it gave its qualified support, the Farmers Union rejected
the Truman administration’s vision for what Henry Luce termed an American
Century.
vif
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In addition to its ideological opposition, the Farmers Union also
criticized President Truman's early Cold War foreign policy for contributing
to the declining status of the family farmer, the segment of America's
agrarian population that was the backbone of the National Farmers Union.
Demonstrating what Ronald Steel recently described as the tendency of
Americans "to look upon foreign policy as a distraction from the real
threats that face the U.S.,2 the Farmers Union claimed that Truman's near
obsession with containing Communism abroad led to the continuation of an
economic program promoting "artificial scarcity" at home. Small farmers,
unable to compete with agribusinesses even in the best of times, were
pushed farther behind in their quest for economic equality by a foreign
policy that, by favoring large business penetration of foreign lands,
reinforced the status quo. Government-sponsored programs designed, like
the Brannan Plan, to give small farmers a greater share of the nation's
economic pie, were lost in the shuffle as the administration enlisted
corporate agriculture in the fight to contain Communism.
In the unforgiving temper of the times. Farmers Union opposition to the
nation’s foreign policy generated suspicions of the organization's loyalty to
2Ronald Steel, "Losing an Empire, Finding a Role," New Perspectives
Quarterly IX (Summer. 1992), p. 19.
v iii
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the United States. Charges of Communist sympathies were leveled at the
Farmers Union from the nation’s press, from the American Legion, from the
rival Farm Bureau, and even from conservative elements within the Union
itself.

The F.B.I., the State Department, and the House Un-American

Activities Committee initiated investigations of the Union, and, in the most
publicized attack, New Hampshire's Styles Bridges harangued the Union for
two hours from the floor of the U.S. Senate. None of the charges were based
on substantiated fact, but focused instead on the fantasy, innuendo, and
guilt by association typical of the times. Pathetic attempts to embarrass
or isolate the Farmers Union, the attacks nevertheless succeeded in creating
internal rifts between those who held fast to the Farmers Union criticism
of America's Cold War policy and those who saw a need for organizational
change. Outwardly, however, the charges failed to suppress the Union's
public position of dissent from American foreign policy.
Then came the Korean War. The sending of American troops to Asia added
to the “expensive uncertainty" of agrarian life in the United States,
impacting particularly on family farms. The war drained farmers off the
land and into both m ilitary service and jobs in war-generated industrial
plants. Fighting against a Selective Service System seemingly incapable of
ix
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appreciating the plight of family farmers, and facing as well a decline in
administration-sponsored programs for agriculture, a number of Farmers
Union affiliates vocally criticized U.S. involvement in Korea as contributing
to the accelerated decline of the nation’s small farms. The Iowa Farmers
Union in particular opposed America's "police action" in Korea, not only for
its negative impact on small farmers but also for its advancement of
corporate profits. Led by president Fred Stover, the Iowa a ffilia te adopted
the view of the conflict offered in I.F. Stone's The Hidden History of the
Korean War, cursing the Truman administration's use of the Communist
demon to fan the flames of war for economic profit.
The national leadership of the Farmers Union, led by president Jim
Patton, disagreed w ith Stover. Weary from the weight of criticism directed
at the Union and fearful that failure to support American troops dying in
Korea would only increase the attacks and cripple the Union's effectiveness,
Patton orchestrated a policy shift that placed the National Farmers Union
squarely in the Truman administration camp. Earlier critiques of American
"imperialism" were replaced by calls for increased m ilitary spending and by
apocalyptic descriptions of a world in need of America's righteous might to
defeat the evil menace of the Soviet Union. The shift in policy allowed no
x
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room for vocal dissent, and so Patton and the national leadership worked
diligently to purge from the Farmers Union individuals like Fred Stover
whose continued criticism of America’s Cold War policies served as a
source of embarrassment to the Union.
Jim Patton denied that his actions during the Korean War represented a
shift in organization policy.

He argued instead that support for United

Nations action in Korea was part of the Farmers Union’s belief in the
efficacy of the U.N.

Had he confined his support of the war to

pronouncements lauding the United Nations, his denial of an organizational
shift would be more believable.

As it was, his adoption of Cold War

platitudes and his deep involvement in the purging of organizational
heretics provided clear evidence that Jim Patton and the national leadership
of the Farmers Union radically altered the foreign policy position of the
organization in the wake of the Korean War.

In the process, they made

casualties of critics like Fred Stover but, by abandoning their principles and
succumbing to the pressures of the times, they also made a casualty of the
Farmers Union itself.
This study is not intended as an evaluation of the accuracy of the
Farmers Union critique of American policy, nor is it designed to offer a
xi
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conceptually sophisticated analysis of the complexities and nuances
involved in the making of that policy. It makes no pretense of assessing, for
example, whether or not Harry Truman, as the Farmers Union claimed,
reversed Franklin Roosevelt's foreign policy objectives. Nor does It offer
anywhere near a complete analysis of the Farmers Union claim that in the
time period under study an ‘unholy alliance" deliberately conspired against
America's family farmers. Finally, although acknowledging that the Farmers
Union critique of Harry Truman often overlooked the larger context of issues
involved in policymaking, this study stops short of examining those issues.
The intent of this dissertation is to describe the foreign policy stand of
the National Farmers Union 1n the early years of the Cold War and to offer an
explanation of how and why that stand changed with the coming of the
Korean War. In discussing the domestic implications of American foreign
policy, It attempts to contribute not only to what Hong-Kyu Park described
as the "least discussed side of the Korean conflict,"3 but also to the
greater issue of the potency of the Cold War as a factor in American life.
Researching the National Farmers Union was a lengthy but enjoyable
process that took me to libraries in twelve states, introduced me to a
3Hong-Kyu Park, "American Involvement in the Korean War," History
Teacher XVI (February, 1983), p. 258.
xii
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wealth of materials that when I began this project I had no idea existed, and
allowed me to meet and correspond with a group of people who are among
the most friendly and helpful individuals I have ever been fortunate enough
to know. Without intending to slight anyone, I would be remiss if I did not
thank specifically Cassandra Volpe o f the University of Colorado's Western
Historical Collection, who allowed me unlimited access to the papers of
both the National Farmers Union and of Jim Patton, and Bob McC wn, head of
the Special Collections and Manuscripts Division of the University of Iowa
Libraries. Bob was by far the most generous of the many kind individuals I
met in my travels, allowing me the historian's dream of spending as much
time as I wanted poring over the as-yet unprocessed papers of Fred Stover.
I also would be negligent if I did not mention the cooperative spirit with
which I was greeted by all members of the Farmers Union, including Patton
supporter's Kenny Schuman and M ilt Hakel, as well as Stover advocates Merle
Hansen, Betty Lownes, and Homer Ayres. I was particularly grateful for the
opportunity to correspond w ith Homer Ayres before his death in June,
1992.
My acknowledgements also would be terribly incomplete without a
tremendous expression of appreciation for Ed Crapol, who, while directing
xiii
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my research, became more than a guide. In the spirit of his mentor, William
Appleman Williams, Ed became both my intellectual yardstick and my
personal friend. I can never thank him enough.
Finally, there are the people in my life who deserve my greatest thanks.
My wife, Kim, and my daughter, Chelsea, put up with a lot of unnecessary
grief in the last five years, grief caused in part by the nature of research
but by the nature, as w ell, of my own addictions.

I love them both very

much, and I appreciate their understanding.
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ABSTRACT

This study chronicles the change In the foreign policy views of the
National Farmers Union Drought about by U.S. Involvement in the Korean War.
Abandoning Its poignant criticisms of President Trumans earlier Cold War
Initiatives, the nation's foremost liberal agrarian organization embraced not
only American actions In Korea but on a larger scale administration
attempts to further what Henry Luce termed the “American Century." This
policy reversal created a r ift between the national organization and various
state and regional branches. The Iowa and Northeastern divisions In
particular objected to the shift as a surrender of principle and as a
capitulation to the corporate-military domination of American society that
threatened the already declining status of the family farmer. These
wayward affiliates became Cold War casualties when the Farmers Union
revoked their charters for their failure to endorse American activities in
Korea. Yet, the national organization's complete about-face on American
foreign policy made it, too, a casualty of the Cold War.
This study is based on a wide variety of governmental and private
sources, including the newly deposited papers of Iowa Farmers Union
president Fred W. Stover. It argues that Americas "preponderance of power"
following the Second World War led not only to a spreading of the American
dream abroad but also to a remolding of political and economic relations on
the homefront. The early post-war period became, in the words of President
Truman, "the years when the cold war began to overshadow our lives."
American priorities gave precedence to increased m ilitary budgets, which
consumed non-defense related spending and strengthened ties between the
m ilitary and corporations eager to play a role in shaping the world in the
American Image.
Organizations such as the Farmers Union initially
rejected these goals as antithetical to American tradition and as damaging
to their own desires for equity within American society. Political and
social pressures, however, brought about an eventual acquiescence in the
new American priorities and repudiation for groups and individuals
unwilling to accept the Cold War as a way of life.

xv
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Chapter One
The Voices o f A g ric u ltu re

Addressing the 31st annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau
Federation in December, 1949, former Secretary of Agriculture Clinton
Anderson chose as his theme the question, "Who Shall Speak for Farmers?"
The Democratic senator from New Mexico told his Chicago audience that the
topic had come to mind when some of his fellow congressmen had dismissed
farm organizations as representing neither farmers nor the various citizens
of the states.

"They don’t represent the farmers," one congressman

reportedly told Anderson. "I represent the people of my state. They elected
me to do that job, and I’m not going to let some fellow who works for a farm
organization te ll me what to do."1 In his comments to the Farm Bureau,
Anderson rejected this shortsighted view of American politics and argued
instead that farm organizations were indeed capable of speaking for the
nation’s farmers.

Considering his audience, the pronouncement was no

surprise.
'Address of the Honorable Clinton P. Anderson, December 14, 1949,
Box 4, Folder “American Farm Bureau Federation," Gardner Jackson Papers,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

2
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3
What Anderson failed to address was which farm organization best
represented the Interests of America’s agrarian population. In the decade
following World War II, dozens of groups and hundreds of publications
claimed to speak for America's farmers, creating what one observer
described as “a babble of voices."2

While most of the organizations

refrained from declaring themselves the sole representative of American
agriculture, they nevertheless criticized their rivals for their Inadequacies
in representing even a segment of the agrarian community. The result was
an ongoing, acrimonious debate that Senator Anderson wisely side-stepped
by declaring that he was "less concerned" about which particular group a
farmer chose to join than he was that the individual "participate actively"
in the group of his choice.
The truth of the matter, as Anderson seemed to understand, was that no
organization could accurately represent all of American agriculture.

The

interests of farmers producing primarily for domestic consumption were
2National Farmers Union president James G. Patton, quoted in Robert L.
Tontz, “Memberships of General Farmers' Organizations, United States,
1874-1960," Agricultural History XXXVIII (July, 1964), p. 153. Fortune
magazine farm columnist Ladd Haystead quantified the diversity of the farm
press with his report that it consisted of over 400 publications. (Ladd
Haystead, “4th Semi-Annual Agricultural Report for the Committee on
Agriculture, American Petroleum Institute," May I, 1951, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, p. 8, Reel * 1 , Michael V. DiSalle Papers, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Missouri.)
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different from the ones expressed by those whose products were aimed
mainly at foreign markets. Southern farmers differed In their needs from
their midwestem counterparts, and sim ilar divisions existed between older,
debt-free farmers and their younger debt-ridden colleagues.

In the same

manner, farmers fortunate enough to be operating on newer lands were
unlikely to be interested in the same concerns held by those whose
farmlands were worn out from decades, if not centuries, of use.

Any

organization claiming to speak for all of these diversified interests would
be, as National Farmers Union president Jim Patton honestly admitted in
1952, "taking in too much territory."3
The distrust of American farmers toward formal institutions made the
task of organizing the agricultural community even more formidable.
Typical were the comments of two Wisconsin farmers polled in 1950 about
their preferences among the leading farm groups. "All these organizations
are after," one Crawford County farmer suggested, "is our money. When they
get it they go into business for themselves." A Manitowoc dairyman added
that, "Farm organizations are doing nothing but arguing among themselves."
Expressing a similar viewpoint, a North Dakota farmer observed that, “You’ll
^Quoted in Karl D. Butler, "Who Shall Speak for Farmers?" Successful
Farming L (November. 1952), p. 163.
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5
never get the real reactions of the farmer from the farm organization
leaders" since they each had "their own axes to grind."4
This combination of skepticism and diversified interests limited fanner
participation in agrarian organizations. The estimate offered by one farm
paper of the time was that only 30% of America's 5.4 million farmers
carried memberships in any of the major farm groups.5

While this

particular figure perhaps underestimated the extent to which the nation's
farmers joined in lobbying activities, it was an accurate reflection of the
general apathy of a large segment of the agrarian community. Perhaps not
unlike the attitudes exhibited by American voters as a whole, many of the
nation's farmers viewed participation in the political process as a waste of
their valuable time.

They trusted that the world would successfully go

'round without them making any uncomfortable commitments.
Those farmers who participated in the political process were attracted
primarily to three agrarian organizations that, contrary to the naysaying
skeptics, were capable of influencing national policy. These three groups,
the Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the National Farmers
^Wisconsin Agriculturalist and Farmer. August 19, 1950, p. 17; Gerald
Brekke to Gabriel Hauge, January 27, 1953, Box 1, Folder "Charles F. Willis,
Assistant to the Assistant to the President," Records of Gabriel Hauge,
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
5H.K. Tharin, "Are Farmers Really Organized?” Farm Front. May, 1945,
pp. 3-4.
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6
Union, in truth represented a little over half of the nation’s farmers. The
broad scope of their memberships meant that, while they occasionally agreed
upon those programs that best served America's agricultural population,
they more often did not.
This was particularly true of their positions on America’s role in the
new world order of the Cold War. Emphasizing what historian Melvyn Leff ler
has recently described as the nation’s “preponderance of power,"6 the
Grange insisted on the right of the United States unilaterally to pursue its
ideological and economic goals. What the organization saw as the specific
objectives of U.S. foreign policy, however, was often lost in their nearjingoistic declarations of American exceptional ism. For the Farm Bureau,
which agreed with the Grange on the uniquely powerful position of the
United 5tates, there was no confusion as to what the nation should pursue.
American efforts should focus specifically, the Bureau argued, on the
expansion of overseas markets.

Continuing what William Appleman

Williams identified as 19th-century agrarian support for “a m ilitantly
expansionist foreign policy,"7 the Bureau in particular called for expanded
Gflelvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the
Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1992).
7Williams, The Roots of the Modem American Empire, p. xxiii.
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7
markets for American agriculture.
While they differed in emphasis, both the Grange and the Farm Bureau
accepted the argument of the Truman administration that Communist
expansion was the main deterrent to the attainment of America's goals.
They therefore supported the anti-Communist rhetoric of the era and
actively lobbied for the establishment of an American Century beneficial to
the United States and to the rest of the world as well. The Farmers Union,
however, rejected this belief in the salutary effects of such a quest. The
organization stressed more emphatically than the other two groups the
immutable linkage between foreign and domestic policies and believed that
the flexing of American power abroad would have serious repercussions at
home. The Farmers Union therefore cautioned against an over-zealous and
self-centered Cold War mentality as disastrous both to the American farmer
and to the broad spectrum of American society.

Its position made the

Farmers Union the sole agrarian representative in the small but vocal circle
of Cold War critics.
The National Grange, the oldest of America's three major agrarian
groups, had itself once played the role of critic. First organized in 1867 as
a leading advocate for agrarian discontent with the legendary "robber
barons" of the railroad industry, the early Grange had demanded active
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8
government intervention as an important step in stemming the tide of
corporate domination of American life.

It had even taken the startlingly

progressive step of admitting women to membership on an equal basis with
men.8
By the late 1940's, however, the Grange bore little resemblance to the
reforming organization of an earlier day. Described by various observers as
pragmatic, conservative, fraternal, and friendly, the Grange in these early
years of the Cold War, as agrarian expert Wesley McCune argued, "moveld]
cautiously and triefd] to avoid offense of anyone."9 Representing what the
State Department labelled a "pie supper membership"10 of 800,000, located
®The early history of the Grange, as well as the Farm Bureau and
Farmers Union, can be found in a variety of sources, including Lowell Dyson,
Farmers' Organizations (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Wesley McCune,
Who's Behind Our Farm Policy? (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956);
Walter W. Wilcox, Social Responsibility in Farm Leadership: An Analysis of
Farm Problems and Farm Leadership in Action (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1975); andTontz, "Memberships," pp. 143-156.
^McCune, Farm Policy, p. 43. In addition to McCune's description,
others citing the conservative nature of the Grange included: Tharin, “Are
Farmers Really Organized?," p. 3; Tontz, "Memberships," p. 144; R.B. Held,
“Our Farm Organizations . . . How They Started; Their Stand Today," Farm
Policy Forum III (November, 1950), p. 10; Ross B. Talbot and Don F. Hadwiger,
The Policy Process in American Agriculture (San Francisco, Chandler
Publishing Company, 1968), p. 118; and Department of State, Office of
Public Opinion Studies, "Current Attitudes of Farmer Organizations Toward
International Relations," February 22, 1945, p. I, Box 19, Record Group 59,
National Archives.
d ep artm en t of State, "Current Attitudes of Farmer Organizations,"
February 22,1945, p. 1.
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9
mainly in Ohio and the Northeast, the once proud champion of reform
delighted in its reputation for fairness and prided itself on liquor and
tobacco-free meetings where both the Bible and the American flag were
prominently displayed.11

When venturing away from what one of its

leading officials called a main focus on "the social and educational
development of rural life ” and into the less fam iliar territory of “legislative
or financial accomplishments,"12 the Grange exhibited an astonishing
reversal of its earlier positions.

It openly criticized government

intervention in the economic life of the nation, opposed the reform-seeking
efforts of organized labor, and, most surprisingly, established remarkably
close ties with American corporations that on occasion led to protests of
government regulation of business.
The shift away from advocating an activist government was evident in
National Grange master Herschel Newsom's claim that his election to the
organization’s highest office in November of 1950 was because of his
opposition to “excessive governmental control of farm products and our
daily lives.”13

Discussing amendments to the Defense Production Act

11 Butler, “Who Shall Speak," p. 37; McCune, Farm Policy, p. 34.
,2 Charles M. Gardner quoted in Wilcox, Social Responsibility, pp. 99100.
,3 “How We Can Stop Rising Prices (A Discussion with Michael V.
DiSalle, Walter Reuther, and Herschel Newsom)," in Harold F. Harding, editor,
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before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1952, Newsom
spoke

of

his

organization’s

apprehension

toward

a

government

"regimentation" that he feared might result in farmers being told "what
[they] shall raise and where [they] shall raise it."14

Other Grange

supporters and officials reinforced this position in their statements
opposing government-imposed price controls.

Fred Bailey of Agricultural

Research Incorporated, a Grange subsidiary, argued that, "Government gifts
and price supports are not and cannot be the answer" to the "perennial and
persistent farm problem" of the nation. Roy Battles, a former farm director
for a Cincinnati radio station who had been brought by Newsom to
Washington as his assistant, put it more bluntly than most. He objected, he
wrote in a memo on the subject of "low-income farmers," to government
“w elfare. . . that subsidizes people into a higher standard of living than they
are entitled to

",5

Such statements create a healthy amount of skepticism concerning the
The Age of Danger: Major Speeches in American Problems (New York: Random
House, 1952), p. 289.
te s tim o n y of Herschel Newsom, March I I , 1952, U.S. Congress,
Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Defense Production Act Amendments of
1952: Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, p. 380.
15-Are There Too Many Farmers?" National County Agent and Vo-Ao
Teacher VI (July, 1950), p. 7; Roy Battles to Lloyd C. Halvorson, July 8,
1954, Box 19, Folder 13a, National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry
Records, 1842-1982, Collection *3020, Cornell University Library.
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Grange's supposed empathy for many of the nation's more Impoverished
farmers.

So, too, does the organization's 1950 observation that those

farmers not producing for a commercial market were best dealt with as a
“social problem/16 a view that Battles once again colorfully elaborated
upon in describing

low-income farmers in his home state of Minnesota.

They could often be found, he wrote:
chasing out to dances with their five kids two or three times a week,
some were partially alcoholics, some would leave overshoes lie out in
the yard all summer long, and in general let what they had go to
rot, some could not be trusted, some had bad health, some had no
regard for education, some were plain lazy or lacked motivation, some
were spendthrifts, some were neurotics

17

When pressed on the question of what to do about the nation's poorest
farmers, Battles and other Grange officials occasionally toyed with the
concept of "social and welfare planning."18 Finding that solution generally
flawed by the necessity of government involvement, Grange leaders opted
instead for encouraging impoverished farmers to move off the land and into
industrial employment.

In proposing this route, however, the Grange ran

into what it fe lt was the "barrier"19 of labor unions. Support for the anti
16"Are There Too Many Farmers?" p. 28.
17Battles to Halvorson, July 8, 1954, National Grange Records.
^B attles to Halvorson, July 8, 1954, National Grange Records.
,9 Lloyd C. Halvorson to Agricultural Committee, November 6, 1953, Box
19, Folder 13a, National Grange Records.
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union Taft-Hartley legislation of 1947 and the obvious resentment evident
in Herschel Newsom's 1952 statements to the Senate concerning the
"imbalance" between the purchasing power of labor and agriculture
demonstrated once again how far the Grange had drifted from its nineteenth
century roots.2®
Nothing, however, more clearly showed the changed nature of the Grange
than its post-war relationship with American business. Despite its claim
to represent the "family-sized farm . . . against the threatened onsweep of
corporation

farming,"21

the

organization

adopted

policies

that

unquestionably placed it in the camp of corporate America. The most
remarkable example of the many close ties between the Grange and
American business was a 1952 suggestion by Herschel Newsom "for a study
of the entire transportation picture toward an end of less regulation of
railroads."22

This new pro-business attitude also expanded beyond the

20Testimony of Herschel Newsom, March 11, 1952, Defense Production
Act Amendments of 1952. pp. 377-378; “A Resume of Agricultural Policy
and Program Recommendations Adopted by the National Grange, Eight-Second
Annual Session at Portland, Maine, November 10-19, 1948," Fred Stover
Papers, University of Iowa. The Stover Papers sit in the same eighty-plus
cardboard boxes that were originally taken out of Stover's home following
his death. Since they are unprocessed, there are no identifying box or folder
numbers in this or subsequent footnotes.
21 Agricultural Extension Service, Iowa State College, "An Introduction
to Farmers' Organizations," January I, 1950, p. 3, Stover Papers.
22McCune, Farm Policy, pp. 37-43.
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nation's shores to include support for an active role by American
businessmen

overseas.

The Grange's

1951

convention,

the

State

Department's Office of Public Opinion 5tudies observed, "asserted that the
only sound way for underdeveloped countries to get the capital necessary
for substantial modern production [was] to provide a favorable climate for
private investment by American businessmen.’23
Grange support for American business expansion went hand-in-hand with
the organization's insistence that a top priority for the American farmer
was =to regain and expand his foreign market." While better diets at home,
further research and education, and improved marketing techniques were all
supported as "long-range projects which help only over a period of years,"
the immediate development of foreign outlets was considered the most
profitable program for American agriculture 24
While encouraging farmers to seek foreign markets, the Grange also
supported a re-evaluation of existing ta riff and reciprocal trade policies
and the imposition of a two-price system for American crops dependent on
an export market. Albert Goss, the National Grange master whose death in
23Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, "Attitudes of
Farmer Organizations Toward International Issues, 1951-1952," July 17,
1952, p. 4, Box 19, Record Group 59, National Archives.
24Roy Battles cover letter for "Fact Sheet of Grange Viewpoints," March
16, 1953, Stover Papers.
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late

1950 opened the door for Herschel Newsom's rise to power,

occasionally advocated outright protective ta riffs ,

and the

Grange

leadership at times recommended modifications in the reciprocal trade
agreements program to lim it the President’s ability to reduce tariffs.25
But the organization's primary complaint with American trade policies was
that they seemed once again to promote the imbalance between the
agricultural and manufacturing communities. "Why is it," Newsom asked in
his annual address of 1952, "that raw products of agriculture come in duty
free whereas, just the minute that any processing occurs. . . it immediately
invites a rather imposing ta riff or protective mechanism?"

"it is high

time," Newsom announced, "to put an end to such grossly unjust trading
policies [that! penalized [farmers] in favor of the non-agricultural workers
of this land. . . ."26 The cornerstone of what the Grange fe lt was a more
equitable approach was a two-price system in which parity prices were
required for that portion of the crop sold in the home market, with the
remaining amount being exported for free market world prices.

Such a

program, the Grange believed, would allow "farmers to sell cheaper abroad
25Department of State, "Attitudes of Farmer Organizations," January
24, 1951, pp. 2 and 11.
26"Address of Worthy Master," 1952, in National Grange of the Patrons
of Husbandry, Journals of the Proceedings of the 84th-87th Annual Sessions
(Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1950-1953), pp. 9-10.
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without breaking the domestic market."27
In addition to being "a good business investment" and "a means of raising
the American standard of living," the pursuit of world markets was also
characterized by the Grange as "an instrument of world peace."

More

specifically, in the Cold War fervor of the late 1940’s and early I950‘s, the
cultivation of export markets was seen as a viable weapon in the fight
against Communism.

Western European nations, Grange officials argued,

"can produce hand and machine made industrial commodities far more
efficiently than they can produce agricultural products . . . .

They must,

therefore, buy from the two great major food exporting areas—namely, the
United States and Canada, or from the area controlled by Russia." To avoid
"strengthenling] the Kremlin both economically and politically," and to
prevent the spread of "a disease that spawns communism," it was important
for the United States to corner the agricultural markets of Europe 28
With the exception of legislative counsel J.T. Sanders' inexplicable 1948
27“Fact Sheet of Grange Viewpoints," p. 3. Other brief explanations of
the two-price system can be found in: “National Master's Address," October
25, 1950, in Journals of Proceedings, p. 18; McCune, Farm Policy, p. 36; and
Wilcox, Social Responsibility, pp. 100-101.
28"Fact Sheet of Grange Viewpoints," p. 1. The view of Communism as a
disease, "a metaphorical virus that threatened to infect the world," has
recently been examined in Geoffrey S. Smith, "National Security and
Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender, and Disease in the Cold-War United States,"
The International History Review XIV (May, 1992), pp. 307-337.
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warning that the United States “should not make the mistake of thinking
that the European recovery program is primarily a means of combating
communism or of promoting our own type of democracy," Grange officials
consistently adopted the Cold War rhetoric of anti-Communism.29
‘ insidious doctrine" and its

"atheism and cruel

The

materialism" were

repeatedly denounced, as were the Communist goals of "rulling] the world,"
of "communizling] all [of] Europe and destroyling] the very freedom for which
we had fought" in the Second World War.3c

Critical of the American

government for following a “coddling policy" that included the "tragic
agreement at Yalta," the Grange insisted that the United States must not
fa il to protect itself against Soviet aggression on the m ilitary, economic,
and moral fronts.31 Its exhortation to "meet force w ith even greater force"
led the Grange occasionally to waver in its opposition to universal m ilitary
te s tim o n y of J.T. Sanders, January 30, 1948, U.S. Congress, Senate,
80th Congress, 2nd Session, European Recovery Program: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, dp. 1121-1122.
30"Address of Albert S. Goss, Master, Before the 82nd Annual Session of
the National Grange, Portland, Maine, November 10, 1948," p. 9, Stover
Papers; "Resume of Agricultural Policy," p. 16; The Grange News. September
2, 1950, p. 1. Other examples of anti-Communist rhetoric can be found in
the Journals of Proceedings for 1950-1952.
31 Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, "Opinions and
Activities of American Private Organizations and Groups," September 18,
1950, p. 1, Box 16, Record Group 59, National Archives; "National Master's
Address," October 25,1950, in Journals of Proceedings, p. 12.
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training, as when Albert Goss uncharacteristically called on "every young
man [to] devote a certain portion of his time In the direct service of his
nation."

In addition, the fear that "propagandists and saboteurs" were

attempting to wreck American democracy from within induced the
suggestion that such "traitors and spies. . . should be dealt with much more
severely than we have been accustomed to deal w ith ordinary criminals."32
The struggle against Communism had particular significance, the Grange
argued, for farmers, both in the United States and throughout the world. The
age old problem of land distribution had allowed Communist proponents to
make great strides in impoverished agricultural communities. With a little
assistance from
underdeveloped

the United
nations

could

States,

Albert

remedy

their

Goss suggested,
economic

woes

these
and

simultaneously avoid Communist Infiltration by following an American
sponsored land redistribution program established "on a much sounder basis
than anything Communism has to offer." The Idea was to "buy up the land In
large holdings and sell to the farmers In small tracts on long term
amortized contracts. The owners could be compensated in long time bonds"
and then given financial aid "to put the capital thus released from land
32Department of State, “Opinions and Activities," September 18, 1950,
p. 1; "National Master's Address," October 25, 1950, in Journals of
Proceedings, p. 13; “Address of Albert S. Goss, November 10, 1948," p. 9.
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holdings into industrial development, such as these backward nations need
so desperately.. . ,“33 What Goss omitted from his argument was that by
encouraging foreign nations to shift their energies away from agriculture
and toward industrial production, the United States would also be creating
the possibility of more overseas markets for American crops.
The anti-Communist rhetoric of Grange officials was accompanied in
these years by a self-righteous insistence on the correctness of the
American position in world affairs and by a chauvinistic determination that
no impediments should hinder U.S. interests.

While openly expressing

support for the United Nations, the Grange pressed for the American right to
pursue its own unilateral agenda. Membership in the U.N., the organization
argued, should neither cancel the American right to declare war nor force it
to act in a manner contrary to its national interest.

In a similar manner,

participation in the International Trade Organization could not preclude the
privilege of the United States to pursue its own trade policies nor tc
“revoke any trade agreement within a reasonable length of time after its
adoption."34
33"Nationa1 Master's Address," October 25,
Proceedings, p. 14.

1950, in Journals of

d e p a rtm e n t of State, "Current Attitudes of Farmer Organizations,"
February 22, 1945, pp. 2 and 5; Department of State, "Opinions and
Activities," December 19, 1947, pp. 4-5; Department of State, "Attitudes of
Farmer Organizations," January 24, 1951, p. 13.
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The Grange position was partially motivated by the belief that large
nations deserved a greater role in world affairs than their less powerful
counterparts. For example, Grange officials favored adjustment of World
Bank regulations "to give those who furnish the most capital greater
control— " The position also reflected the Grange belief that much of the
world had come to expect something for nothing, and that European nations
in particular had failed to provide their citizens with sufficient return for
their labors to allow them successfully to survive in the competitive world
economy. Commenting on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
National Grange Monthly declared, in April, 1949, that what the world
needed was not a statement of rights but a more practical Declaration of
Human Responsibility. With this perspective in mind, the Grange announced
its support of American economic assistance programs only to nations
demonstrating a willingness to help themselves.

In what was surely a

promotion of American self-interest, the organization also demanded that
when the United States furnished assistance "proper publicity be given in
regard to the source of the aid."35
35Department of State, "Current Attitudes of Farmer Organizations,"
February 22, 1945, p. 5; Department of State, "Opinions and Activities,"
April 11, 1949, pp. 1-2, and November 10, 1952, p. 1; Department of State,
"Attitudes of Farmer Organizations," January 24, 1951, p. 8.
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The largest of the national farm organizations, the American Farm
Bureau Federation, shared many of the views of the Grange. Its insistence
on nations making their "just contributions" to United Nations programs
mirrored the Grange position on national responsibility.

Similarly, its

announcement that “individual recipients of any aid should be informed that
this aid came from the United States" echoed the Grange interest in proper
publicity being given to American efforts toward European reconstruction.
Farm Bureau support for the Taft-Hartley Act and for right-to-work laws,
and the organization's opposition to the raising of the minimum wage
likewise put the Farm Bureau in line with the Grange as having what
historian Lowell Dyson called an "adversarial attitude toward organized
labor."36
What the Farm Bureau did not share with the Grange was a legacy as a
proponent of reform.

Bom in

1919 under the sponsorship of the

Binghampton, New York, Chamber of Commerce, the Bureau was "nurtured on
funds from industry and , . . never completely le ft its home and parents."37
^"Resolutions Adopted at the 32nd Annual Convention of the American
Farm Bureau Federation, Dallas, Texas, December 14, 1950," p. 7, Box 1
(Agriculture Committee), Folder “American Farm Bureau Federation 19501951," Bourke B. Hickenlooper Papers, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch,
lowa; Testimony of Allan Kline, January 30, 1948, European Recovery
Program, pp. 1115-1116; Dyson, Farmers1Organizations, p. 22.
3?McCune, Farm Policy, p. 15.
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Its 1950 membership of approximately 1.5 million, most of whom resided in
the South and Midwest, included a large number of non-farmers, and its
policy positions clearly indicated a preference for preservation of large
commercial farmers over their less advantaged contemporaries. Mistakenly
characterized by one 1950 commentator as "the unpredictable middle"38 of
the agrarian organizations, the Farm Bureau in fact was neither middle of
the road nor unpredictable.

It was perhaps not as callous as the New

Republic suggested when it accused the organization of disdainfully
dismissing poor farmers as bringing on their own poverty out of sheer
laziness. But the 1949 argument of its national president that "a relatively
few people [should] produce the necessary food" of the nation was typical of
the Bureau’s belief that there were too many farmers in America and that
those not up to the task of producing for a commercial market should be
encouraged to seek employment elsewhere.39
Although it had arrived at its position by a more direct route than that
taken by the Grange, the Farm Bureau shared with the older organization a
distrust of government intervention in the nation’s economy.

That

government agencies, including the Agriculture Department, should attempt
38R.B. Held, "Our Farm Organizations," p. 10.
39Helen Fuller, "Who Speaks for the Farmers," New Republic CVI
(February 23, 1942), p. 267; Allan Kline quoted in McCune, Farm Policy, p. 21.
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to subvert the "natural" role of farm organizations in the formation of
agricultural policy was a particularly vexing situation that the Farm Bureau
believed could only result in disaster for the nation's farmers.

It would

mean, the Farm Bureau argued, "deciding on a political rather than economic
basis the production pattern of American agriculture."40
Much of the Farm Bureau's anti-government sentiment was a result of its
displeasure with what it termed the "socialistic intents and purposes"41 of
New Deal programs such as the Farm Security Administration. Farm Bureau
president Edward O'Neal had taken the lead in opposing the F.S.A. in the early
1940's, but it was his successor who made the fight against a "regulated
economy" one of the major rallying points for the Bureau's membership.
Former Iowa Farm Bureau president Allan Kline, who succeeded O'Neal in
1947, was accurately described in a flattering 1955 biographical sketch as
an "evangelist of free enterprise" who openly embraced the nineteenth
century liberal creed that "there was no God other than Adam Smith whose
te s tim o n y of Allan Kline, April 18, 1952, U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd
Congress, 2nd Session, Farm Price Supports and Production Goals: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, p.
185. Other examples of the Farm Bureau's anti-government attitude can be
found in the American Farm Bureau Federation O fficial Newsletter. August
6, 1951, p. 2, and December 24, 1951, p. 1, and in E. Howard H ill, Talk to
Chamber of Commerce Secretaries, January 22, 1951, Bex 9, Folder 6, E.
Howard Hill Papers, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.
4 'Orville Merton Kile, The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades
(Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1948), p. 270.
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prophet was John Stuart Mill. . . ,“42 Under Kline's leadership, the Farm
Bureau zealously argued that the avenue for American success lay on the
road of unrestrained capitalism and that "governmental paternalism leads to
economic stagnation."43
Farm Bureau disapproval of a government-directed agricultural policy led
to a public feud between Kline and Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan.
The Secretary's family farm review and his Brannan Plan for agriculture,
programs th3t continued and even expanded government involvement in farm
planning, were condemned for leading the American farmer toward a status
as "a peasant dependent upon the government’s largesse.*44

After

appearing with Kline in a "mud-slinging" debate in Des Moines in February of
1950, Secretary Brannan accused the Farm Bureau leader of directing
"vicious personal attacks" against both the Department of Agriculture and
himself. Kline, who rumor had it was a leading candidate for Secretary of
Agriculture had the Republicans won the presidency in 1948, denied the
accusations as "truly remarkable."45
42Victor L. Albjera, "Allan Blair Kline: The Farm Bureau, 1955," Current
History XXVI11 (June, 1955), p. 362.
43Test1mony of Allan Kline, April 18, 1952,
170.

Farm Price Supports, p.

^ o o s ie r Farmer. September, 1951, p. 7.
^ “The Controversial Mr. Kline," Iowan I (October-November, 1952), p.
20: American Farm Bureau Federation O fficial Newsletter. March 17, 1952,
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When it was not engaging in verbal sparring, the Farm Bureau focused
much of its energies in the immediate postwar years on opposing the
continuation of government imposed price controls. Although the group had
supported such measures as a wartime necessity, with the arrival of peace
they were denounced as "an economic narcotic"46 and linked with a host of
societal ills. Kline told the Senate in 1951 that "continued price controls
w ill lead to a breakdown of respect for the law, and a consequent breakdown
in public morality." They would also, he concluded, create an "economic base
for the support of a new criminal group" whose livelihood would be
established through the inevitable development of black markets.47
Writing to Iowa Senator Bourke Hickenlooper in early 1951, Kline placed his
argument in a broader perspective with the charge that economic controls
had "more in common with totalitarian principles than with the principles
p. 1; Charles Brannan to Allan Kline, September 23, 1950, Box 1, Folder
"Kline, Allan D.,“ Papers of Wesley McCune, Truman Library; Allan Kline to
Charles Brannan, September 29, 1950, Box 155, Folder 2, President’s
Secretary’s Files (Subject File: Cabinet, Agriculture), Truman Library. The
papers of McCune, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, are
filled with numerous examples of angry correspondence between Brannan
and Kline.
^Testimony of Allan Kline, April 18, 1952,
199.

Farm Price Supports, p.

^Testimony of Allan Kline, May 25, 1951, U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd
Congress, 1st Session, Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951:
Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, p. 1757.
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which support our free American system."48
The warning against totalitarianism was one aspect of the intense Farm
Bureau interest in international affairs. While almost always viewing the
world scene from the same perspective as that of the Grange, the Farm
Bureau consistently overshadowed the older organization in the intensity
and persistence of its argument. As the nation's largest farm organization,
with its own Department of International Affairs, the Bureau devoted great
amounts of time and print to the state of the world. Multi-part editorials
by John C. Lynn and Gwynn Garnett entitled, respectively, "The Struggle for
Peace" and "Our Stake in Foreign Affairs" were but two examples of this
concern for world events.49
Farm Bureau pronouncements on American foreign policy reflected the
organization's insistence on joining economic and national

security

interests. “U.S. foreign policy objectives," the Bureau's annual convention of
1951 announced:
should be to help maintain freedom in the world, to improve the
economic well being of nations, to build adequate m ilitary defense in
cooperation with friendly nations, to expand production and individual
opportunity in friendly cooperating nations, and to accomplish these
purposes without impairing the stability of the U.S. economy or its
^ A lla n B. Kline to Bourke B. Hickenlooper, January 5, 1951, Box 1
(Agriculture Committee), Folder "American Farm Bureau Federation 19501951," Hickenlooper Papers.
^Am erican Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. October 9 November20, 1950, and February 19-March 19, 1951.
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free institutions.50
A history of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation's firs t fifty years spoke in the
same terms. “The organization has advocated," the group’s secretary and
treasurer wrote, “intelligent United States involvement in world affairs and
acceptance of a responsibility

to assist other nations

in helping

themselves."51
The Farm Bureau perspective on American foreign policy contained the
same elements of activist involvement and anti-Soviet rhetoric evident in
the position of the Grange. Rejecting both isolationism and appeasement,
the Bureau instead demonstrated a preference for a policy of collective
security pursued through the workings of the United Nations.

Calling the

earlier demise of the League of Nations “one of the great tragedies of our
time," the Bureau vowed “that no such failure w ill come to [the] U.N."52
Support for the United Nations, however, was tempered by the suspicion that
even as late as 1949 it was not yet strong enough to be completely trusted
with the preservation of world peace. As a result, the Bureau stressed the
50The Nation’s Agriculture XXVII (February, 1952), p. 9.
51 Donald B. Groves and Kenneth Thatcher, The First Fiftv: History of the
Farm Bureau in Iowa (Lake Mills, Iowa: Graphic Publishing Company, Inc.,
1968), p. 227.
52Gordon H. Allen, "Washington Ringside," September 18, 1950, Box 1
(Agriculture Committee), Folder “American Farm Bureau Federation 19501951," Hickenlooper Papers.
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necessity for regional collective security arrangements and argued that
until the U.N. was more equipped to handle such tasks that relief and other
programs were best le ft to the efforts of national governments, particularly
the United States, more experienced in the field.53
In addition to being impeded by its youth, the United Nations was also
crippled, the F3rm Bureau argued, by the uncooperative and self-centered
attitude of the Soviet Union. Matching the Grange's anti-Soviet rhetoric,
Allan Kline charged that the "completely ruthless . . . materialists and
atheists" running the Soviet Union had deliberately blocked U.N. actions in
order to further their goal of unilaterally ruling the world.54

Using

apocalyptic terms eerily resembling the language of NSC-68, President
53A sampling of the Farm Bureau position on the U.N. and collective
security would include: Farm Bureau annual resolutions printed in the
American Farm Bureau Federation O fficial Newsletter. December 25, 1950,
pp. 3-5, and December 24, 1951, pp. 1-3; “Farm Bureau Asks Stronger U.N.,"
Wallace’s Farmer and Iowa Homestead. December 16, 1950, p. 12; "Give Us
Chance to Produce," Wallace's Farmer and Iowa Homestead. January 6, 1951,
p. 18: Ohio Farm Bureau Advisory Council Guide. V III (December, 1950), n.p.;
Testimony of Allan Kline, February 5, 1948, U.S. Congress, House, 80th
Congress, 2nd Session, United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War
Recovery Program: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, p.
941; Testimony of Allan Kline, May 6, 1949, U.S. Congress, Senate, 81st
Congress, 1st Session, North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 575-576; and Department of State,
"Opinions and Activities," April 11, 1947, p. 3.

54American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. October 9,
1950, p. 1.
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Truman’s April 1950 in-house reassessment of American foreign policy,
Gwynn Garnett spoke of the division "between the free world and the slave."
The characterization was repeated in Farm Bureau resolutions in 1950,
when the organization proclaimed that there were "two great forces at work
in the battle for the minds of men," and again in 1951 with the proclamation
that the United States was "one of the few remaining strongholds of free
people."55 While duplicating the language of NSC-68, Bureau officials also
showed their approval for what became known as the domino theory. As part
of his "Our Stake in Foreign Affairs" series, Gwynn Garnett in February of
1951 published a table showing what percentage and which specific areas of
the world fell into the categories of "Communist dominated," "Communist
threatened," "softening up," and 'hard-core freedom loving capitalists."56
The last group, much to Garnett’s displeasure, contained, he said, only ten
percent of the world.
Communist expansion made it necessary, John Lynn argued in his
November, 1950, editorial, "The Struggle for Peace," for the United States to
"send abroad our supplies to help defend democracy." This was particularly
true in Asia, he wrote, an area of the world once provided a ‘measure of
55American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. March 19,
1951, p. 2, December 25,1950, p. 3, and December 24, 1951, p. 1.
^Am erican Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. February 26,
1951, p. 2.
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security" through the beneficial existence of the Imperial System.

With

that system now "suspended," the newly independent nations of Asia were
ripe targets for Communist reminders that western colonial powers had
imposed their control on the region not to assist the Asian peoples but to
benefit themselves through exploitation.

It would take some time, Lynn

suggested, but it was crucial that Asia "shift, mental gears and see in the
west a protector, and in the Soviet Union a threat." The opportunity to begin
this process presented itself with the situation in Indochina, where Lynn
applauded the decision of the United States to follow through on its promise
of furnishing "military equipment and supplies for the French forces" aiding
that nation in its struggle with Communism.57
While Lynn and other Farm Bureau figures spoke of supporting the
"world-wide defense of freedom, democracy, [and] the dignity of man" as
some holy crusade against Communist imperialism,58 what they were most
concerned with was the preservation of a capitalist world order. Following
the lead of its "evangelist of free enterprise," Allan Kline, the Farm Bureau
57American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. November 13,
1950, p. 2. Indicating either a lack of geographical knowledge or the
ascendancy of passion over fact, Lynn mistakenly interchanged "Indochina"
and "Indonesia," treating the two as if they were one.
58American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. December 25,
1950, p. 3.
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extolled the virtues of American capitalism and maintained that, “The
United States must demonstrate to the world that a dynamic, expanding,
competitive capitalism is the true way to the more abundant life that
thoughtful people everywhere are seeking."59
For farmers, the Bureau insisted, this dynamic capitalism rested upon
the expansion of overseas markets.

While the Grange had touted the

expansion of foreign markets for American agriculture as a main priority,
that organization's most avid spokesmen could not come close in matching
the intensity w ith which Farm Bureau representatives hammered away at
the significance of foreign markets for American crops.

It was one topic

that consistently appeared in Farm Bureau testimony before Congress and in
the organization's annual resolutions. And each time the argument appeared,
It was phrased in the Cold War terminology that saw the struggle for
markets as an adjunct of the capitalist-communist struggle for "the minds
of men."
Although in its concern over the fate of Indochina the Farm Bureau had
expressed an interest in the future of Asia, it was most concerned with the
effect American policies would have on the ability of American farmers to
sell their crops in Europe. Discussing American plans for post-war recovery
^American Farm Bureau Federation O fficial Newsletter. December 22,
1952, p. 2.
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with the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1948, Allan Kline spoke of
"maintaining permanent markets in Europe which would prove very
beneficial to American agriculture."60 The problem with preserving these
markets, Kline and other Farm Bureau officials continually pointed out, was
that “unless our foreign aid program is geared to meet the needs of our
allies, they'll be forced to turn to Communist dominated countries for the
necessities of life."61
By the early

1950’s, the Bureau was convinced that misdirected

American policies, specifically the Mutual Security Act, had allowed this
disastrous scenario to take shape.

Instead of fulfillin g Europe's primary

need by focusing on exports of foodstuffs, the mutual security program
emphasized the shipment of m ilitary and industrial goods. Europeans were
then forced, Kline told the Senate in

1952, "to supplement their

requirements for . . . foods and raw materials by exchanging industrial
products and critical materials with iron-curtain countries." Citing British
purchases from the Soviet Union of 11 million bushels of com, 16 million
bushels of barley, 2.8 million bushels of oats, and 7.4 million bushels of
60Testimony of Allan Kline, February 5, 1948, United States Foreign
Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, p. 943.
61 Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," November 10, 1952,
p. 1.
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wheat, Kline criticized the mutual security program as having been written
"without regard t o . . . essential international relations" and as dealing with
"mutual security as though it were primarily a m ilitary operation. . . ."62
Adding that British purchases of American wheat had dropped from 34
percent of her total in 1951 to 11 percent of her total in 1952, Gwynn
Garnett agreed with Kline that continuation of the program would allow the
Soviets "to gnaw away at Western European trade and steal the U.S. farm
market bit by bit."63
The Farm Bureau's assessment of America's reciprocal trade policies
was more positive.

Noting that during the life of the Reciprocal Trade

Agreements Act the value of American agricultural exports had climbed
from $670 million to $4 billion, the Bureau praised the program for enabling
friendly nations to sell their products to the United States and thereby earn
dollars to buy American goods.

The only criticism of the program was

directed not toward the government but toward U.S. businesses that balked
at increasing their purchases of foreign products. To successfully export,
the Farm Bureau argued, a nation must also be w illing to import, and the
62Testimony of Allan Kline, March 23, 1952, U.S. Congress, Senate,
82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Mutual Security Act of 1952: Hearings Before
thfiiQMDmttteg on Foreign Relations, p. 442.
^American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. Novmber 24,
1952, p. 2.
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sacrifices must be shared by both the agricultural and non-agricultural
segments of the economy.64
Whether they were criticizing the mutual security program, praising
reciprocal trade, or even discussing an issue only marginally related to the
concerns of most farmers, Farm Bureau officials never strayed far from
their Cold War concerns about competition with the Soviet Union. When it
was suggested in 1951 that long-standing ta riff concessions regulating the
importation of Swiss watches be dropped, the Bureau protested not only
because Americans presumably enjoyed the craftsmanship of precision
instruments, but also because withdrawal

of

the concessions, the

organization told the U.S. Tariff Commission, “might force Switzerland to
turn to the Iron Curtain countries for a m arket... .“65 This obsession with
Soviet competition, an obsession that to a lesser degree was shared by the
Grange, was typical of a large segment of American society in the early
years of the Cold War. Viewing the Communist philosophy as a threat to the
American way of life, most Americans reacted in a predictably antagonistic
fashion by lashing out at the perceived enemy.
64American Farm Bureau Federation O fficial Newsletter. December 25,
1950, p. 4, September 29,1952, p. 2, and October 6,1952, p. 3; Testimony of
John C. Lynn, January 24, 1951, U.S. Congress, House, 82nd Congress, 1st
Session, ExtenslQn..Qf t he Redm:ocaLIrafle Agces/nents Act; Hear ing, Before
thgXomrnltte.iffl3J^S-amlJ3.feaDs, pp. f 5 i - i 6 9 .
^Department of State, "Opinions and A c tivitie s / June 11, 1951, p. 1.
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The last of the nation's major farm organizations, the National Farmers
Union, stood alone in rejecting this Cold War mentality. Since its birth in
Texas in 1902, the Farmers Union had supported the efforts of America's
smaller farmers to improve their lifestyles and simultaneously had opposed
what it viewed as a dangerous trend toward corporate domination of
American life.

Its compassion for the less privileged gave the Farmers

Union a different perspective on world events. In recognizing moreso than
most Americans the complexities of Communism, the Farmers Union moved
beyond a knee-jerk reaction to the Soviet Union as a monolithic threat to
national security.

In rejecting the primacy of corporate expansion, the

Farmers Union also questioned the existence of a Soviet threat to the
American economy.
Arguing for cooperation over confrontation, the Farmers Union favored
friendly collaboration among the world's leading powers, immediate support
for the efforts of the United Nations, and avoidance of any unilateral
activity that either by-passed the U.N. or sought to further national selfinterest at the expense of international harmony. National president James
G. Patton viewed the immediate post-war years as a time for the United
States to 'assume a sound, constructive, realistic and cooperative role in
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shaping the future of the entire world." Such a role included an essential
understanding with the Soviet Union and a rejection of "an arms-length
attitude of fear, suspicion and fatal hesitation toward our allies and the
people we are pledged to liberate."66 Speaking to the annual convention of
the South Dakota Farmers Union in the fa ll of 1945, Patton argued for an
approach to international affairs in which Americans:
learn to live in a peace based on patience, tolerance and understanding
of the peoples who do not speak our language, who do not use our form
of government and whose concepts are predicated upon centuries of
economic, social and political backgrounds widely different from
ours. Specifically, we must learn to live in this world w ith the great
country of Russia. We simply must come to understand how Russian
people think, why they do what they do, and then guide our foreign
policy in terms of a firm position but with determination to co
operate to live in peace.67
The Farmers Union role as Cold War critic was in many ways paradoxical.
In the firs t place, its membership of 500,000 was by the end of World War II
no longer centered as it was in its earliest days in the South. Instead, the
organization's strength by 1945 resided in the Plains states, with
Wisconsin, the Dakotas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma leading the way. With its
membership focused in this wheat-producing region, and with wheat ranking
high on the lis t of America's agricultural exports, one would expect it to be
66James 6. Patton, "The Federal Government's Role in the Postwar
Economy." American Political Science Review xxxvm (December, 1944), p.
1126; National Farmers Union, "Abundance, Freedom, Peace, or Scarcity,
Want, World War Three," 1944 pamphlet, Stover Papers.
&7National Union Farmer. October 15, 1945, p. 5.
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the Farmers Union, and not the com belt-centered Farm Bureau, pushing for
expansion of overseas markets. Such, however, was not the case.
A second seeming contradiction was the disparity between the
organization's original 1902 insistence that "dabbling in politics dissipates
farm movements"68 and its active participation in the post-war period in a
host of politically-charged issues that the Farm Bureau and National Grange
insisted on avoiding. The scope of the Farmers Union interest in all manner
of issues, and the comparative lack of involvement by the Grange and the
Farm Bureau, was highlighted in a 1947 State Department study of "Current
Leadership Opinion on Major Foreign Policy Issues."

Noting the Farmers

Union as the sole agrarian organization represented in the study, the authors
explained that the other two groups were not included ‘because they have
not taken a stand on most of the issues examined. They largely confine their
expressions of opinion to issues more directly connected with their special
fields of interest." A similar study four years later concluded that of the
nation's major agricultural organizations the Farmers Union demonstrated
"the widest range of interest and the greatest inclination to express itself
on humanitarian causes not particularly of interest to farmers."69

This

68John A. Crampton, The National Farmers Union: Ideology of a Pressure
Group (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 77.
^Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, “Current
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diversity of interests caused one contemporary observer to criticize the
Farmers Union for "scattering] its energies on too many nonagricultural
matters."70 In truth, however, the breadth of the organization’s concerns
was one of its most impressive strengths.

It also showed how far the

organization had come from its original rejection of political involvement.
The role of the Farmers Union as Cold War critic was equally remarkable
because of the organization’s lengthy history of internal squabbling. Early
bickering over the predominance of the Texas group in leadership roles was
followed in subsequent years by intense disputes over the issues of
expanded political activity, organizatonal membership for non-farmers, and
opposition by some particularly vocal factions to the policies of the New
Deal. The occasional intensity of these internal debates led Jim Patton to
characterize one four-year period in the organization's history as an "Irish
Picnic" in which "everybody grabbed a shillala and hit the firs t person he
could see."71
Leadership Opinion on Major Foreign Policy Issues, June 4, 1947, p. 3, Box
19, Record Group 59, National Archives; Department of State, "Attitudes of
Farmer Organizations," January 24, 1951, p. 2.
70William P. Tucker, "Populism Up-to-Date: The Story of the Farmers
Union," Agricultural History XXI (October, 1947), p. 208.
71 Quoted in Charles H. Livermore, “James G. Patton: Nineteenth-Century
Populist, Twentieth-Century Organizer, Twenty-First Century Visionary,"
PhD dissertation, University of Denver, 1976, p. 15. The early internal
disputes are also dealt with in Tucker, “Populism Up-to-Date," pp. 198-208,
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That such a raucously divided, supposedly non-political organization of
primarily wheat producing farmers would play a role as one of the leading
critics of U.S. foreign policy was the result of both an activist leadership
and an impressive dedication to principle. Jim Patton’s election to the
national presidency in 1940, and the elevation to power of such significant
state figures as North Dakota's Glenn Talbott and Iowa's Fred Stover,
heralded the beginning of a more united and more politically motivated
organization. Acknowledging their allegiance to the domestic policies of
Franklin Roosevelt, this new leadership turned away from internal bickering
and instead focused much of their criticism on what they perceived as the
Farm

Bureau's dangerous advocacy

of

big

business.

The

"moral

disintegration of the Farm Bureau leadership," could be seen, Stover's Iowa
Union Farmer charged in 1946, in President Allan Kline’s announcement that
"there are too many farmers" in America. Suggesting that "the Farm Bureau
is in reality a subsidiary of the National Association of Manufacturers," the
Iowa paper in 1951 cited the late Senator George Norris's observation that,
“The time w ill come when the rank and file of American farmers w ill
realize by whom they are being deceived."

For their part, Farm Bureau

leaders were equally critical of the Farmers Union, characterizing it as a
and in Dyson, Farmers’ Organizations, pp. 224-225.
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"radical vocal minority" unfit to speak for the nation’s farmers.72
The animosity between the Farmers Union and the Farm Bureau was a
reflection of the organizations’ contrasting memberships as well as their
opposing visions for America's future.

Representing the interests of the

nation’s larger, corporate-oriented farmers, the Farm Bureau envisioned an
active American role in the world economy led by the most powerful
elements of American society. Advocating a Darwinian view of competition,
the Farm Bureau championed a corporate-agrarian partnership that actively
sought a dominant position both on the homefront as well as in the wider
field of world affairs. Those smaller farmers less able to compete were
encouraged to pursue other means of making a living, and those nations
intent on challenging American economic supremacy were sim ilarly warned
to step aside.
Farmers Union officials rejected the "capitalistic survival of the fittest"
as leading to "survival of the greediest,"73 and envisioned a more
72lowa Union Farmer. May 11, 1946, p. 1, and January, 1951, p. 4; E.
Howard Hill address to the Winneshiek County Farm Service Company,
December 20,1951, p. 5, Box 9, Folder 6, Hill Papers.
73F.W. Stover, "What Kind of a Future Farm Program Do We Want?" April
15, 1937 radio address, p. 4, Stover Papers. Besides demonstrating a
knowledge of Darwinian theory, the address* reference to the "frontier as a
safety valve" also showed a working knowledge of the theories of historian
Frederick Jackson Turner. National president Jim Patton demonstrated a
sim ilar fam iliarity with Turner with his 1942 observation that some
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cooperative world, both at home and abroad. Unlike the Grange, which had
abandoned its populist ideology, the Farmers Union took seriously its role as
spokesman for the underdog. The first sentence of the organization’s March,
1952, "Golden Jubilee"

issue of

the National

Union Farmer spoke

disparagingly of the "robber barons" of the nineteenth century, and the
paragraphs immediately following reminded readers of Farmers Union ties
to the Greenback Movement, the Silver Movement, the Populist Party, the
Farmers Alliance, and William Jennings Bryan.74 As an advocate more for
the nation’s workers than for its corporate directors, the Farmers Union
stood alone in arguing for a close relationship between America’s farmers
and its industrial workers. Opposition to the Taft-Hartley Act and active
support for what John Crampton called "the Union’s major postwar ideologic
victory,"75 the 1946 passage of the Full Employment Act, demonstrated
how in the area of farmer-labor relations the Farmers Union once again
stood apart from both the Bureau and the Grange.
This cooperative mentality revealed itself in the Farmers Union position
on foreign affairs through the organization’s principled insistence that
inequalities in American life were the result of "running out of the
frontier." (James G. Patton, "Again the Call is for Pioneers," commencement
address at Western State College, Gunnison, Colorado, June 5, 1942, p. 4.)
7%aIlflPaLUnM].FJCmer, March, 1952, p. 19.
75Crampton, Ideology of a Pressure Group, p. 184.
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world peace was a more important consideration than extension of American
markets. Rejecting the Farm Bureau plea that the Soviet Union represented
a genuine threat to America's economic stability, Farmers Union leaders
argued that a policy of abundant production allowed sufficient markets for
all nations.

There was no need, Jim Patton and other Farmers Union

officials insisted, for the world to be divided into ideological spheres of
influence controlled by military, political, and economic antagonists.

It

was also unnecessary, the organization argued, for the United States to
unilaterally impose its will upon the world, or for American business
interests to so dominate the life of the nation that farmers and other
laborers were left behind in their quest for economic equality.
Unfortunately for the Farmers Union, the appeals for international
cooperation and abundance for all attracted little support. As the Cold War
intensified, the nationalistic and self-interested arguments of the Grange
and the Farm Bureau more typically represented the thinking of the nation.
The Farmers Union nevertheless persisted in its views and, until the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, served as one of the few voices of
dissent from the Cold War rhetoric that swept the United States.
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Chapter Two
Protesting U n ilateralism

Franklin Roosevelt's April, 1945, death left the formation of America's
postwar foreign policy in the hands of Harry Truman.
unexpected elevation to power, but rejecting what

Awed by his
surely was an

understandable tendency to hesitate, the new President instantly declared
one of his primary goals for the immediate future. "We must," Truman told
his secretary of state, “stand up to the Russians."1 In the first two years
of the Truman administration, this desire for a tough policy contributed to
U.S. strengthening of Chiang Kai-shek's regime in China, American efforts to
retain exclusive control over atomic weapons, the sending of naval forces to
patrol the Mediterranean, a showdown with the Soviets over Iran, and
President Truman's quasi-official support for Winston Churchill's "iron
curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. Between 1947 and 1950, years marked
by Truman's growing confidence as President, it also led to the enunciation
of the Truman Doctrine, Secretary of State George Marshall's European

1Quoted in Walter LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 19451984. fifth edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 16.
42
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Recovery Program, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the NSC-68 re-evaluation of U.S. foreign policy, and the sending of U.S.
troops to Korea. All of these programs, from the ill-defined steps of 19451946 to the more focused measures of 1947-1950, were said by the
President to be necessary to lim it Soviet communist expansion.
The rationale for American policy was offered by career diplomat George
F. Kennan, who in a July, 1947, article in Foreign Affairs called for the
"containment" of the Soviet Union through the "adroit and vigilant
application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical
and political points."2

Kennan’s analysis of Soviet expansion and his

suggestion of containment as an appropriate response became the hallmark
of a U.S. policy determined to see the world in dichotomous terms.

The

Soviet Union, which through the course of four years had fought side by side
with American forces in the effort to defeat totalitarianism, now became
the enemy in a world of black and white, of good and evil.

As the chief

defender of democratic principles, the United States, so Truman argued,
carried the weighty responsibility of protecting the world against the new
terror of Soviet Communist expansion.
While Truman’s "get tough" attitude toward the Soviet Union received
2"The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs XXV (July, 1947), p.
576.
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broad support, the National Farmers Union was unconvinced of the necessity
for containment.

It viewed administration actions as driven less by the

desire to impede Soviet expansion and more by Truman’s eagerness to
establish what Henry Luce had termed an “American Century." The Farmers
Union rejected the dtchotomous world view offered by President Truman and
supported instead a world of international cooperation whose cornerstone
was an effectively functioning United Nations.

Expressing a faith In

International cooperation that occasionally Included calls for constitutional
world government, the Farmers Union took the lead in championing the work
of the United Nations and in criticizing activities that it felt by-passed the
organization.

The Farmers Union executive committee echoed this

sentiment when in late 1946 it informed the State Department of its belief
that, "Any attempt on the part of single nations to handle relief and
displaced persons w ill not be effective and w ill create additional strains
between members of United Nations."3

In the same month, the Montana

division of the Farmers Union urged the United States government to cease
unilateral military activities by withdrawing American troops "In India and
China, and other foreign countries not under the jurisdiction of the U.S. army
•^Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," December 6, 1946, p.
4.
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of occupation."4

Farmers Union faith in United Nations action, and the

manner in which it differed on this topic from the other farm organizations,
was evident in the state Department’s evaluation that:
The Farmers Union has tended to favor action through the U.N. instead
M. reliance on paramount U.S. military power, whereas the others,
particularly the Farm Bureau Federation, tended to favor action
through the U.N. along with maintenance of strong U.S. military
power.5
Such an approach to foreign affairs prompted the State Department to
categorize the Farmers Union as "liberals" and as “internationalists seeking
to minimize use of power."

In the government's view, this placed the

organization in the company of the Chicago Sun. PM. the Raleigh News and
Observer, the New Republic, the C.I.O., the League of Women Voters, and
Henry Wallace.6
Farmers Union opposition to Truman's policies had not begun with the
President’s first day in office. In fact, although devastated by the death of
Franklin Roosevelt, Jim Patton had taken the time to urge Americans "to
rally behind President Truman."7 On at least two occasions in early 1946,
the Farmers Union did just that.

At its annual convention in March, the

department of State, "Opinions and Activities," November 22, 1946,
p. 3.
department of State, "Attitudes of Farmer Organizations," January
24, 1951, p. 5.
department of State, "Current Leadership Opinion," June 4, 1947, p. 3.
National Union Farmer. April 15, 1945, p. 4.
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organization openly supported the President’s plan for a post-war loan to
Great Britain. Noting that the British had for years provided "an important
market for agricultural exports," the Farmers Union favored the $3.75
billion loan as of "immediate self-interest" to farmers. Jim Patton even
worked closely with the State Department in responding to the charge that
the loan actually gave England "tremendous advantages over American
business."8
In that same month, the Farmers Union once again showed a willingness
to cooperate with President Truman when it remained silent following
Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri.

While the

liberal Christian Century led widespread media criticism of the speech by
noting that, "not even Hitler in the days of his power resorted to more naked
military warnings than Churchill thundered forth in his Missouri speech,"
and while a joint Senatorial statement criticized the British leader for
attempting to "cut the throat of the United Nations,"9 the Farmers Union
spokesmen chose to keep to themselves whatever criticisms they may have
8Natlonal Union Farmer. April 15, 1946, p. 1 of “program section;"
James G. Patton to William Benton, May 14, 1946, 811.50/5-446, Box 4834,
Record Group 59 (Department of State Decimal File 1945-1949), National
Archives.
9"0n Talking Tough," Christian Century LXIII (March 20, 1946), p. 358;
New York Times. March 7, 1946, p. 1
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had.
The “rally behind President Truman" ended quickly, however, and by mid1946 whatever honeymoon had existed between the National Farmers Union
and President Truman was over. When the President lashed out at striking
railroad workers, threatening to draft them Into the military if they
continued thetr boycotts, Patton was enraged. Hearing of the events at home
while attending an international farm organization conference in London,
Patton called the incident "a shameful hour in American history" and
characterized Truman’s actions as "naked, open fascism."

Repeating the

Christian Century’s earlier analogy, the Farmers Union leader bitingly noted
that, "Hitler himself also confiscated business profits when it was
expedient to do so." Later, In a report to the National Farmers Union board
of directors, Patton charged that the President's "long step toward fascism"
was "the sign of a very weak man." On his return to the United States,
Patton ordered a drastic reduction In the size of the organization’s offices
in Washington, D.C. The reason, he argued, was that the Farmers Union had
"lost confidence" in the direction of the administration.

A conciliatory

meeting between Patton and Truman in July did little to heal the growing
differences between the President and the Farmers Union.10
10 lowa Union Farmer. June 8, 1946, p. 3, July 13, 1946, p. I, and July 27,
1946, pp. 1-2; Alonzo Hamby, Bevond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and
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While the rift involved both domestic policy and foreign affairs, the
latter took center stage following Truman's firs t year in office.

One

particularly volatile area of disagreement was atomic energy, where the
Farmers Union was intent on expanding consideration of peaceful uses and
minimizing, even eliminating, military applications. Jim Patton's call for
the free availability of atomic research information to all the people of the
world was reflected in his praise for One World or None, a 1946 work
written by seventeen well-respected leaders in the fields of science,
journalism, and military affairs. Recognized by Newsweek as “an important
challenge. . . to abolish war if the world is to survive," the book included a
chapter by Walter Lippmann that argued for the necessity of a world state
developed out of the framework of the United Nations.

Lippmann's

statement combined with commentaries by physicists J.R. Oppenheimer,
Albert Einstein, and Niels Bohr to inform the world “that only through world
government and the abolishment of national sovereignty can we control
atomic energy...."

In mailing copies of the work to his state presidents,

Patton praised the publication as “the best thing which has been done to
American Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 75-6;
Curtis D. MacDougall, Gideon's Army (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1965),
p. 608; "Report of James G. Patton, President, to the Board of Directors,"
June 28, 1946, Box 57, Folder "National Farmers Union 1946," Jackson
Papers.
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date on atomic energy “11

His views became part of the Union’s 1946

program when the convention asked the U.S. government

"to stop the

manufacture of atomic bombs immediately, and to offer to dismantle the
bombs already made." It was only by taking this step, the Farmers Union
statement continued, that "the United States [could] convince other nations
of our good faith, and thereby halt an international race in fabrication of
atomic bombs." Patton's attendance at a University of Chicago conference
on atomic energy held in late 1946, reinforced his belief that "there must
be a great movement gotten underway for complete disarmament, right down
to pistols."12
The Farmers Union approach to the question of atomic power was
markedly different from the Truman administration’s design presented to
the United Nations by Bernard Baruch in m id-1946. More concerned with the
military applications of atomic energy than with its peaceful uses,
Baruch's plan sought American control over further development of atomic
11 National Union Farmer. October 15, 1945, p. 5; Newsweek XXVII (April
1, 1946), pp. 93-94; Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, eds.. One World or
None;_A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the. Atomic Bomb, with
April 16,1946, cover letter from Jim Patton, Stover Papers.
1National Union Farmer. April 15, 1946, p. 1 of "program section;"
"Statement of James 6. Patton Before Executive Committee of National
Board of Directors, National Farmers Union," December 17, 1946, Box 2,
Folder "National Farmers Union Board of Directors 1946-1948," Farmers
Union of the New York Milk Shed Records 1939-1957, Collection *1858,
Cornell University Library.
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resources, and led to a unilateral American approach when the soviet Union,
not surprisingly, rejected the Baruch proposal.

The administration's

attitude prompted one Farmers Union leader, Northeastern Division
president Archie Wright, to lament the future possibilities for his children,
possibilities that he saw as ‘gamma ray poisoning, at worst, or at best, the
prospect of having to bring down their meat with bows and arrows. That
interests me a lot more," he concluded, "than stories about the terrible
Russians."13
President Truman's treatment of Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace
following Wallace's "The Way to Peace" speech in New York City on
September 12, 1946, sealed the divisions between the Farmers Union and
the President.

The former secretary of agriculture and vice president

openly challenged the "get tough" policies of President Truman and
Secretary of State James Byrnes by calling for mutual cooperation with the
Soviet Union and for concessions on the part of both nations to guarantee a
world of friendly competition. He further called for limitations on military
expenditures and for sole possession of atomic bombs In the hands of the
^W alter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at
Home and Abroad Since 1750 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989), pp.
447-448; Archie Wright to Clarence Kilbum, February 22, 1950, Box 2,
Folder "Clarence Kilbum 1948-1956," New York Milk Shed Records.
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United Nations.

His call for an international system ‘based on moral

principles and not on the Machiavellian principles of deceit, force and
distrust" led to demands for his resignation from Senators Arthur
Vandenberg and Tom Connally, to angry reactions from

administration

figures James Forrestal, James Byrnes, and George Kennan, and to heated
media criticism that Wallace was suggesting a return to the "repulsive"
concept of appeasement that could not possibly work with a Soviet nation
addicted to a “messianic psychology." The widespread negative reaction led
to Wallace's forced resignation eight days after the speech.14
Wallace's statements had been sponsored in part by the National Citizens
Political Action Committee, an organization born in June of 1944, with Jim
Patton as one of Its vice chairmen. Two months prior to the speech, when
14The Wallace speech can be found in Vital Speeches of the Dav XII
(October 1, 1946), pp. 738-741. For a sampling of congressional and
administrative criticism, see "The Liberals and '46," New Republic CXV
(September 30, 1946), p. 396; "The Wallace Speech," Nation CLXIII
(September 21, 1946), p. 311; “The Wallace Speech," Commonweal XLIV
(September 27, 1946), p. 563; New York Times. September 18, 1946, p.l;
Time XLVIII (September 30, 1946), p. 26; Congressional Record. 80th
Congress, 1st Session, pp. A3249 and 6745; and J. Samuel Walker, Henrv A
Wallace and American Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1976), p. 159. Examples of media criticism w ill be found in "The
Speech," Time XLVIII (September 23, 1946), p. 28; David Lawrence, "Who
Speaks for America—Wallace or Byrnes?," U.S. News and World Report XXI
(September 20, 1946), pp. 28-9; "Foreign Policy of Mr. Wallace: Press
Evaluation." U.S. News and World Report XXI (September 27, 1946), pp. 31-2;
and "An Embarassed President," Christian Century LXIII (September 25,
1946), p. 1142.
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Wallace had written President Truman a letter criticizing Bernard Baruch’s
atomic control plan, Patton had supported Wallace’s stand. Ten days after
Wallace’s address, the position of the National Farmers Union was clearly
stated in a St. Paul radio broadcast made by Gordon Roth, the director of
public relations for the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association, who
referred to the “get tough" policy of the Truman administration as an
“unfortunate" Ingredient in an "Inevitable march to war." Praising Wallace
for going beyond partisan politics, Roth noted that, "The hysteria and almost
artificial Indignation reminds one of the criticism that President Roosevelt
got when he gave his ’quarantine-the-aggressors’ speech in Chicago before
World War II."15
A week after Wallace’s speech, Jim Patton joined 300 delegates in
Chicago for a Conference of Progressives.

Attended by such notables as

Elmer Benson, Harold I ekes, Hans Morgenthau, and Claude Pepper, the
gathering resulted from a desire "to carry on the fight for fulfillment of the
domestic and foreign policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."

While the

meeting dealt with a variety of issues, many of them of a primarily
15MacDougall, Gideon's Army, pp. 49-52; James G. Patton, 1946 guest
editorial in Denver Post, Folder "1945-1946," Jim Patton Archives, National
Farmers Union Offices, Denver, Colorado; Gordon Roth, "Food for Freedom
Program," radio address of September 22, 1946, Stover Papers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
domestic nature, the program’s foreign policy section took a solid stand
against “the United States' attempt to obtain military bases around the
world- and announced firm support for ending any close military alliance
with the British and for stoppage of the manufacturing and stockpiling of
atomic weapons.16

Patton’s convention address, his most outspoken

statement to date, denounced the Truman administration’s "new imperialist
adventures backed to the hilt by American diplomacy and American
arms."17
Two days before the Conference of Progressives, Jim Patton had joined
with Iowa Farmers Union president Fred Stover in a unanimous endorsement
of Henry Wallace's foreign policy at the 30th annual convention of the Iowa
Farmers Union in Des Moines.

Delegates approved

a foreign policy

statement that opposed a "world-wide American military force" that was
"costing the American people % 18,000,000,000 a year." In his address to the
Iowa convention, Patton praised Henry Wallace as "one of the most
stimulating, refreshing thinkers we have ever had," and then questionned the
necessity of an eighteen billion dollar military budget when he told the
convention that, "We are either getting ready to whale the tar out of
^-progressives Mobilize for Action," The Railroad Trainman LXIII
(December, 1946), pp. 402-406; MacDougall, Gideon's Army, pp. 105-106.
1National Union Farmer. October 1, 1946, p. 3.
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somebody pretty soon, or we shouldn’t be spending that much money for
military a ffa irs

",8

The highlight of the Iowa convention was a lengthy analysis of U.S.
foreign policy presented by Waldo R. McNutt, president of the
Division of the National Farmers Union.

Eastern

Beginning with a comparison of

recent statements made by Henry Wallace and Herbert Hoover, McNutt
castigated the latter’s suggestion of extending the American defense
perimeter as "American imperialism and power politics," and praised the
former for "carrying on the Roosevelt tradition of food for peace, for full
employment and the century of the common man."

Arguing that In firing

Wallace, President Truman had folded under pressure from Byrnes and
Vandenberg, a "combination of southern reactionaries and northern money,"
McNutt criticized the Truman administration for expanding America's
economic domination, for propping up British colonial exploitation, and for
adopting the "get tough" attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The Soviets,

McNutt told the convention, had suffered the most from World War II, and
now, In the aftermath of the fighting, U.S. efforts to deal harshly with our
former ally represented a clear reversal of stated wartime goals. As the
Soviets continued the Allied wartime effort "to wipe out fascism
everywhere," by seeking a "free and democratic China" and by assisting in
18lowa Union Farmer. September 28. 1946, pp. 1-4.
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the ouster of "notorious kings" in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary,

the

United States and Great Britain restored a repressive Greek government,
trained and equipped Dutch soldiers to further colonial exploitation in
Indonesia, backed the corrupt Cniang Kai-shek in China, and 'teamed up to
use the threat of atomic warfare against our former ally." Using events in
China as the best example of America’s “new globe girdling plans," McNutt
questionned the granting of $602 million in post-war aid to Chiang Kai-shek
and the training of forty Chinese divisions in the same time period, when
during the entirety of the war the U.S. had spent less money and trained less
divisions to aid the Chinese in their fight against Japan. Labelling American
actions "reactionary," McNutt concluded that continuation of such policies
would lead to disaster.19
A month after the Iowa convention, Northeastern division president
Archie Wright published an article entitled "A Double Standard Foreign
Policy" praising Henry Wallace for his courage in speaking out against a
policy that in his view was becoming less "pro-American" and more "antiRussian." Wright pointed out that the United States had:
. . . grabbed bases close up to Russia's borders and howled our heads
off about Russia’s border states
We have talked war openly and
then condemned Russian defense preparations as provocative. We
have demanded that everyone, and especially the Russians, park their

1^lowa Union Farmer. October 12, 1946, pp. 1-4.
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guns and uranium inventories at the door while we atom bomb our
smug paternal guidance to all the world.20
Farmers Union dissent with a peace-time military budget of $18 billion,
increased aid to Chiang Kai-shek, the attempt to preserve American control
of atomic weapons, and the overall aggressive policy toward the Soviet
Union reached a new peak in March, 1947, following President Truman’s
official declaration of cold war.

Appearing before a joint session of

Congress, the President asked for $400 million in aid for the nations of
Greece and Turkey. These countries had previously fallen under the paternal
eye of Great Britain, but that nation’s resources were too drained by war to
continue financial aid beyond the spring of 1947. The President told the
nation’s Congress that Greece, and Turkey to a lesser extent, were
threatened by communist-led terrorist activities, and that there was no
other country to which those nations could turn but the United States.
American assistance was essential if “international peace and hence the
security of the United States" were to be maintained 21
The response of the National Farmers Union to this "Truman Doctrine"
was sw ift and unequivocal. Meeting in St. Paul for its biennial Officers’ and
2 0 lowa Union Farmer. October 26,1946, p. 1.
2 'Hugh Ross, editor, The Cold War. Containment and Its Critics (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Company, 1963), p. 6.
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Leaders' Conference, the Farmers Union Board of Directors unanimously
approved a resolution condemning Truman's appeal as supportive of
"undemocratic regimes" and as unnecessarily by-passing the United Nations.
Charging that the program signaled the imposition of a new American
imperialism abroad, the resolution called upon "all liberty-loving people" to
speak out in opposition to the plan.22
At the close of the conference, Jim Patton further elaborated on the
Farmers Union opposition to Truman's new policies when he told the
delegates that:
The by-passing of the United Nations Organization, the underwriting
of a fascistic type of government in Turkey, the support of Kings in
Greece who long ago should have been thrown out, the attempt to
militarize a front against Communism in the world, is a part of the
whole front of reaction.23
Patton then telegramed the organization’s concerns to President Truman,
warning him that such "unilateral imperialistic action" on the part of the
United States would "doom the United Nations more surely than the Senate
irreconcilables of the 1920's doomed the League of Nations dream of
Woodrow Wilson." Patton assured the President that the National Farmers
22Vlinutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of National Farmers
Union at the St. Paul Hotel, St. Paul, Minnesota on March 22 and 23, 1947,"
Stover Papers.
23"Synopsis of James G. Patton’s Remarks at the Close of the NFU
Leaders’ Conference," St. Paul, March 21, 1947, Folder “1947-1948," Patton
Archives.
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Union was not opposed to going to the aid of Greece and Turkey, but
preferred that assistance be carried out through U.N. agencies such as the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Food and
Agriculture Organization, that the aid be of a non-military nature, and that
the expenditures be funneled not to the monarchists governments but
instead to the people of those nations.

Rather than continue a policy of

“saber-rattling, oppressive imperialism," Patton asked the President to
consider instead an aid package similar to the one offered by Democratic
senators Claude Pepper and Glen Taylor. That resolution, which left Turkey
out of the picture entirely, called for UN-administered aid to Greece,
"specifically excluded" all military assistance, and based approval of the
program on Greek assurances that the funds would be distributed in a nondiscrlmlnatory manner.

Truman, and Congress, quickly and resoundingly

rejected the Pepper-Taylor alternative.24
The State Department, in citing the National Farmers Union opposition to
the "unilateral nature . . . and the military rather than relief emphasis" of
Greek and Turkish aid, characterized Patton's feelings toward the program
as "dubious."

In truth, his opposition went well beyond dubious.

As a

24National Union Farmer. April 1, 1947, p. 12; William C. Pratt, "Senator
Glen H. Taylor; Questioning American Unilateralism," in Thomas G. Paterson,
editor, Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the
Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 151-152.
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sponsor of the Denver Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Patton
supported that organization’s portrayal of the Truman program as a
repudiation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements that intended as its
ultimate goal "the building up of an iron ring around the Soviet Union." In a
statement that protested the "sending [of] arms and military personnel to
Greece and Turkey," the Denver council restated the Farmers Union belief
that Truman's “policy toward Greece and Turkey pointedly ignores . . . the
United Nations organization."25
Two weeks after the Farmers

Union meeting

in St.

Paul,

the

organization's legislative secretary, Russell Smith, testified before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on the topic of "Assistance to Greece and
Turkey." Attacking the program as "the culmination of a deliberate policy of
unilateralism that has been pursued with respect to the Near and Middle
East for at least six months," Smith argued that American intervention In
the internal affairs of other nations would lead to "the hearty hatred of the
masses of the people in those countries." opposing ideologies, he continued,
25Department of State, "Attitudes of Farmer Organizations," January
24, 1951, pp. 4 and 7; Mrs. Herbert D. Ulmer to Charles A. Eaton, March 31,
1947, with accompanying pamphlet of the Denver Council of AmericanSoviet Friendship entitled "War or Peace, Choose Now!," Box 483, Folder "Aid
to Greece and Turkey, March 1947, Folder 4 of 5,“ Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 80th Congress, Record Group 233 (Records of the U.S. House of
Representatives), National Archives.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60
were best fought not by military means but "by affording to the masses of
the Greek people the means for building a permanently productive economy."
Smith criticized both the United States and Great Britain for falling to
exert their influence in favor of F.A.O. proposals for Greece and observed
that the two nations had "collaborated in a do-nothing policy that finally
has resulted in the

present

emergency."

He praised the Truman

administration for wisely following George Marshall's 1946 advice to back
off from a similarly volatile situation in China, where United States support
for the uncooperative Chlang Kai-shek had led to Chinese resentment of the
United States.

Smith wondered why the same strategy had not been

followed to avoid an "untenable" American position "between the Greek
monarchy and its opponents." He then summarized Farmers Union opposition
to Truman's aid package for Greece and Turkey by noting that U.S. funds
"should not be used to support the military power of any foreign
government'’ and that “bypassing of the U.N. by its most powerful member. . .
Inevitably delivers a seriously damaging blow to the UN."26
In addition to Russell Smith’s testimony, the committee was flooded
with protests decrying American intentions of assuming the role of British
26Testimony of Russell Smith, April 9, 1947, U.S. Congress, House, 80th
Congress, 1st Session, Assistance to Greece and Turkey: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, pp. 311-313.
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imperialism in the region and specifically objecting to the by-passing of the
United Nations.

The magnitude of the protest prompted U.N. ambassador

Warren Austin to telegram committee chairman Charles Eaton with the
pointed argument that “the United States program for aid to Greece and
Turkey does not repeat not by-pass the United Nations." Arguing what by
now had become the standard administration explanation for failure to use
the U.N. more consistently, Ambassador Austin justified United States
action with the statement that, "No organ of the United Nations can at this
time provide financial and military assistance to the Greek government of
the emergency required," but that:
when stable conditions are restored in Greece it should be possible to
provide such further financial and economic assistance as might then
be required through the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations and related specialized agencies.27
Such explanations carried little weight with Farmers Union leaders, who,
had they seen Austin’s telegram, surely would have noted his distinction
between American-supplied military assistance and UN-provided economic
aid.
Some Farmers Union leaders based their objections to the Truman
Doctrine on the American tradition of supporting the right of national selfdetermination. Observing that he was "profoundly disturbed by the present
27Warren R. Austin to Charles A. Eaton, May 8, 1947, Box 483, Folder
“Greek and Turkey Aid (General)," Record Group 233.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62
condition of American Foreign Affairs," Alabama president Aubrey Williams
feared that American policymakers had:
thrown over board the traditional American policy of the fight of the
peoples of the world to determine what shall be their way of life—of
self-determination—and have set out to force upon them our ideas of
what their way of life should be—and to force it upon them at the
point of a gun.26
Iowa's Fred Stover agreed with Williams, and in an editorial entitled
"Imperialism At Its Worst," he assailed the President for betraying the
Jeffersonian revolutionary ideology of the United States by supporting the
"tottering monarchies" and "forces of oppression" in Greece and Turkey.
Stover also accused Truman of reneging on the Yalta promise to work toward
a peaceful settlement of the Dardenelles issue; instead, Stover argued, the
United States was now "unilaterally supporting] the Turkish army which has
historically permitted the Dardenelles to be used against Russia and has
historically held that strategic waterway as agent for the western powers."
The editorial suggested American duplicity with its questionning of the odd
coincidence that an F.AO. program for Greece had been taken off the agenda
of the United Nations' Social and Economic Council on the "same day that
Britain notified our government of its decision to end financial aid to
28"A Farmers’ Union Program for American Agriculture," address given by
Aubrey Williams, August 2, 1947, Box 35, Folder "Farmers Union
Correspondence 1947," Aubrey Williams Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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Greece."29
The Iowa Union Farmer ran an accompanying editorial taken from Facts
for Farmers entitled "F.A.O. Challenges Truman on Greece."

It provided

details of a report made by an eleven-man F.A.O. mission headed by Utah
Agricultural College’s Franklin S. Harris after visiting Greece in the spring
and summer of 1946.

The proposals made by the group were "at total

variance with the demands made by President Truman," particularly on the
issue of military expenditures. Noting that current Greek military spending
was a major factor in that nation’s growing inflation and in the "extreme
inequality in the distribution of wealth," the mission proposed that funds be
earmarked for non-military purposes such as development of water
resources, improvement of agricultural methods, and expansion of industry
and foreign trade. To continue instead along the lines proposed by President
Truman would be "a fundamental departure from traditional American
foreign policy" and would be a shallow use of supposed food relief "as a
cover for a program of 'military lend-lease.'" Like the Stover editorial,
Facts for Farmers also wondered if there was not some oddity in the timing
of Trumans speech, in this case insinuating that the President had
intentionally stifled the effect of the F.A.O. report by going before Congress
- 9|owa Union Farmer. April ig t JQ47, p. 4
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two days before release of the F.A.O. findings.30
The unwillingness of the Truman administration to work through the Food
and Agriculture Organization was particularly galling to Jim Patton. As a
delegate to the 1945 United Nations conference in San Francisco, Patton had
specifically worked for the success of F.A.O. as an agency geared toward
increasing worldwide agricultural production and distribution.
had found his efforts

blocked by State

Instead, he

Department “indifference,"

complaining as early as April, 1945, to assistant secretary of state win
Clayton of the department's foot-dragging on what Patton saw as the "most
important job facing the United Nations." A year and a half after the U.N.
conference, Patton was s till Incensed over Clayton's "devoting much of his
energy to preventing establishment" of

workable international

food

agencies, and in January of 1947 the farm leader vented his anger in a
speech to the Eastern division of the National Farmers union.

"Our

international relationships," Patton charged:
have deteriorated to Inter-power diplomatic jockeying, with
emphasis on building economic, geographic, legalistic and military
barriers against the next war, and with virtually no time given to
establishing and pushing forward the positive salients or peace.
High on Patton’s list of "positive salients of peace" was an F.A.O. program of
nutrition that aided in the supply of rood to the world's needy people. Two

30|pwa Union Farmer. April 19, 1947, p. 4.
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months later, with the introduction of the Truman Doctrine, Patton’s hopes
for a vigorous F.A.O. backed by the United States were dead.31
Farmers Union discontent with the Truman administration’s foreign
policy increased with George Marshall's June, 1947, request for a multi
billion dollar program to further the economic recovery of Europe. Although
the organization supported the revival of the European economy, and while
Jim Patton agreed to work with the administration in its efforts to do so, it
is misleading to suggest, as Charles Livermore has in his study of Jim
Patton, that the Farmers Union was "an enthusiastic supporter" of the
Marshall

Plan.32

Instead, Patton and other Farmers Union leaders

criticized the Marshall Plan for the same primary reason they had given in
repudiating Truman's assistance to Greece and Turkey—the failure of the
United States to act through the United Nations.
In a letter addressed to American farm, labor, and business leaders, a
31 Livermore, "James G. Patton," pp. 129-130; Department of State,
"Opinions and Activities," December 13, 1946, p. 3, and January 31, 1947, p.
3; James G. Patton to Will L. Clayton, April 5, 1945, and W.L. Clayton to
James G. Patton, April 10, 1945, 550.ADI Interim Commlsslon/4-545, Box
2403, Record Group 59. Clayton’s response to Patton's letter of April 5
denied the accusation of departmental indifference and argued instead that
State's delay in dealing with F.A.O. proposals was caused by "general
considerations of the total legislative program of the Administration."
^Livermore, “James G. Patton," p. 127. Livermore’s view is based on
Patton's 1950 participation in the Economic Cooperation Administration's
survey of the impact of the Marshall Plan on Europe.
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copy of which he forwarded to Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson,
Jim Patton asked for support for the Farmers Union position that, "The
Marshall Plan should be carried out under the direction of the Economic
Commission for Europe." Such action was essential, Patton argued, to "turn
the country from its policy of unilateral action to one of strong, persistent
support of the United Nations and its subsidiary units.” Failure to do so
would mean that the United States would "be committed for from at least
four to five years to a policy of single-handed action that threatens the
base of enduring peace."
Patton rejected the arguments of critics distrustful of the Economic
Commission for Europe because its role in European recovery had been
endorsed by the Soviets.

Instead, he said, the Soviet endorsement was an

excellent reason fox working through the commission, as cooperation would
increase the chances for "a mutually useful exchange of goods and services
between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe," the element of the
E.C.E. program that most experts saw as the key to long-term European
recovery. Finally, Patton concluded his letter with the stem warning that
the United States:
cannot afford to take the position that we are a big bad Santa Claus
who is footing the bills and therefore is going to be boss. Such a
conception wholly destroys the world democratic structure envisaged
when the United Nations was set up at San Francisco. It is bound to
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make us the target of resentment instead of gratitude, to cause
needless loss and inefficiency in expenditure, and to delay
indefinitely the hopes of enduring peace.33
The American approach to international affairs, according to the Farmers
Union, had played a key role in the late 1946 disbanding of U.N.R.RA, despite
a report from the U.N. agency that $750 million worth of food and clothing
would be needed in Europe between January 1 and harvest time in 1947.
Truman administration

unilateralism

also

threatened

the

continued

existence of F.A.O. unless the United States Congress increased the amount
of funds that it could contribute to that struggling agency. But with some
leading American officials reportedly adopting the callous attitude that the
end of U.N.R.R.A. was simply the end of the "gravy train," and with other
reports surfacing that the American-British-Canadian controlled Combined
Food Board of U.N.R.R.A. had systematically played politics with food
requests at the expense of Soviet bloc nations, there was little hope that
the United States was intending to adopt a more benevolent approach to
world relief or rehabilitation.

Northeastern Division president Archie

Wright’s commentary to a New York newspaper that, "If your readers,
33James 6. Patton to Earl 0. Shreve, November 18, 1947, Box 1453,
Record Group 16 (Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture,
General Correspondence, 1906-1975), National Archives. Jim Patton also
discussed this situation in a letter to "Dear Co-Workers," September 12,
1947, Stover Papers.
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farmers and others, favor the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan,
it is because they don't know what it 1s," summarized Farmers Union
sentiment

toward

American

unilateralism

and

plans

for

European

recovery.34
Following the September, 1947, passage by the National Farmers Union
board of directors of a resolution seeking U.N. sponsorship of European
recovery, Patton began 1948 by testifying before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in its hearings on the Marshall Plan.

His testimony

was influenced by an earlier trip to the nation's capital that had left him
discouraged and feeling that America's leaders had concluded that “it must
be two worlds, and that war is inevitable; Patton's comments incorporated
segments from a North Dakota Farmers Union resolution criticizing the
United States for the “reckless abandonment of U.N.R.R.A" and for the "illconsidered attempts. . . to bolster the m ilitaristic regimes of Greece and
Turkey." The North Dakota resolution repeated the request for American
acquiescence in E.C.E. administration of European recovery, arguing that
■Hjim Patton letter to “Dear Co-Workers," September 12, 1947, Stover
Papers: National Union Farmer. December. 1947, p. 2. The American official
who reportedly made the "gravy train" comment was Assistant Secretary of
State William L. Clayton. Details and commentary on the demise of U.N.R.R.A.
can be found in Nation CLXIII (August 10, 1946), pp. 144-145, and Nation
CLXII (March 30, 1946), pp. 361-362; Archie Wright to Harold B. Johnson,
April 13, 1948, Box 3, Folder "Watertown Daily Times 1941-1956," New
York Milk Shed Records.
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adoption of the proposal would ’ go far toward assuring the world, and
Russia in particular, that the United States does not contemplate a modern
Roman imperialism."

Patton elaborated on his organization's belief that

military, strategic, and defensive considerations should play no part in the
recovery program,

and that

any American attempt

"to dictate

to

participating countries what form of government they support" similarly
had no place in a program whose only aims should be "restoring the economic
foundations of peace and prosperity" and reviving "the spirit of San
Francisco."35
Perhaps recognizing the reluctance of Congress to shift completely
toward E.C.E.-sponsored European recovery,

Patton

told

the

Senate

committee that the National Farmers Union would be willing to accept, as an
alternative, a bill presented
Committee on Foreign Affairs.

by Chairman Charles Eaton of the House
That bill, H.R. 4840, called for close

cooperation with U.N. agencies and seemed to Patton to take "very seriously
the sincere protests of those of us who really want the United Nations to
succeed." Perhaps most importantly, H.R. 4840 also contained provisions for
35James G. Patton to Board of Directors, National Farmers Union,
September 4, 1947, Box 35, Folder "Farmers Union Correspondence 1947,"
Williams Papers; Testimony of Jim Patton, January 26, 1948, European
Recovery Program, pp. 927-933; National Union Farmer. February, 1948, pp.
5 and 8.
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a repayment plan that did not take advantage of European nations incapable
of the “payment of full consideration" called for in a second bill proposed by
Massachusetts representative Christian A. Herter. Herter’s bill, H.R. 4579,
struck Patton as a way of draining poorer nations and making them too
dependent on the support of the United States. "Since, in general," Patton
informed the Senators:
the poorer th? country the greater the aid, following [Herter's]
repayment idea would mean that the greater the aid, the greater the
American mortgage on a country's currency and economy. If this isn't
imperialism, I don't know the meaning of the word.36
Throughout the debate over the Marshall Plan, Jim Patton had grown
increasingly discouraged over the future of the United Nations.

The

dissolution of U.N.R.R.A, the tendency, as Patton saw it, of the World Bank
and of the International Monetary Fund to act as private bankers with an eye
on commercial profit rather than to act in the financial interests of needy
nations, and the American unwillingness either to adequately fund or to
consistently support UN-sponsored programs led him to wonder whether
the U.N. would meet the fate of the earlier League of Nations. Speaking in
Colorado Springs in late 1947, Patton had charged that his beloved U.N. had
become "nothing more than a debating society."
36Testimony of Jim Patton, January 26,
Program, pp. 927-933.

His prescription for

1948, European Recovery
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correcting this trend mirrored the argument presented earlier in One World
or None. The United States, he said:
should give leadership in securing amendment of the
United Nations Charter to create a limited world government, with
sovereign power and police force to make universal national
disarmament possible.37
Patton repeated his gloomy assessment of the U.N.'s future and called
once again for expanded U.N. powers when he addressed the annual
convention of the National Farmers Union two months after his Senate
testimony. Reminding the delegates that the United States was not the only
nation in the world and that Americans were not "God's chosen children,"
Patton argued that the policies of the Truman administration would lead to
"war and suppression, not peace and democracy."

In a similarly charged

speech, North Dakota Farmers Union president Glenn Talbott once again
compared Truman’s policies to those of Nazi Germany and declared that
administration advocates "were deliberately fostering a red scare to create
a smoke screen behind which their true aims could be hidden." Convention
delegates openly criticized the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan by
approving a resolution that opposed "the practice of any country, including
our own, of using food or any other form of aid as a means of controlling the
internal politics of another country." It ended with the comment that the
37“james G. Patton Remarks at Social Action Luncheon in Colorado
Springs/ October 22, 1947, Folder ” 1947-1948/ Patton Archives.
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National Farmers Union was also "opposed to the using of aid funds for
military purposes.38
Two editorials in the April, 1948, issue of the National Union Farmer
summarized the position of the Farmers Union on the state of U.S. foreign
policy.

Presenting what has come to be known as a “contrived crisis"

scenario, the editors pointed out that, "One crisis after another is being
created to get us to accept policies that thinking, unfrightened people
wouldn't even listen to." The Marshall Plan, "little more than an expanded
Truman Doctrine," relied more on military aid than on economic assistance
and contributed billions of dollars to nations such as Iceland, Portugal, and
Turkey that had not even fought in the war and to nations such as Portugal,
Turkey, and Greece that were ruled by "iron-fisted tyrants." The editorials
pointed out that the U.S. Congress on one day criticized the "inefficiency
land] corruption" of the Chinese government and then almost immediately
gave that nation $463 million in aid. Asking "What Kind of a Policy Is This"
that caused the United States to lose "more prestige in the last two years
than Franklin Roosevelt was able to build up in 14 years," the Farmers Union
paper announced that the Truman administration had the nation, and the
38"Report of James G. Patton to NFU Convention, Denver, Colorado," March
9, 1948, Box 11, File Folder # 12, James G. Patton Papers, University of
Colorado, Boulder; National Union Farmer March, 1948, pp. 1,1a, 4a-7a.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73
world, "on the road to war."39
In addition to disagreements with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan, Farmers Union leaders also opposed administration efforts to move
toward Universal Military Training and the establishment of a peace-time
draft.

Following six months of hearings, a nine-member Presidential

Advisory Commission on Universal Training in June, 1947, Issued a 448page report that presented universal training as a matter of "urgent military
necessity." The panel included General Electric president Charles Wilson,
former ambassador to the Soviet Union Joseph Davies, former Roosevelt
advisor Sam Rosenman, manpower expert Anna Rosenberg, physicist and
M.I.T. president Karl Compton, editor of the Christian Herald Reverend Daniel
Poling, Georgetown University geopolitical expert Reverend Edmund Walsh,
Princeton University president Harold Dodds, and black attorney Truman
Gibson, Jr. Collectively they predicted that the United States could lose its
monopoly on atomic weapons as early as 1951, and that a Soviet attack
could be anticipated by 1955. In order to guard against the “indescribable
horror" of a third world war, the committee called for an annual outlay of
39National Union Farmer. April, 1948, p. 8. A March, 1948, Patton
telegram to President Truman had expressed the similar fear that policy
was being determined "by creating one crisis after another." (Department of
State, "Opinions and Activities," March 29, 1948, p. 3.)
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$1.75 billion to buttress America’s military forces.

"To do less," they

concluded, was "to gamble with our lives and liberties."40
The following month Jim Patton joined former Navy Secretary Josephus
Daniels, Colorado Senator Edwin C. Johnson, and seventeen educators and
religious leaders in an analysis of the report. Their commentary opened with
the powerfully enunciated argument that enactment into law of a universal
military training program "would drastically change the character of our
democracy and virtually destroy the chances of preventing a third World
War." It continued in an eloquently worded rebuttal of the commission's
findings that criticized the government’s lip service to the United Nations,
its "trite and unbelievably childish oversimplification of history" in arguing
that "a nation can survive only if it is huge and m ilitarily powerful," and its
emphasis on “nationalism instead of internationalism." After describing the
government program as indicative of "the bankruptcy of statesmanship,"
Patton and his colleagues offered as an alternative universal disarmament,
a strengthened United Nations, and a program of relief and reconstruction
that included the Soviet Union as a recipient nation 41
Six months later, Patton sent a message to Farmers Union locals in
^Newsweek. XXIX (June 9, 1947), pp. 24 and 27; Time XLIX (June 9,
1947), pp. 19-20.
4 '"An Analysis of the Report of the President’s Advisory Commission on
Universal Training, July 7, 1947," Stover Papers.
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which he pointed out that adoption of the universal military training
program would be a return to the ways of the Old World, ways that stressed
"goose-stepping men in uniform." The National Farmers Union opposed the
program because, Patton wrote, it would lead to more military control of
the nation, it was an inappropriate way to prepare for war in an atomic age,
its excessive cost would divert funds from greater needs such as hospitals
and schools, it would lead to the destruction of the United Nations, and it
would also lead to war. When Truman added a request for a peacetime draft
in March of 1948, Patton also expressed disagreement, telegraphing the
President with a request to "end our one-way street approach to
international problems."42
Patton biographer Charles Livermore has argued that in the aftermath of
Truman's surprising 1948 win, "a more mature and power-conscious Patton
shifted his priorities to a less naive level and set to work within the
postwar reactionary environment" to fashion "excellent relations with the
Truman administration." The result, he wrote, was an "immediate and firm"
relationship between the Farmers Union and the post-1948 Truman
Administration.43 There was praise in the post-1948 period for the Point
42Natlona1 Union_Farmer. January. 1948, pp. 1-2, and March, 1948, p. 1.
43Livermore, “James G. Patton," pp. 149-150.
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Four program, Truman’s scheme for the sharing of technological and
scientific knowledge with underdeveloped nations that Patton hoped would
signal a trend toward American cooperation with the United Nations. But
Farmers Union insistence on reduced military budgets and its rejection of
the North Atlantic alliance make invalid any suggestion of harmony between
the Farmers Union and the President. The months between Truman's defeat
of Dewey and the beginning of the Korean War repeated the pattern in place
since i945, with Farmers Union criticism of Truman’s foreign policy a
constant. In a radio script prepared by the National Union Farmer and
intended for widespread use on local stations, North Dakota’s Glenn Talbott
criticized the Marshall Plan as "amazingly work[ing] on the theory that
starving people need guns instead of food." On the same program, President
Patton spoke of the "inept and reactionary" Washington leadership.

Fred

Stover's Iowa Union Farmer, in a post-election editorial entitled "We Didn’t
Celebrate," anguished over John Foster Dulles' selection as head of the
American delegation to the United Nations, a move that Stover believed put
a halt to any hope for change in U.S. policies. Eloquently tying foreign and
domestic policies together, the editorial argued that:
we cannot have a really liberal domestic program with a really higher
standard of living while continuing our present reactionary
militaristic foreign policy. We cannot have both guns and butter. As
long as a large part of our total production and manpower and a major
part of our federal budget is used for military purposes at home and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
abroad, we cannot have an abundance of civilian goods and a rising
standard of living at home.44
The criticism continued in early 1949 with Jim Patton's call for the
dismissal of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and a reduction in the
military budget of fifty percent.

Forrestal's firs t annual report, Patton

said, revealed the Secretary's desire to expand the powers of the military.
Suggesting that the United States remove itself from "the interstellar
pipings of Mr. Forrestal along the path of ever heavier military burdens,"
Patton called for a redistribution of funds to benefit "production and
services needed in the civilian economy."45
Forrestal's fate was overshadowed in the early months of the new year
by Farmers Union opposition to President Truman's decision to create a
North Atlantic alliance.

Reaction in Iowa was swift, as Fred Stover

critiqued the pact as a "North Atlantic Deception" that had "little to do with
the defense of our country." The alliance, Stover wrote, had been "formed
with the deliberate intention of undermining the U.N.," and as an extension of
Truman's containment policies contributed to an unnecessary and expensive
^ lo w a Union Farmer. November 20, 1948, p. 4; "National Union Farmer
Broadcast Script for Radio Platter on Farm Prices, Organization, and
Monopoly," with November 2, 1948 cover letter from William c. Vincent,
Stover Papers.
45National Union Farmer. January. 1949, pp. 1 and 7.
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series of thrusts and counterthrusts by the United States and the Soviet
Union. Earlier American aid to Greece and Turkey had led, said Stover, to the
Soviet Union's 1948 "counter flanking movement" in Czechoslovakia, and this
current attempt by the United States to establish military bases In
Scandinavia would “practically force Russia to overrun Finland" and would
lead to Russia "taking strong measures to strengthen her position by
absorbing the satellite states into the Soviet system."

Noting the

“considerable propaganda" in the American press over Soviet maneuvers in
the Baltic Sea, Stover wondered why such actions so close to Russian
territory should be more alarming than American naval maneuvers in the
Mediterranean.

To Stover, the United States was attempting to make a

virtue of imperialism "by mixing some political philosophy of freedom with
It."

He angrily rejected such a combination, and condemned the North

Atlantic Pact as an obligation that "mortgages our lives to war."46
Stover's opposition to the Atlantic Pact was mirrored in other states and
in the actions of the National Farmers Union In Denver. The national board
of directors unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the pact as a
"futile gesture . . . directly contrary to American precedent and history."
Repeating what had been its most consistent theme since Truman's rise to
46 Iowa Union Farmer. March 19, 1949, p. 4, and April 16, 1949, p. 4; Fred
Stover, undated handwritten notes entitled "The Crisis in the Farmers
Union," Stover Papers.
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power, the board expressed the view that regional defense agreements such
as N.AT.O. further weakened the United Nations. The pact was described as
“the most alarming” of "certain very disturbing elements" that continued to
plague an administration foreign policy unnecessarily influenced by the
American military.47
The one clear exception to Farmers Union displeasure with Truman's
foreign policy was its praise for Point Four. "Your proposals," Patton wrote
Truman in January of 1949:
for taking American 'know-how* into the underdeveloped regions of
the earth have sent a thrill of hope through millions of Americans.
Amid the festering fears of new war that have marked the years since
war's end, your call for positive action to shape a better world has
come like a proverbial breath of fresh air.48
Yet even this high praise was tempered by Patton’s fear that the new
program might go the way of previous American efforts and become another
47National Union Farmer. April, 1949, pp. l and 7; May 24, 1949
Resolution of Savo Farmers Union Local No. 822 (Frederick, south Dakota),
with accompanying June 2, 1949, letter from Don C. Matchan, Stover Papers;
Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," March 28, 1949, p. 2;
Department of State, “Attitudes of Farmer Organizations," January 24, 1951,
p. 6. In their opposition to regional defense agreements. Farmers Union
officials showed no awareness of Article 51 of the U.N. charter that allowed
for such arrangements. The presumption is that they would have viewed the
provision as contradictory to the true spirit of internationalism.
^James G. Patton to Harry S. Truman, January 31, 1949, 800.50 TA /13! 49, Box 4 159, Record Group 59.
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unilateral crusade. He strongly warned Truman against such a possibility
and urged him instead to take great pains to operate Point Four through the
United Nations.

Concerned that the program would be implemented by

unilateral "treaties between the United States and each of the countries
where American technicians and capital are to assist in development,"
Patton asked the President to "reverse this trend" and to follow a policy of
"enlightened self-interest" in which the United States "function[ed] as one
among the company of nations . . .

on a basis of equality not of

dominance."49
Patton's desire to see the United States adopt a policy of equality over
one of dominance went unfulfilled, and by the end of 1949, the Farmers
Union president was still criticizing Truman's dealings with the rest of the
world. In a statement presented to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
in October, he noted that "a negative policy of merely trying to stop the
spread of communism w ill [not] lead to peace," and that such actions as the
Atlantic Pact "would merely serve to freeze the present cleavages and make
them more difficult to heal."50

In the same month, the South Dakota

49James 6. Patton to Harry 5. Truman, January 31, 1949, 800.50 TA /13149, Box 4159, Record Group 59.
50Statement of James G. Patton, October 12, 1949, U.S. Congress, House,
81 st Congress, 1st Session, To Seek Development of the United Nations Into
a World Federation: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs pp.
15-16.
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Farmers Union adopted a platform that read:
The foreign policy of the United States has gone from bad to worse.
We cannot have freedom at home while we enslave people abroad.
Since our last National Convention, our government has continued its
unilateral political and economic action in the Truman Doctrine,
Marshall Plan, North Atlantic Military Pact and the Rearming of
Europe. We feel that each of these actions is bringing us closer to
war and not near to peace.51
The most explicit, and most colorful, denunciation of U.S. foreign policy
came that same October from Iowa's Fred Stover. In an address to the Iowa
Farmers Union, Stover excoriated the “intellectual pigmies, who are
masterminding our world policy/ and whose "pretended patriotism” had U.S.
citizens “dazzled by the halo of national self-righteousness."52
The Farmers Union assault on U.S. foreign policy continued at the 1950
national convention in Denver where delegates approved a program that
reiterated support for the U.N. and called for “abandonment of unilateral
activity in world affairs." The introduction of “A Statement from America's
Family Farmers to the President of the United States" opposing atomic
escalation highlighted a convention that rejected the inevitability of war
and named peace as the "overriding necessity" of the day.53
5 '"Excerpts from the South Dakota Farmers Union platform adopted
October 1949," Folder *555, Official File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry
S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
52"Excerpts from Convention Address of Fred Stover, Iowa F.U. Ch.,
October 1949," Folder *555, President Truman's Officials Files.
^ National Union Farmer. March, 1950, pp. 8 -9 and 16.
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In the aftermath of the convention, the Iowa Union Farmer quoted Albert
Einstein as placing responsibility on the United States for the "present
hysteria and international tension." The scientist’s rejection of the "Great
Illusion" that the United States, because of its "unlimited strength," could
impose its own brand of peace on the world led to a call from the Iowa paper
for "a new approach to Russia" and a reversion to the policies of Franklin
Roosevelt. Raymond Fosdick, a State Department consultant on Far Eastern
policy and president of the Rockefeller Foundation, also identified with the
Farmers Union position with his appeal for U.S. identification with world
revolution.

In an article he wrote for the New York Times Magazine in

February of 1950, Fosdick called it a "tragic misconception" to blame
Communism for the widespread unrest against hunger and disease, and
wrote that, "Those who talk of arms and a display of power as the principal
counters in the game misunderstand what the game is about." Making the
same charge was Chicago journalist Keyes Beech, who in May filed a report
from Asia in which he noted that, "Democracy to most Asiatics is a
mouthful of words."

Fred Stover’s pleasure at finding allies in the

scientific, governmental, and journalistic worlds was underscored by his
personal distribution of a hundred copies of Fosdlck’s commentary.54
5^1owa Union Farmer. March 18, 1950, p.4 and June 17, 1950, p. 4;
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Invited to address the Australian Peace Congress held in Melbourne in
April, 1950, Fred Stover gave what he later called his best speech ever
when he addressed the main convention on April 19. A clear and powerful
compilation of the many ideas Stover had been developing throughout the
early years of the Cold War, the speech accused U.S. policymakers of
assuming “stainless moral perfection" and of believing that “under their
leadership America can do no wrong." Returning from Australia, Stover was
skeptical about the chances for world peace.

President Truman's May,

1950, comment that he would not hesitate once again to use the atomic
bomb, Herbert Hoover's call for a United Nations without Russia, and Dean
Acheson's attempt, as Stover saw it, to "put a democratic label on the
resurrected Nazis in Germany" led to Stover's glum assessment that "things
are going to get worse. . . before they get better."55
Raymond B. Fosdick, "We Must Identify Ourselves with World Revolution,"
February 12, 1950 article in the New York Times Magazine, reprinted March
!8, 1950 by the ACLU’s The Open Forum, copy of which, with Stover
comments, is in Stover Papers; Keyes Beech, “Why Are We Losing Asia to
Reds?," St. Louis Post-Dispatch. May 6, 1950, copy with Stover comments in
Stover Papers.
55 lowa Union Farmer. March 18, 1950, p. 4; U.S. Farmers Association,
Biographical Sketch of Fred Stover (Hampton. Iowa, 1985), p. 30; F.W. Stover
to Mrs. Elizabeth Moos, May 4, 1950, Stover Papers; Address of F.W. Stover
to Australian Peace Congress, Melbourne, Australia, April 19, 1950, Stover
Papers; Mrs. Jessie M. Street to Fred Stover, April 21, 1950, Stover Papers;
Fred Stover to Mrs. Jessie M. Street, May 12, 1950, Stover Papers.
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While Stover was travelling to and from Australia, Jim Patton was
sailing for Europe as part of an Economic Cooperation Administration survey
of agricultural conditions in England, Greece, Italy, and Germany.

After

completing that assignment, Patton was joined by eight other National
Farmers Union leaders in Sweden for a meeting of the International
Federation of Agricultural Producers. He was impressed with the progress
evident since the close of World War Two, and he surprisingly praised some
of the work of the Marshall Plan, particularly its efforts in Greece. Patton
was not as comfortable with the situation in Germany, however, and he
expressed a fear over “definite signs of the revival of nationalism" in that
nation. Mostly, however, his trip to Europe reinforced his belief that the
United States needed to make significant changes in the way that it dealt
with the rest of the world. Writing from Europe, Patton commented that:
The heavy feeling I have in my heart is that my dear, beloved America
is going down the same tragic road of monopoly, militarism, fear,
distrust and hate. It is SO unnecessary, it is so negative, and it is so
immoral and destructive.56
Jim Patton's critique was typical of the consistent assault on
administration foreign policy that the National Farmers Union maintained
through the

first

five years of Harry Trumans presidency.

The

560epartment of State, "Opinions and Activities," July 31, 1950, p. 1;
Department of State, "Attitudes of Farmer Organizations," January 24, 1951,
p. 9; National Union Farmer. May, 1950, p. 3; Eastern Union Farmer. JulyAugust, 1950, p. 3;
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organization's argument was as simple as it was direct: the United States
had failed to live up to its pronouncements of international cooperation and
had sought instead to by-pass the newly created United Nations to selfishly
shape the world in its own unilaterally dictated fashion.

The approach

included a rejection of the cooperative spirit exhibited by the Allies in the
years of World War II, a pre-occupation with strategic and defense
concerns, a betrayal of traditional American support for national selfdetermination through support

for un-democratic regimes,

and the

contriving of one crisis after another to justify American action in place of
what was said to be an inadequately prepared United Nations. The dangers
inherent in the Truman administration scheme were that the United States
would lose credibility with much of the world, might even earn for itself
the hatred of many of the world's people, would interfere with the re
establishment of economic ties between western and eastern Europe, and
would squander American dollars on containment of a supposed communist
threat while ignoring much needed social programs at home.
Truman administration actions often justified the criticisms of the
Farmers Union. The President's dismissal of Henry Wallace indicated a dear
rejection of a world view emphasizing mutual cooperation with the Soviets,
reduced military expenditures, and a prominent role for the United Nations
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in the control of atomic technology.

Administration reluctance to fully

support the efforts of U.N.R.R.A., F.AO., and the E.C.E., the declaration of a
Truman Doctrine that announced American intentions to intervene in areas
where the United States deemed it necessary, the development of the
Marshall Plan as an American-run project for European recovery, the push
for a program of universal military training, and the sponsorship of regional
defense alliances all marked a clear preference for a unilateral American
approach to world affairs.
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Chapter 3

Stepchildren and the Unholy Alliance

National Farmers Union dissent from post-war American unilateralism
reflected the organization's devotion to the policies and memory of Franklin
Roosevelt. Jim Patton and the 500,000 members of the Farmers Union had
been enthused by the former

President's promise of

international

cooperation exhibited from the Atlantic Charter through his final conference
appearance at Yalta. This dedication to the principle of internationalism
made it difficult for the Farmers Union to accept what they perceived as the
policy reversals of President Harry Truman following Roosevelt's death In
1945. The new President was judged by the Union as drifting away from
international cooperation as the guiding light of American foreign policy and
as adhering Instead to unilateral American self-interest.

These changes

were rejected as contrary not only to the memory of Franklin Roosevelt but
to the tradition of American democracy.
Yet there was more than principle involved in the repudiation of Harry
Truman's foreign policy. There was also the question of survival. Carrying a
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lengthy memory of unsuccessful agrarian efforts to attain equality in
American society, and believing that events at home and events abroad were
irrefutably linked, the Farmers Union criticized

President Truman’s

international policies for contributing to the long-established consignment
of America’s farmers to second-class citizenship.

The Farmers Union

position was based on three premises: (1) that agriculture was, as the
Northeastern Union Farmer described it, the “step child of the American
economy;"1 <2) that within agriculture small family farms were being
victimized by the efforts of the nation’s largest farmers to drive them out
of business; and (3) that the attempts by corporate agriculture to eliminate
small farms was part of an "unholy alliance"2 between business and
government created not only to dominate the domestic economy but to
expand American power abroad by controlling the resources of the world.
Despite President Truman’s publicly expressed support for agriculture, his
focus on containing the threat of communist expansion was seen as
contributing to the demise of America’s family farms.
The Farmers Union’s contention that agriculture was at the bottom of the
nation’s economic pecking order was a fact periodically reinforced by the
1Northeastern Union Farmer. December, 1952, p. 7.
National Union Farmer. March, 1948, p. 4a; 1950 Iowa Farmers Union
Resolutions, Stover Papers
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release of any number of government statistics.

Although farmers, like

most other segments of American society, had benefitted economically from
U.S. involvement in World War II, and although agrarian prosperity carried
over into the early post-war years, by 1948 the American fanner was
anything but the "enviable individual" Fortune magazine erroneously
described him as in June, 1949.3

At a time when industrial wages,

corporate profits, and government spending were all on the rise, the only
thing increasing for the farmer was his mortgage debt level. Agricultural
income dropped precipitously from the post-war high of $17.8 billion in
1947 to $13.0 billion in 1950, and average annual farm income declined
from $3,500 to just over $2,700.4
In an attempt to improve their financial stability, many farmers sought
part-time employment off the farm. In fact, the number of farm operators
working off their farms for more than 100 days per year increased by nearly
200,000 between 1944 and I949.5 Other farmers found more ingenious
ways to improve their family incomes. Faced with the prospects of either
3“Those Prosperous Farmers," Fortune XXXIX (June, 1949), pp. 64-68.
Agricultural statistics
cited in Congressional Quarterly Service,
Congress and the Nation. 1945-1964: A Review of Government and Politics
in the Postwar Years (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965),
p. 669, and in Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1956), p. 169.
5 Facts for Farmers. July, 1952, p. 2.
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plowing their crops under or having them die in the fields, a group of
Farmers Union members 1n New Jersey chose instead to take four hundred
crates of produce directly to the factory gates. Selling their products at
anywhere from 33 to 50 percent below retail, these Farmers Union members
increased their profits from 20 to 40 percent.6
Despite the decline in farmer income and the variety of alternative
methods farmers pursued to improve their lot, many consumers took for
granted that agrarian greed was responsible for Increased food prices.
Farmers, though, pocketed very little of the money spent in the marketplace.
Their share of the consumer's food dollar dropped from 54 cents in 1945 to
46 cents by June, 1950.

Bureau of Agricultural Economics statistics

revealed that even if farmers charged nothing for their crops, consumers
still would be stuck with high prices.

That the retail price of bread

increased in 1948 at a time when the farm price of wheat had fallen
suggested that charges of greed would best be directed not toward the
nation's farmers but toward processors and other middlemen.

It was the

"greed and avarice of the food distributors of the nation," North Dakota
^Statement of Ed Yeomans, October 3, 1947, U.S. Congress, Senate,
80th Congress, Prices of Consumers Goods: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, pp. 36083651, in Box 3, Volume 16, Record Group 128, National Archives; Statement
of Glenn Talbott, October 8, 1947, Prices of Consumers Goods, pp. 19642014, in Box 6, Volume 9, Record Group 128.
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Senator Usher Burdick argued, that was the prime cause of high prices.7
Not only did farmers not rake in huge profits, but they also suffered as
consumers themselves. An eight percent drop in farm income from 1949 to
1950 was made even worse by a corresponding six percent rise in
agricultural production expenses. Prices received by farmers consistently
lagged behind prices paid by farmers, resulting in an overall decline in
purchasing power. North Dakota farmers alone lost more than $200 million
in purchasing power from 1948 to 1949, while farmers in the five states of
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Montana, and the two Dakotas together lost more than
one billion dollars.8 Added to the host of other statistical evidence, this
decline reinforces the contention that Americas farmers were indeed the
stepchildren of the economy.
Evidence also supports the Farmers Union premise that the largest of

7llMaJMffl..Eamer. May, 1951, p. 8; Facts for Farmers. October,
1950, p. 3; James G. Patton and Angus McDonald, “The Monopoly Squeeze/
Farm Policy Forum. IV (January, 1951), p. 31; Usher Burdick to Herb Hester,
August 21, 1950, Box 23, Folder 4, Usher L. Burdick Papers, University of
North Dakota. For one Congressman's discussion of the misguided consumer
charges of agrarian greed, see Address of the Honorable Albert Gore,
Chicago, Illinois, December 14,1949, Box 4, Jackson Papers.
8The Agricultural Situation. March, 1951, p. 2; U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics. 1960 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, I9 6 0 , p. 441; "Annual Report of Glenn J. Talbott,
President/ November 15, 1950, Folder *555, President Truman's Official
Files.
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America's agricultural concerns actively sought to drive the bulk of the
nation's family farmers out of business.

After peaking in 1935 at 6.8

million, the number of farms in the United States steadily declined to just
over six million in 1940 and then to 5.3 million by 1950.

A study of

twenty-four Farmers Union states showed a net loss of over 209,000 farms
in the five year period from 1945 to 1950. Eight of the states lost more
than ten thousand farms, and three of them declined by twenty thousand or
more. After making up 23.2 percent of the American population on the eve
of World War Two, American farmers declined to only 16.6 percent of the
population a decade later.9
The farms remaining in this shrinking environment represented what one
farm journal called "the polarization of American agriculture," and what Jim
Patton saw as an alarming trend toward “factories in the fields."10
Between 1940 and 1950, farms of less than 180 acres declined by fifteen
percent while farms of 500 acres or more increased by eleven percent. The
^The Agricultural Situation. November, 1951, p. 4; lowa union Farmer.
February, 1951, p. 7; Wayne D. Rasmussen, ed.. Agriculture m the United
States: A Documentary History. Volume 4 (New York: Random House, 1975),
p. 2917; Victor K. Heyman, "The National Farmers Union in its Political
World: A Case Study in Influence and the Factors of Influence Potential," PhD
dissertation (Washington University, 1957), p. 22; “This Is What's Happening
to American Agriculture," Box 5, Folder "Minutes, June 1945-December
1953," U.S. Farmers Association Records, University of lowa.
1°Facts for Farmers. July, 1952, p. 2; Patton, “Again the Call is for
Pioneers," pp. 9-10.
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average farm grew from 174 acres to 210 acres. But while the trend was
toward larger agricultural units, the vast majority of American farms
remained small family ventures.

Over three-fourths of the nation’s 5.3

million farms consisted of less than 180 acres, and nearly three-fourths of
these contained less than 100 acres.11
America's small farmers were not being physically removed from the
land, but they were falling farther and farther behind their corporate
counterparts in the race for economic stability. By 1950, the largest 1.8
percent of America's farms averaged a net income of over $16,600, while
fully 71 percent earned an annual income of $1,031 or less. When U.S. News
and World Report highlighted the "typical Kansas wheat farmer" as having a
net income of $11,350, it may have been typical for Kansas but it was
certainly misleading for the nation as a whole.12
As small family farms walked the edge of poverty, some observers
suggested that the poorest among them should seek other means of making a
living.

Speaking in defense of urban residents facing escalating grocery

11 Facts for Farmers. July, 1952, p. 2, Samuel Lubell highlighted the
division of American farmers into "haves" and “have nots" in "Divided We
Plow," chapter seven of his Revolt of the Moderates, pp. 154-175. The same
theme was carried through all of Grant McConnell, The Decline of American
Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).
12 lowa Union Farmer. May, 1951, p. 8; "Farm Profits: Another Good
Year." U.S. News and World Report XXV (December 10, 1948), pp. 22-23.
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prices, Henry Luce’s Life magazine in 1947 pointed the finger of blame at
the “3,800,000 marginal or submarglnal" farmers whose "ignorance,
Indigence, bad luck, bad health or poverty" had led to government assistance
and had therefore contributed to higher consumer costs.

Life’s proposed

solution, mirroring a U.S. Chamber of Commerce report of 1945, was to
encourage this marginal farm population to move to the cities where they
could work In more productive Industrial pursuits.

The business of

American agriculture would then be left In the hands of the two million
farmers whose supposedly more efficient techniques accounted for 858 of
U.S. commercial production. Sensing that "Jeffersonian Idealists and urban
sociologists" would oppose the plan for its repudiation of the family farm
as

“a prolific breeding ground for staunch citizenry," Life reminded its

readers that rural America had also produced the likes of John Dlllinger and
“Pretty Boy" Floyd.13 The caustic comment reflected not only the views of
Luce, but also the attitude of America’s Increasing number of corporate
agribusinesses for whom Jefferson’s agrarian ideal was a thing of the past.
On the third contention of the Farmers Union, that the demise of the
13“The Farmer. He Is a Dual Personality and Our Farm Policy Should
Recognize That Fact," Life XXII (May 5, 1947), p. 3 4 The Chamber of
Commerce study, entitled "Variations in Farm Income and Their Relations to
Agricultural Policies," was cited in Fred Stover, Peace and Parity (Des
Moines: lowa Union Farmer Association, 1953), p. 4.
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small farmer was caused in part by an "unholy alliance" between business
and government, the preponderance of evidence suggests that the Farmers
Union charge resembled more fact than fiction.

There is no proof of a

planned conspiracy against agriculture between government and business.
But the Truman administration’s preoccupation with containment and its
eagerness to enlist corporate America in the struggle against Communism
relegated both domestic concerns and the non-corporate community to the
back burner of American priorities. For an impoverished segment of society
that long had been struggling for economic equality, these were ominous
trends.
Like the Populists, their ideological ancestors of an earlier century,
National Farmers Union leaders advocated government action as a corrective
to social and economic inequality.

The organization had therefore hailed

such New Deal programs as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and
the Farm Security Administration and had been encouraged by the imposition
of government price controls during World War 11. Jim Patton and various
state leaders had also welcomed the government's wartime promise that
increased agricultural production to win the war would be rewarded by
guarantees that farmer “productive capacities would be protected after the
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war was over."

Acting on this promise, American farmers had expanded

production by one-third, allowing the nation to increase its agricultural
exports and the American consumer to eat better than he had in years.14
With the end of World War II, however, the promise of government
assistance to agriculture was forgotten.

Price controls were abandoned

after a bitter struggle between the Agriculture Department and the Office
of Price Administration.15

The removal of controls widened the gap

between farmer costs and income and led the Farmers Union to seek
economic

relief

through

increased

agricultural

parity

payments

Incorporated as a potential tool for economic restructuring in the 1933
Agricultural Adjustment Act,

parity

was a concept through which

agricultural prices were set at such a level as to allow farmers to maintain
the same relative economic status they had experienced in the base period
of 1910-1914. A parity figure of 100% meant that a farmer's costs and
income would in theory allow him to provide for his family in the same
manner as in the earlier period.16
14 lowa Union Farmer. October 12, 1946, p. 1.
^Details of the fight w ill be found in Barton Bernstein, "Clash of
Interests: The Postwar Battle Between the Office of Price Administration
and the Department of Agriculture," Agricultural History XLI (January,
1967), pp. 45-57.
,6 U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, May 13, 1952,
Parity Handbook: A Reference Manual on Parity Price. Index of Prices Paid by
Farmers, and Index of Prices Received, p. 2.
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Parity payments were passionately opposed by certain segments of the
American population. Fortune magazine labelled the concept an “outrage."
Ladd Haystead, who wrote an occasional farm column for Fortune, doubted
the need for any farm program at all. "Do my eyes deceive me," he wrote:
when I see outside of even the smallest farm town a big sign
directing me to the local Cadillac dealer? Or am I deceived again
when I come upon a consolidated school whose parking lot is filled
with Oldsmobile convertibles? Pop has the Cadillac, Junior has the
Oldsmobile, and my heart bleeds for the downtrodden farmer.
The Omaha World-Herald went so far as to question the loyalty of farmers
seeking government payments. Calling on Congress to abolish price support
programs altogether, the paper asked farmers to "put patriotism ahead of
hand-out-ism."

This viewpoint was taken to an added extreme by Don

Paarlberg, a future Elsenhower appointee, who referred to parity programs
as coming In "various shades of pink."

The Detroit News graphically

summarized opposition sentiment when it published a cartoon depicting the
government bowing down to the interests of the farmers.17
Partly In response to consumer complaints that guaranteed prices for
farmers caused higher food costs, Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan
17Fortune magazine was quoted in North Dakota Union Farmer. April 16,
1951, p. 1, while the Omaha World-Herald was quoted in Rockv Mountain
Union Farmer. January, 1951, p. 2; Haystead, “4th Semi-Annual Agricultural
Report" p. 14; Don Paariberg, “It’s Time for a New Look at Parity," Successful
Farming (September. 1951), p. 126: Detroit News. March 15, 1951, p. 36.
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In 1949 introduced what came to be known as the Brannan Plan, it called for
agricultural prices to seek their own levels In the marketplace, which in the
surplus situation then in existence meant lower prices for consumers. But
whenever prices fe ll below what was judged to be a fa ir return for the
farmers, the government would make up the difference between that price
and what had been received in the marketplace. To prevent corporate farms
from being the chief beneficiaries of the program, a provision was included
that prevented payments to farms producing above a certain lim it.18

HIGH FOOD
C O ST

PARITY
^

i

prices
TO

;

farmers

f c v iV .

. -i

Opposition to the Brannan Plan was as severe as it had been to the
18Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 263-268.
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concept of parity. Farm groups representing the nation's largest farmers
naturally protested their exclusion from

the program, Dot Indiana

Representative Cecil Harden uttered the most frequently heard criticism
when she condemned the plan as part of a trend toward ‘state socialism."
Fortune expressed the same concern, but was also angered that the program
had ‘utterly perverted" the idea of government assistance "from a valid idea
to protect the farmer from adversity to the demagogic and wholly ruinous
idea of maintaining an extraordinary level of prosperity, no matter what the
bill to the rest of the country."19
In defending Farmers Union requests for government involvement in the
economy, Jim Patton stood Fortune's argument on its head.

Far from

benefiting America's farmers, the nation's economic policies, he charged,
had in fact favored big business. Ever since the defeat of the Populists and
the Non-Partisan League by the "far-flung and better organized divisions of
monopoly," corporate America had imposed on the nation "an economy of
artificial scarcity maintained to create an artificial price to secure a
predetermined profit." Billed as a system of "free enterprise," it was, in
Patton's view, "neither a system nor free," but merely a "shibboleth paraded
1^Undated Terre Haute speech by Cecil Harden, Box 8, Folder 7, Cecil
Harden Papers, Indiana Historical Society; "Those Prosperous Farmers," p.
68.
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through the slick-paper magazine advertisements of giant corporations
seeking freedom for exploitation."20
This "free" enterprise system had a profound effect on small farmers.
According to its proponents, including leading figures in both the Farm
Bureau and the Grange, agricultural products, like all other items, would
locate their fa ir prices in a market regulated by the law of supply and
demand. Jim Patton disagreed. Convinced that, "While men are made by God,
markets and other institutions are made by men," he rejected the premise of
“an automatically operating free market system." Markets are "free," Patton
said,

"only within

a framework of

laws, property rights,

wealth

distribution, trade practices and other rules of the game" and were subject
also “to certain patterns of market power distribution." in other words, men
made the rules, and powerful men made rules advantageous to themselves.
Large businesses, with "access to corporate finance, decreasing cost
schedules, . . . and other means of conducting privately-managed price
support and market allocation programs," were at a clear advantage.
too, were the growing number of corporate farms

So,

whose use of

20National Union Farmer. October 1, 1946, p. 3; Patton, "Again the Call
is for Pioneers," p. 7; James G. Patton, “Agriculture Must Serve Mankind," an
address by James G. Patton Before the National Farm institute, Oes Moines,
lowa, February 16, 1946, Stover Papers, p. 2; Patton, “The Federal
Government's Role in the Postwar Economy," pp. 1126-1127.
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"monopolistic pricing policies" enabled them "to extort from consumers and
the rest of the market exhorbitant sums for food and fiber."

But for

America’s four million independent small agrarian producers, with none of
the advantages of corporate size and power, the laws of supply and demand
were, as Patton exclaimed in 1948, "a joke."21
The American economy, Fred Stover had argued as early as 1937, was
crippled by its acceptance of two mistaken assumptions: that "if big
business prospers all w ill prosper" and that "government regulation w ill
cause us to lose our economic freedom." Adoption of these Coolidge-like
tenets of laissez-faire capitalism had created what Jim Patton termed an
"economy of scarcity" in which the nation’s resources were controlled by a
handful of corporations. By arbitrarily adjusting production levels, these
industrial giants were able to maximize profits even in periods when the
rest of society was struggling for economic survival. Profit figures for any
number of American corporations, which Farmers Union newspapers and
other agricultural journals habitually published, confirmed the argument.22
21 James 6. Patton, "Implications of Agricultural Imports and Exports to
U.S. Farm Policies," Statement before the Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry, April 21, 1953, pp. 3-4, Stover Papers; Testimony of James G.
Patton, April 16, 1952, Farm Price Supports and Production Goals, p. 102;
NatJmLUnion Farmer. March, 1948, p. 6A.
22F.W. Stover, "What Kind of a Future Farm Program Do We Want?," radio
address, April 15, 1937, Stover Papers. Increasing corporate profits were
reported in a host of agricultural publications, including lowa Union Farmer.
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For the bulk of America’s farmers, thts situation created what Jim
Patton and Angus McDonald, who had joined the Farmers Union from the staff
of the New Republic, termed a “monopoly squeeze."

Farmers In need of

equtpment were forced to deal w ith the two companies that controlled “89
percent of all grain binders, 77 percent of all com planters, 75 percent of
all tractor-drawn cultivators, 68 percent of all tractors, 64 percent of hay
loaders, and 61 percent of all tractor plows.* When ready to market their
goods, they encountered the same problem, for a handful of companies
controlled distribution as well. Even if they were somehow able to bypass
the distributors, as the Farmers Union members In New Jersey had done by
selling directly to the consumer, they were s till faced with the reality of
purchasing "production and family needs in a protected scarcity market and
sellllng] their output in a freely competitive mass market over which they
[had] no control."23
For the nation's smallest farms, the squeeze took on an added dimension.
Pressured by the government to increase production, but outmaneuvered by
the cheaper costs of corporate agriculture, small farmers faced two
November 1950, p. 8, and May, 1951, p. 8, and in Facts for Farmers. October
1950, p.4.

23patton and McDonald, "The Monopoly Squeeze," pp. 30-31; Testimony
of James G. Patton, April 16, 1952, Farm Price Supports and Production
Goals, o. 103.
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options: either maintain full production and accept the accompanying decline
in profits, or reduce production and again accept lower profits, it was a nowin situation that in the opinion of the Farmers Union could only be
remedied through government Intervention.
To break the stranglehold of scarcity economics, Jim Patton proposed a
"road of abundance" program that relied not only on a greater role by the
government but also on full agricultural production.

He denied that he was

advocating socialism, arguing instead for a “mixed economy" somewhere
between "the privately-administered monopoly-controlled ‘free* market on
the one hand, and government-sponsored scarcity practices on the other."
The goal was to assure “a smoothly-functioning economy" that provided “an
ever-increasing standard of living, not to just a few at the top, but to all
our people." This, to Patton, was the true meaning of “free enterprise."24
Patton's argument for full production was based on his belief that the
government's approach and intensity during World War Two could be
duplicated in time of peace.

The leveling of mountains and remaking of

islands that had contributed to victory In war could be paralleled by an
24James 6. Patton, "Implications of Agricultural Imports and Exports,"
p. 19; James 6. Patton, "The Federal Government's Role in the Postwar
Economy," pp. 1126-1127; National Union Farmer. October 15, 1945, p. 5,
and March, 1948, p. 5A

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
equally extensive exploitation of human energy to bring about advances In
such programs as rural electrification, aid to education, and development of
the nation’s natural resources. For agriculture, such creativity would allow
for minimum price supports and guaranteed minimum Incomes, “incentive
payments to shift agricultural production from surplus commodities to
needed commodities," aid to disadvantaged farmers, and, perhaps most
importantly, "pricing policies. . . aimed at moving agricultural products Into
the places needed."

It would only succeed, however, if Industry ceased

restricting production "for the purpose of maintaining a predetermined price
and profit." And It would only succeed If the government took an active,
interventionist role in altering what Fred Stover said were "the economic
conditions which breed discontent."25
In April of 1944, the National Farmers Union had been belatedly Invited
to join the National Postwar Conference.

Pioneered by the National

Association of Manufacturers and originally consisting of sixteen "major
social and economic groups," the conference had met earlier In the year to
seek solutions to the "many serious problems which confront the nation

“

At the supposed urging of the Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation,
25James G. Patton, "Agriculture Must Serve Mankind," pp. 8-10; National
Union Farmer. April 1, 1947, p. 1; Fred Stover, "What Kind of a Future Farm
Program Do We Want?"
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and the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, all of which had been
among the original sixteen members, organization chairman Walter D. Fuller
extended the membership invitation to Jim Patton in a letter that announced
“complete equality on the part of each group in the proceedings."26
Patton’s response to Fuller was a succinct and bitter summary of the
Farmers Union anxiety over the growing power of American business.

In

rejecting the invitation, the Farmers Union president accused the N.A.M.initiated group of seeking "to mold policy apart from the constitutional,
democratic processes." The predominance of groups representing “business
and capital" and the relative absence of organizations serving the needs of
labor and “real dirt farmers" committed the conference, Patton wrote, to "a
conspiracy against the public interest." If successful in obtaining its goal,
which Patton saw as the "domination of public policy," this "stacked private
planning group" threatened to become a "super-government."27
When Farmers Union leaders focused their criticisms on the domestic
26Walter D. Fuller to James 6. Patton, April 7, 1944, and James G.
Patton to Walter D. Fuller, April 29,1944, Stover Papers. In addition to the
farm groups and the National Association of Manufacturers, the other
original sixteen members included the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce,
American Bankers Association, American Federation of Labor, American
Legion, Association of American Railroads, Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S.A., Committee for Economic Development, Congress of Industrial
Organizations, Investment Bankers Association of America, Kiwanis
international, National Foreign Trade Council, and Rotary International.
2?James G. Patton to Walter D. Fuller, April 29, 1944, Stover Papers.
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aspects of scarcity economics, they rarely included President Truman on
their lengthy list of notable villains. The names Morgan, Mellon, DuPont,
Pew, Hoover, Dulles, and Forrestal were featured on a regular basis,
particularly in the lowa Union Farmer.28 but the President generally
escaped the organization's wrath.

In fact, his announced support for the

Brannan Plan and his pursuit of both full employment and abundant
production drew applause from some organization spokesmen, including
Gordon Roth, the public relations director for the Farmers Union Grain
Terminal Association.29

Perhaps accepting corporate greed as an

historical trend beyond the control of any one man, and grateful that in some
respects Harry Truman's domestic Fair Deal mirrored the New Deal policies
of Franklin Roosevelt, the Farmers Union levied only occasional attacks on
the President's seeming failure to make government a more outspoken
advocate for the needs of the small farmer.
When turning their attention to the relationship between scarcity
economics and foreign policy, however, Farmers Union leaders openly
rebuked the President. American dealings with the rest of the world, they
28See, for example, lowa Union Farmer. September 28, 1946, p. 1, and
April 17, 1948, p. I.

29g0rdon Roth, “Food for Freedom" radio address, January 13, 1946, p.
4, Stover Papers.
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argued, were something that a U.S. President could directly influence. How
he chose to position the United States in the international arena would
impact significantly on American ties with other nations. More importantly,
the President's stand in foreign affairs was also seen as establishing the
moral tone for the nation’s future. When Harry Truman reneged on wartime
assurances that the United States could cooperate with the Soviet Union and
chose instead to create what Glenn Talbott called “a blind, unreasoning fear
of Russia and the Communists,"30 he abandoned the high road of principle.
By generating an atmosphere in which prevention of Soviet expansion
became the overriding priority of the nation, and by encouraging overseas
business expansion as one means of achieving that result, Harry Truman lost
sight of the more noble goals of internationalism and unwittingly abetted
what the Farmers Union condemned as the “unholy alliance’ between
government and business.
Disputing the Truman administration’s contention that it was unselfishly
assisting in the rebuilding of a war-torn world, the Farmers Union charged
that the government was instead promoting the "rapacious imperialism of a
privileged few."31 Just as Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge had vowed in
30National Union Farmer. March, 1948, p. 1.
31 Address of F.W. Stover to Australian Peace Congress, Melbourne,
Australia, April 19, 1950, Stover Papers.
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1898 that, "the trade of the world shall be ours,"32 and just as the National
Bankers Association had in that same decade proposed "an imperialism of
capital to govern the world,"33 so now were government and business said
to be teaming up to control the resources of the world. The benefits for
business were, as Patton informed the Chicago Conference of Progressives
in

1946, the “exorbitant profits found in foreign investments and

exploitation of resources in countries with living standards lower than
ours."34

For the government the advantage lay in the deterrent to

communist expansion provided by the spread of American interests abroad.
Such a program of postwar corporate imperialism had been frequently
advocated during the course of the war. Virgil Jordan, the president of the
National

Industrial

Conference

Board,

told

an

Investment

Bankers

Association convention in December of 1940 that in the aftermath of the
conflict the United States would be embarking "on a career of imperialism
in world affairs" that would take the nation "southward in our hemisphere
and westward in the Pacific." Two months later, in presenting his case for
an American Century, Henry Luce noted that in the decades after the war
32Fred Stover, "Production, Ideas, and Wars: An Outline," undated
article in Stover Papers, p. 8.
33pred Stover, The Contest Between the People and the Plunderers
(Hampton, iowa: U.S. Farmers Association, 1951), pp. 8-9.
^^National Union Farmer. October 1, 1946, p. 3.
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"Asia. . . w ill be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year."35
When the United States emerged from World War Two in a position of
unparallelled strength, the call for empire continued.

A March 2, 1947,

article in the Chicago Journal of Commerce, w ritten by Austin Kipiinger and
entitled, "U.S. Must Accept New Role as imperialist," argued that:
The United States can produce more than its present capacity to
consume
We sell the excess abroad. And since the rest of the
world is not up to our standard of production, we must decide what to
take in payment. We can let the deficit stand as a debt which w ill
probably never be paid. Or--and this is where imperialism comes in—
we can take ownership of properties throughout the world and help to
run them.36
Klplinger's views bore a remarkable resemblance to Senator Beveridge's
1898 observation that, "American factories are making more than the people
can use," and that therefore "American law, American order, American
civilization, and the American flag [should] plant themselves on shores
hitherto bloody and benighted."37
When President Truman announced his plans for Greek and Turkish aid
shortly after Kiplinger’s article, at least one Farmers Union official was
convinced of collusion between the administration and American business.
Pointing to the purchase by Standard Oil of New Jersey of "$300 million in
35Fred Stover, "Production, Ideas, and Wars," p. 8; Henry Luce, "The
American Century," U fe X (February 17, 1941), pp. 6 1-65.
’ ^Quoted in Stover, The Contest, pp. 9-10.
37Quoted in Stover, The Contest, pp. 14-15.
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Near Eastern oil on the same day that Truman submitted his proposal to
Congress," Fred Stover labelled the Truman Doctrine an "oil doctrine."
Rather than "serving Its announced purpose of helping people threatened by
Communism," It was in fact assisting American corporations in "the most
colossal oil grab in history." Operating behind the Truman Doctrine's smoke
screen of political ideology and subsidized by public tax dollars, America’s
oil monopolists were pursuing "the wonders of private enterprise"
abroad.38
The suggestion of govemment-business collusion was reinforced by the
direct

ties

between

American

corporations

and

specific

Truman

administration officials. Secretary of Defense James ForrestaVs links with
Dillon, Read and Company, a business w ith "a huge financial stake in Middle
Eastern oil," caused the biggest stir, but John Foster Dulles' business ties
were not far behind. The list of profit-seeking corporations with direct
links to the administration included Studebaker, Pepsi-Cola, and the Texas
Oil Company.

Interestingly, a number of officials working directly with

European reconstruction held executive positions in Time Corporation, home
of Henry Luce and the American Century. The pattern seemed to reflect the
1946 advice of Standard Oil treasurer Leo D. Welch. "Private enterprise," he
38 lowa Union Farmer. April 19, 1947, p. 4, and June 21, 1947, p. 4.
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had said, "must begin to evolve its foreign policy, starting with the most
important contribution it can make—men in government!"39
Regarded as even more threatening than the ties between government
officials and private corporations was the apparent desire of America's
"corporate manipulators" to re-establish ties with their old European cartel
partners. The “diabolical" nature of the attempt was seen in the fact that
many of their former partners were individuals and corporations who had
supported the fascist policies of both Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini.
Fred stover pointed to the revival of Germany's l.G. Farben industry as a
typical example, while Jim Patton saw the same design in the 1949 attempt
to grant an Export-lmport Bank loan to Franco's Spain. What made the latter
case even more disturbing to Patton was that pressure for the loan was
being exerted by representatives of the Anderson-Clayton Company, a
Houston corporation bearing the name, and by inference the support, of
Assistant Secretary of State W ill Clayton. After having fought a world war
to eliminate these forces, the untted States was now seeking to re-create
the status quo by establishing business ties with "the vast cartels,
combines, monopolies, and conspiracies that [had previously] governed the
economy of Europe and [had] thrust their tentacles throughout the colonial
39 low a Union Farmer. April 17,1948, p. I, and January 15, 1949, p. 4
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areas of the world."

The desire to do so meant that the American

government would have to conveniently and silently violate wartime
agreements signed for the express purposes of eradicating Nazi Ism and
limiting German war potential.

The most tragic element of the plan,

according to Stover, was that the whole effort was being financed "with
public funds skillfully wangled out of Congress in the name of European
relief."40
Public funds were also being used to build up what the Farmers Union
perceived as a particularly potent element of the unholy alliance, the
American m ilitary.

President Truman’s calls for increased m ilitary

spending were seen as being prompted not only by the desire to contain
Soviet expansion through m ilitary encirclement but also by the need to
protect corporate interests abroad. A 1946 Iowa Farmers Union resolution
condemned “the extension of the United States monopolies into the world
markets under the protection of a world-wide American m ilitary force."
When aid to Greece and Turkey was condemned a year later as a "colossal oil
grab," the Iowa group made note of the protection provided to the effort
through the growing number of American airfields

in the eastern

^ lo w a Union Farmer. April 17, 1948, p. 1; National Farmers Union
press release, April 27, 1948, Stover Papers; James G. Patton to Will
Clayton, May 13, 1949, and James G. Patton to Dean Acheson, May 13, 1949,
852.51/5-1349, Box 6350, Record Group 59.
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Mediterranean.

What particularly puzzled and angered Fred Stover, once

again, was that great amounts of public money were being used to protect
private investments. "Whenever," he told an Australian audience in 1950,
"an American monopoly or investment banker wants to Invest some of their
corporate profits abroad, then our m ilitary forces must go along to provide
public protection for free private enterprise." Stover found himself “at a
loss to know what to call a system where we socialize the losses and
individualize the gains."41
The added Ingredient of the m ilitary as a fixture of the unholy alliance
moved some Farmers Union figures to conclude

that

the Truman

administration was preparing for a third world war.

New York's Archie

Wright assessed the "aggressive policy of business expansion In foreign
lands" as the vanguard of an administration program "bent to big business
interests" and promoting the development of a “warfare state." Huge stocks
of surplus goods In the hands of several large corporations led to Wright's
conclusion that "one of two things is certain to happen. Either, we have the
biggest economic bust the world has ever seen, or, we go by successive
steps to war." Adding to the equation the fact that European "purchases [of
41 Iowa Union Farmer. September 28, 1946, p. 1, April 19, 1947, p. 4,
and June 21, 1947, p. 4; Address of F.W. Stover to Australian Peace
Congress, Melbourne, Australia, April 19, 1950, Stover Papers.
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American goods] have been heavier than any year except just previous to
World War ll," Wright concluded in June of 1950 that, "chances of war are
great In the next 6 -24 months."

In any case, he argued in quoting from

Washington Farm Letter editor Wayne Darrow, "You may as well make your
plans on a basis that the U.S. Is moving.Into a war economy... whether war
develops or not."42
The Farmers Union belief that the United States was sponsoring a
program of "world wide corporate totalitarianism" led It to closely monitor,
and to frequently criticize, the nation’s foreign policy decisions.

As a

proponent of Internationalism, Jim Patton had favored the creation of both
the internaticnal Monetary Fund and the World Bank. But by 1948 he was
disturbed that their originally intended purpose as a source of public
funding for
subverted.

international

development and reconstruction

had been

They now appeared to him to be under the control of

"international private banking concerns' who viewed the agencies as
Instruments for private profit.

Just as he criticized the Truman

administration for failing to fully support such United Nations organizations
42Archie Wright, "To All Officers and Delegates," June 6, 1950, Box 3,
New York Milk Shed Records; Archie Wright, "To All Officers and Delegates,"
July 7, 1950, Box 4, Folder 25, Fred Briehl Papers, 1911-1974, Collection
*3474, Cornell University; Northeastern Union Farmer. November, 1951, p. 1.
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as F.A.O. and U.N.R.R.A., Patton now argued that the United States was not
taking adequate steps to wrest control of the I.M.F. and World Bank from the
hands of private investors.43
Believing that restrictive trade policies had contributed directly to
World War Two, the National Farmers Union also called on the Truman
administration

to

reject

scarcity-producing,

individually

negotiated

commodity agreements and to pursue instead reciprocal trade packages that
would lead to “the freer exchange of agricultural and industrial goods
between nations.- Such an approach, the Union fe lt, would allow the United
States “to import the commodities of other nations so as to enable them to
buy from us." Jim Patton strongly protested the closing of House Ways and
Means committee hearings on extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act in 1948, and warned that the act's near defeat was sponsored by
“special interest groups* whose alarming efforts would be seen by the world
“as evidence that the United States [had] not wholly abandoned its prewar
economic isolationism.-44
In line with their desire for open trade, Patton and the National Farmers
43National Union Farmer. April 1, 1947, p. 1 and March, 1948, p. 5A.
44Nationa) Union Farmer. April 15, 1946, p. 1 of "program section;"
Robert and Rosalind Engler, "The Farmers Union in Washington," (September,
1948), pp. 82-83; Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," May 10,
1948, pp. 3-4.
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Union also favored lowering world ta riff barriers as a way of Improving the
living standards and full employment opportunities for people in all nations.
Typical of the organization's views on ta riffs was Its flay, 1950, protest of
proposed restrictions on oil imports. Expressing his opposition both to New
York congressman Eugene J. Keogh and to Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
Farmers

Union

legislative

secretary

Russell

Smith

spoke

of

the

organization's "long-standing advocacy of gradual and steady reduction of
barriers of all kinds to International trade."

Oil Import restrictions, he

argued, would hit particularly hard at United States trade with Venezuela,
"one of the few countries which Is able to accumulate American dollars in
sufficient quantity to make purchases in this country without the necessity
of elaborate government loans or grants by us in order that it may do so."
Beyond damaging trade with our South American neighbor, Smith wrote, the
proposed restrictions would also hamper the much-needed goal of bringing
all nations together "as functioning members of the world economy.’45
Farmers Union faith in reciprocity and its rejection of re s tric tio n s
trade policies even led the organization to oppose programs that clearly
favored the American agricultural community.

When 1t was suggested in

45Russell Smith to Dean Acheson, May 31, 1950, and Russell Smith to
Eugene J. Keogh, May 31, 1950,400.116/5-3150, Box 1745, Record Group 59;
Robert and Rosalind Engler, "The Farmers Union in Washington," p. 82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117
1949 that European nations receiving Marshall Plan assistance be required
to buy U.S. surplus farm crops, the Farmers Union joined with the Farm
Bureau and the National Grange in protesting the scheme. ‘Much as the farm
organizations want to market their surplus crops," the three groups jointly
announced, "we feel it would be a serious blunder for us to assume the
responsibility of dictating to the European nations what they must buy." A
proposal a year later to substitute one billion dollars of federally owned
farm surpluses for one-third of the funds requested for E.C.A. operation was
also jointly rejected. Passage of such a plan would, the farmers argued,
"lend substance to the Russian claim that America is using E.C.A. for the
purpose of dumping Its farm surpluses."

Farmers Union opposition to

Washington Senator Warren Magnuscn’s 1949 and 1950 efforts to Impose
protective ta riffs on foreign agricultural imports offered further evidence
that the organization's dedication to open trade transcended agrarian selfinterest.46
in what was clearly an exception to its philosophy and general practices,
the Farmers Union in April of 1950 did attempt to influence American trade
policy to the advantage of the nation's farmers,

informed by California

^Russell Smith to Eugene J. Keogh, May 31, 1950, Record Group 59;
Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," August 1, 1949, p. 1, and
March 27, 1950, pp. 1-2; U.S. Congress, Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Session,
Congressional Record, p. 14317.
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vegetable growers that the importation of Egyptian onions "threatened] the
entire onion industry in the United States," Russell Smith asked the State
Department to intervene by invoking the infrequently used “escape clause." A
part of the reciprocal trade program that allowed for "protection in special
instances," the clause, to Smith's knowledge, had never been invoked for the
benefit of American farmers, in light of what Smith saw as "a rising trend
both in agriculture and labor groups toward renewed resistance to the
lowering of U.S. ta riff barriers," he warned that refusal to ever invoke such
cushions as the escape clause would amount to an "over-zealous application
of a good principle" that would in fact, he said, "damage the principle
itself."47
The attempt to lim it the importation of Egyptian onions was a rare
exception to the Farmers Union stance that favored open international trade,
its consistent support for the International Wheat Agreement and its
criticisms of the Senate’s "short-sighted provincialism" in delaying
approval of the program in 1948 were more typical of the Farmers Union
acceptance of international cooperation.48
47Russel1 Smith to Carl D. Corse, April 25, 1950, 411.0031/4-2550,
Box 1804, Record Group 59.
^Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," August 23, 1948, p. 3;
Testimony of James G. Patton, May 23, 1949, U.S. Congress, Senate, 81st
Congress, I st Session, The International Wheat Agreement: Hearings Before
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No administration program received as much Farmers Union attention as
Secretary of State George Marshall’s plan for European recovery. After
failing in their efforts to havd the Marshall Plan coordinated through the
United Nations, Jim Patton and other prominent figures in the Farmers Union
reluctantly supported the program as the only available alternative. Even in
their support, however, they consistently challenged the plan as both short
sighted and misguided and as reinforcing the inequalities of America’s
economic status quo.
Begun at a time when the government was pushing for full production,
the European Recovery Program offered a potential windfall to American
agriculture.

The government-sponsored opening of European markets for

agricultural products as part of the design to revive the European economy
was hailed as the farmers' saving grace by The Christian Science Monitor
and as "an export subsidy on a grand scale" by later historians.49 Farmers
Union officials and patrons, however, judged It quite differently. To them,
the Marshall

Plan represented

at

best

only

short-term

benefits.

Agricultural exports may temporarily increase, Fred stover argued, but
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 69.
^Frederick W. Carr, "ERP: Farmers’ Dividend," The Christian Science
Monitor. June 18, 1949, p. 5; John T. Schlebecker, Whereby We Thrive: A
History of American Farming. 1607-1972 (Ames: The Iowa State University
Press, 1975), p. 278.
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without proper safeguards the program would accomplish little more than
"taking food away from our poor and giving it to the poor in Europe." The end
result may be European stability, but "only at the cost of sacrificing
stabilization at home."50
Stover was supported in this view by Minnesota's Jim Youngdale, a
former Congressional candidate and an avid supporter of the Farmers Union.
Writing to the Iowa Union Farmer in January of 1949, Youngdale criticized
the Marshall Plan as "a device to maintain a temporary false prosperity at
home by dumping . . . goods on foreign markets to dispose of potential
surpluses."

Less convinced than Stover of the program's potential to

promote European stabilization, Youngdale wrote that, "The effect w ill be to
create a glut abroad and to cause unemployment and depression . . . .

Once

foreign markets are glutted, the surpluses w ill pile up here to cause a
depression at home."51
Fortune magazine agreed that the program was being used "as a dumping
mechanism for U.S. exports" and announced that, “many Congressmen took for
granted, when ECA was passed, that it would be used for disposing of farm
50Address by F.W. Stover, New Party Convention, Mitchell, South
Dakota, June 27, 1948, p. 6, Stover Papers; Iowa Union Farmer. November
15, 1947, p. 4.
5 * Iowa Union Farmer. January 15, 1949, p. 4.
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gluts." It even published a cartoon showing a distressed Secretary Srannan
hoping for ECA assistance In disposing of agricultural surpluses. Fortuned
concern, however, was not that the practice was harmful to farmers In the
long run but that It "accelerateldl the current worldwide d rift toward state
controls and statist direction of trade."52

The Farmers Union contention that Increases In agricultural exports were
merely temporary was supported by Department of Agriculture statistics.
After peaking at $3,830,000,000 In 1948, agricultural exports declined by
$844,000,000 In 1949.

That same year, agricultural imports exceeded

exports for the firs t time since before World war Two. To New Jersey’s
Waldo McNutt, the Truman administration’s obsession with deterring
communism was responsible for the sudden drop In agricultural exports.
52"The Misuse of ECA." Fortune XXXIX (April, 1949), pp. 74-5.
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Selling products only to those nations considered essential in the fight
against communism, and denying products to nations that had come under
the control of the Soviet Union, clearly limited the nation’s overseas
markets. McNutt rejected the approach as narrow-minded and called instead
for a policy that would allow American farmers open access to all markets,
not just those dictated by the political fetishes of the Washington
establishment.53
In addition to critiquing the Marshall Plan as both short-sighted and
misguided, the Farmers Union also criticized it for contributing to the
growth of the nation’s most powerful economic elements.

In a letter to

E.C.A administrator Paul Hoffman, Jim Patton expressed his concern that
shipments to Europe were being funneled through "the biggest units of
Industry and business.” He urged Hoffman to use European recovery as an
opportunity to enhance not the "great aggregations of economic power," but
the small businesses and cooperatives of the nation. "Every effort," Patton
wrote, "must be exerted to enable cooperatives to become the principal
channels of supply on this side and the principal channels of distribution on
the other side." There is no evidence that Hoffman followed Patton’s advice.
53U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, i960, p. 593;
North Dakota Union Farmer. November 6, 1950, p. 2; Iowa Union Farmer.
October 12, 1946, p. I.
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Nor is there any Indication that the administration of the Marshall Plan
changed Patton's earlier expressed opinion that government officials were
not sincerely Interested in the needs of either starving Europeans or
America's small farmers.54
Fred Stover and Jim Youngdale were more blunt in their analyses of the
economic implications of the Marshall Plan, stover assessed the program as
"a colossal swindle by which countless billions of dollars are extracted
from United States tax payers to insure Wail Street Interests. . . ."
Youngdale contended that the only people who would benefit from the plan
would be the “big business tycoons" who were running it.

Both opinions

were the result of a widely held belief, in Farmers Union circles, that the
Marshall Plan's originally expressed intention of providing economic relief
for Europe had been quickly forgotten. In its place was a scheme designed
by the "unholy" alliance of government and business to provide noncommunist European nations with sufficient m ilitary equipment to ward off
the potential threat of communist expansion.

As Marshall Plan nations

54Farmers Union press release on European Recovery Program, April 27,
1948, Stover Papers. Patton’s earlier doubts about the sincerity of Truman
officials included his 1945 questionning of the State Department's loyalty
to F.A.O. director general Sir John Orr’s world agricultural program, and his
1946 request for the recall of Herbert Hoover from his food mission abroad.
Department of State, "Opinions and Activities," November 23, 1945, p. 2, and
April 8, 1946, p. 5.
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were, in the words of the North Dakota Union Farmer, "required to spend
more and more of their dollar credits on armaments," the Marshall Plan
became less

a program for European economic recovery and more an

extension of the American policy of containment. "Guns, not butter" became
the cry of Marshall Plan administrators and of Wall Street concerns for
whom the transfer of m ilitary equipment meant a greater profit than that
found in the sale of agricultural produce.55
North Dakota's Glenn Talbott was equally critical of corporate Intentions.
While he stressed the importance of European markets for agricultural
surpluses, he criticized those who looked upon European recovery as an
opportunity solely for profit. His position that the primary goal of European
recovery must be the promotion of the general welfare led to a heated
discussion with Missouri's conservative Republican Senator James P. Kern.
During an October, 1947, subcommittee hearing, Kern proposed that the
United States consider assistance to Europe only after thoroughly examining
what European nations could give the United States in return.

Talbott

argued that assistance should be provided even without assurances of
55Address by F.W. Stover, New Party Convention, Mitchell, South
Dakota, June 27, 1948, p. 6, Stover Papers; Iowa Union Farmer. November
15, 1947, p. 4, and January 15, 1949, p. 4; North Dakota Union Farmer.
November 6, 1950, p. 2.
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repayment.

Such an approach, he fe lt, would help everyone avoid the

possibility of war.56
Aside from this laudable dedication to a cooperative spirit in the
international arena, what made the Farmers Union critique of U.S. foreign
policy so impressive was its repeated insistence that what went on in the
realm of foreign affairs was irrevocably linked to the domestic scene. Time
and again in these early postwar years, Farmers Union spokesmen returned
to this theme of interconnectedness as the chief reason why, as Glenn
Talbott put it, farmers had "no choice but to take an active and vigorous
interest in our foreign policy."57
In testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its 1948
hearings on the Marshall Plan, Jim Patton insisted that the nation's farmers
supported the overseas shipment of fe rtilize r and farm machinery as part of
the European Recovery Program. Their willingness to do so, however, would
not continue if the exports were used by businesses as an excuse to increase
prices for these products at home. To prevent this from happening, Patton
urged the government to re-impose domestic price controls. Only in this
way could farmers be assured that a plan to put Europe back on its feet did
56Statement of Glenn Talbott, October 8, 1947, Prices of Consumers
Goods, op. 1979-2014, Record Group 128.
57Statement of Glenn Talbott, October 8, 1947, Prices of Consumers
Goods, pp. 1977-1980, Record Group 128.
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not also result in further harm to the already damaged state of the nation's
farmers.58
This link between foreign and domestic policies was also addressed by
Fred Stover.

He noted that programs such as the Marshall Plan would

continue to place unnecessary burdens on the “low income groups in our
population" unless the government took measures to protect both American
consumers and American farmers.

While he did not deny the need for

overseas markets for American goods, Stover did question the argument of
American business that foreign markets were necessary because Americans
were unable to consume all that was produced in the United States. It was
not the inability to consume. Stover argued, but the inability to purchase
that created difficulties for Americans. Industry's unwillingness to provide
fa ir wages for their workers stood in stark contrast to their equally
strident refusal to lower prices while accumulating increased profits. It
was this greed of American corporations that not only limited the
purchasing power of the nation's citizens but also furthered the corporate
insistence on the need for overseas expansion.59
58Testimony of Jim Patton, January 26,
Program, p. 932.

1948, European Recovery

59lowa Union Farmer. November 15, 1947, p. 4; Address of F.W. Stover
to Australian Peace Congress, Melbourne, Australia, April 19, 1950, Stover
Papers.
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Gordon Roth also focused on the link between domestic and foreign
policies when he chastised American corporations for their efforts to
curtail wage and price controls at home while simultaneously hoarding
steel, copper, and other materials critical to European recovery.

While

businesses defended their actions as part of a ’ crusade to save private
enterprise and the American way of life,' Roth portrayed them Instead as
part and parcel of a ’fourteen carat gold-plated reactionary thinking" that
hurt farmers at home, promoted mass starvation abroad, and disguised the
true goal of increased corporate profits.60
For New York's Archie Wright, U.S. foreign policy was particularly
destructive to American agriculture.

Unlike many of his Farmers Union

counterparts, who saw the chief danger to farmers lying in the restriction
of overseas markets or in the growing strength of American business,
Wright feared that the real problem would be the mindless destruction of
the nation's land. The ‘so-called defense effort’ was being run by ’industry
minded" officials who had no knowledge of agriculture.

They thought,

Wright argued, that food =is like the air, it's Just everywhere and all you
have to do to stock up is to go to a grocery store and if you want to eat you
^Gordon Roth, "Food for Freedom" radio addresses, January 13, March
3, and September 22, 1946, Stover Papers.
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go to a restaurant." Combining their lack or agricultural understanding with
their desire for full production as a weapon against communism resulted In
a policy that in the end would spell “common disaster for all." Agriculture,
in particular, would "curl up like a leaf in the fire."61
Wright’s commentary spoke volumes about the position of America’s
small farmers In the early years of the Cold War. The family farm faced
economic extinction not only because of a lengthy national tradition of
taking the farming community for granted and not only because of corporate
agriculture’s pervasive growth, but also because the Truman administration
was both Inadequately prepared and increasingly unwilling to avert its eyes
from its primary focus on foreign affairs.

The overwhelming interest in

containing the spread of Soviet communism, and the obvious attraction of
using overseas corporate expansion 3S a means of promoting that end, left
small farmers in the ranks of the forgotten, in a world where the games of
power and Influence were played on a zero-sum field, the result was a
reafflrmatton of the small farmer as the stepchild of the American
economy.
This Is not to argue that Harry Truman deliberately contrived behind
61 Archie Wright, "To All Officers and Delegates," June 6, 1951, Box 1,
Folder "Delegate Letters, 1948-1951," New York Milk Shed Records; "Archie
Wright's Report to the Farmers Union Convention," October 7, 1950, Box 1,
Folder "1950 Convention," New York Milk Shed Records.
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closed doors to deny economic advancement to the nation's family farmers.
In fact, his public support for small farmers as the backbone of Jeffersonian
democracy was in aii iikeiinood an honest expression of his personal
feelings. But, like other presidential figures who followed him in the years
of the Cold War, the seduction to focus too exclusively on foreign affairs
was overwhelming.

In yielding to this temptation, Harry Truman allied

himself with the corporate entities more able to benefit him in the struggle
with communism. His decision reinforced the Farmers Union belief that an
"unholy alliance," detrimental to the interests of small farmers, was a very
real part of the power structure of the nation.
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Chapter Four

Weathering the Storm
Twentieth century critics of American foreign policy have never fared
well either at the hands of the government or at the altar of public opinion.
Dissenters have often faced overzealous governmental scrutiny, and
domestic opponents have frequently reveled in their role of public pariah.
They have also suffered from internal dissension, experiencing on numerous
occasions

organizational

divisiveness

brought

about

by

public

or

governmental pressures, it was not surprising, then, that the Farmers Union
dissent from President Trumans international policies earned for the
organization the suspicion of the American press, the animosity of
administration and congressional agencies, the ridicule of its chief agrarian
rival, and the enmity of internal critics.
weathered well the storm of criticism.

The organization publicly

But the attacks on the Union

exacted a heavy price, and by the closing months of 1950 the Farmers Union
would be consumed by a bitter organizational dispute over the direction of
American foreign policy.
Attacks on the National Farmers Union inevitably focused on charges of

130
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organizational sympathy with, or even direct control by, Communist agents.
Studies of the role of the Communist Party in American agriculture have
correctly warned against overestimating the strength of this relationship.
William Pratt, for example, in a 1985 article entitled "Radicals, Farmers,
and Historians," argued that "farmers never were a high priority" either for
American socialists or communists, for "with the demise of historical
Populism in the 1890‘s, the focus of the left in the United States shifted
from the countryside to the city."1 Pratt acknowledged the presence of
Communists or Communist sympathizers within the Farmers Union, but his
final assessment of their role in shaping the organization’s policies was in
line with Lowell Dyson’s earlier judgment that "farm work was always the
party’s poor stepchild."

"Given the individualistic nature of American

farmers," Dyson argued, "Communists had always worked at a disadvantage"
when trying to transform the nations agrarian population into Communist
revolutionaries.2
Contemporaries of the National Farmers Union, however, were convinced
1William c. Pratt, "Radicals, Farmers, and Historians: Some Recent
Scholarship about Agrarian Radicalism in the Upper Midwest," North Dakota
History Lll (Fall. 1985), p. 18.
^Lowell Dyson, Red Harvest: The Communist Party and American
Farmers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 202. See also
William C. Pratt, "Farmers, Communists, and the FBI in the Upper Midwest,"
Agricultural History LXII (Summer, 1989), pp. 61-80.
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that the group had succumbed to the internal borings of Communist moles.
In the prevalent hysteria of the early Cold War, no other rationale seemed
capable of explaining the organization’s outspoken and seemingly misguided
criticisms of American policy.

While the evidence used to justify the

accusations consisted almost exclusively of contrived fabrication, much of
the American public accepted as gospel truth that the Farmers Union was, if
not directly controlled by Moscow, at least sympathetic to Soviet aims.
Typical of this public perception was the astonished statement of a
Pennsylvania woman upon learning that the courts had ruled In favor of the
Farmers Union in a libel case.

"What was wrong with the courts," she

wanted to know. "Was it not well established that the Farmers Union was
Communist infiltrated?"3
The impression had been Imbedded in the public psyche even before the
conclusion of World War Two, most notably through an October, 1944,
article in the conservative Farm Journal entitled “Communist Beachhead in
Agriculture." Piecing together shaky strands of what would be considered in
almost any court of law largely circumstantial evidence, author Robert
Cruise McManus announced that the Farmers Union "Is not yet, by any
3Irene B. Stanford to Ezra Benson, April 15, 1953, Box 2320, Folder
“Publications 4-2," Record Group 16 (General Correspondence).
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means,reduced to the status of a Communist capttve, but it is time that all
farmers clearly understand what Is going on." With apologies to Jim Patton,
whom he suspected was merely an unwitting victim of Communist Intrigue,
McManus presented his damning evidence of Farmers Union collusion with, or
sympathy for, Communist front organizations.4
The role played by Charles Egley, the general manager of the St. Paul
Farmers Union Livestock Commission Company, as 1940-1941 director of
the American Peace Mobilization, was offered by McManus as one piece of
evidence.

The A.P.M., a group that had protested the nation's defense

policies and which, according to McManus, advocated a "program of sabotage"
against the government, was also said to be supported by six other Farmers
Union leaders: Alabama's Gerald Harris, Louisiana's Clinton Clark, South
Dakota’s E.H. Chrum,

Montana's

H.5.

Bruce,

Ohio's

H.R.

Lenox,

and

Pennsylvania's Solon Philips. That none of these individuals was prominent
In the making of National Farmers Union policy indicated just how far
McManus had stretched 1n his questionable efforts to prove guilt by
association.
McManus pursued the same line of attack with two other charges: that
the Farmers Union's Washington, D.C. representative, Paul Sifton, was a
^Robert Cruise McManus, "Communist Beachhead in Agriculture," Farm
Journal LXV1II (October, 1944), pp. 23, 84-85.
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member of the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, a
group characterized as "the legal arm of the Communist party," and that the
Farmers Union had an odd relationship with Farm Research Incorporated,
publishers of Facts for Farmers. Both the National Farmers Union and Farm
Research, wrote McManus, had received financial backing from the Marshall
Fund, a program established "under the w ill of the late Robert Marshall, a
young millionaire of Communist leanings." In addition. Farm Research had
been founded in 1932 by Lem Harris, former secretary of the Communist
Party of Minnesota, and its Facts for Farmers, wrote McManus, "consistently
followed] the Communist line in its editorial policies."

The intended

impression, of course, was that in aligning itself with a group that
"followed the Communist line" the Farmers Union was either a mindless
dupe of, or a subversively intentional proponent of, a Moscow-directed
program of Communist expansion. In the narrow-minded atmosphere of the
times, McManus was unwilling to grant the possibility that, in opposing
American foreign policy, the Farmers Union acted as an independent agent
whose views happened to coincide with those of Facts for Farmers.
The Farmers Union also shared the views of Farm Front, a paper published
by the New York State Farm Commission of the Communist Party.5 In fact,
5Lowell

Dyson,

“Radical

Farm Organizations

and

Periodicals
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the Farmers Union was heartily praised by Farm Front as "the most
democratic of the great farm groups" and as performing "a genuine service
to agriculture."5 The journal often carried Farmers Union news, and its
opinions were frequently identical to those expressed by Jim Patton, Glenn
Talbott, Fred Stover, and Archie Wright. As the Cold War became more and
more a fact of life. Farm Front echoed the Farmers Union by supporting both
United Nations activity over unilateral American programs and passage of
the Brannan Plan as a corrective to the Cold War-inspired "economic
difficulties" of the nation's farmers.7

It similarly mirrored the Farmers

Union in rejecting American support for the non-democratic government of
Greece, administration attempts to use food as a weapon to influence
European politics, and the efforts of Wall Street bankers to use the Cold War
"to conquer the markets of the world."8

That the Farmers Union could

America, 1920-1960." Agricultural History XLV (April, 1971), p. 117.
6H.K Tharin, "Are Farmers Really Organized," Farm Front. May, 1945, p.
4.
7George Cook, "Farmers Union Convention," Farm Front. November,
1949, p. I; Fred Briehl, “Greece, Turkey, and Farmers," Farm Front. April,
1947, p. 1; George Cook, "The Marshall Plan and the Farmer," Farm Front.
November, 1947, p. 2; George Cook, "Farmers and Foreign Policy," Farm Front.
June, 1950, p. 3; Fred Briehl, “Farmers and the Cold War," Farm Front. July,
1950, p. 1.
®"Freedom From Hunger," Farm Front. January, 1947, p. 1; George Cook,
"The Marshall Plan and the Farmer," Farm Front. November, 1947, p. 2;
George Cook, "Ill-W ill or Good," Farm Front. May, 1949, p. 3; “Wide Battle
Front," Farm Front. July, 1950, p. 1.
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share these views with a Communist-affiliated organization without itself
being a Communist front was unthinkable to McManus. He would have been
confused as well by the persistent efforts of Farm Front’s Communist
editors to encourage their readers to seek change through the democratic
process of contacting their congressmen.
While guilt by association was McManus's preferred method of attack, he
resorted to a frontal assault when he charged that Archie Wright was "a
foremost member of the Communist party" who had addressed the party's
national convention in 1936.9

Wright denied that he had ever been a

Communist and that he had spoken to the party’s convention, and he sued the
Farm Journal for $7.6 million. Unfortunately for Wright, as Lowell Dyson
pointed out in Red Harvest, "the judge narrowed the case to the question of
whether calling someone a Communist was libel."10 When the jury decided
that it was not, McManus and the Farm Journal walked away with a smug
sense of vindication, and Archie Wright was left erroneously tainted as a
Communist agent.
Six years after this decision that the term "Communist" was not in itself
libelous, another federal court stood the ruling on its head in a case that had
^McManus, “Communist Beachhead," p. 23.
10Dyson, Red Harvest, p. 194; National Union Farmer. March 15, 1945, p.

2.
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all the markings of a pathetic comedy. It began when the Utah division of
the American Farm Bureau Federation, in opposing the re-election of
Congressman Walter Granger, published the statement that, “Representative
Granger has exhibited his evident animosity toward farm organizations
(except the communist dominated Farmers Union)."11 The Farmers Union
objected to the characterization and initiated legal action. While the Utah
Farm Bureau was apparently willing to apologize and settle out of court, its
parent organization was not. Eager to prove its often-stated claim that "the
Farmers

Union

consistently

advocates

Communist

causes,

parrots

Communist propaganda and refuses to denounce Communistic activities," the
American Farm Bureau Federation encouraged its Utah affiliate to seek total
victory in the week-long $250,000 libel case that opened in Salt Lake City
on May 14, 1951.12
11 United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Utah State Farm

Bi£g.9y±e.dejalloii,.e.t..aL-y.^.N9t.i.on9,l F9rmfi[^ualQn-S,gryj.(:.ej:otT>oratj.9n-ftt
aL June 11, 1952, Box 17, Folder "National Farmers Union Press Releases,"
Papers of Herbert J. Waters, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence,
Missouri.
^National Union Farmer. May, 1951, p. 1; GTA Digest. June, 1951. p. 7.
The quote about the Farmers Union advocating Communist causes is from a
September 15, 1950 address delivered by Iowa Farm Bureau Federation
president E. Howard Hill (Box 9, Folder 5, Hill Papers). As a major figure in
the Farm Bureau, his comments were typical of the organization's overall
negative attitude toward the Farmers Union. The speech was also a source
of frustration for this writer, for Hill began his tirade against the Farmers
Union at the bottom of page 7 and completed it on page 11. The bulk of his
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Just how different the trial would be from the Archie Wright case was
indicated by Judge Willis Ritter’s instructions to the jury.

"The label of

’Communist’ today," he informed the eight men and four women:
in these time in which we live,* in the minds of averaae
and
w
respectable persons, places the plaintiffs beyond the pale of
respectability and makes them a symbol of public hatred, ridicule or
contempt. . . . [T]o designate plaintiffs herein as "communist
dominated" is to cripple the functioning and damage the reputation of
those organizations in the communities in which they do business.13
With the term "communist dominated" deemed libelous per se, the jury was
instructed to decide the case on the basis of two issues: whether the
charges were true or false, and, if false, how financially damaging they had
been to the Farmers Union.
Farm Bureau lawyers produced an abundance of witnesses to prove their
contention that "the economic and political theories of the Union were
similar or parallel to the doctrines and teachings of the Communist
Party."14 Among them were many former Communists brought in to testify
about the ties between Farmers Union officials and the Communist Party of
America.

Typical of these ex-Communists, both for the nature of his

testimony as well as for the ease with which his charges were refuted, was
arguments should have been on pages 8 through 10, but those three pages
were mysteriously missing from the copy at Iowa State.
,3 U.S. Court of Appeals, Farm Bureau vs. National Farmers Union, p. 3.
1^U.S. Court of Appeals, Farm Bureau vs. National Farmers Union, p. 4.
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Miami newspaperman Paul Crouch. The journalist informed the Salt Lake
City court that a regional organizer for the Farmers Union in Tennessee had
been a secret member of the Communist Party and had used that position to
influence Farmers Union policy and membership.

Farmers Union attorney

Quentin Burdick, legal counsel for the North Dakota Farmers Union and son of
Congressman Usher Burdick, challenged the allegation and got Crouch to
admit that in previous sworn testimony before the House Un-American
Activities Committee he had acknowledged that the individual in question
had not been a Communist.15
Burdick just as easily dismissed the testimony of Manning Johnson,
another ex-Communist who told the court that as a member of the
Communist Central Committee in the 1930's he had helped put Communist
Party members into the Farmers Union in New York. Reminded that the Union
had not organized a New York affiliate until 1944, Manning was taken aback
and admitted that he had mistaken the Farmers Union for some other
organization. Judge Ritter quickly disallowed his entire testimony.16
Other equally pathetic attempts to impugn the Farmers Union were
offered as the trial progressed. Howard Rushmore, a New York City Hearst
newspaper reporter, identified a former South Dakota Farmers Union
1National Union Farmer. May. 1951, p. 1; GTA Digest. June. 1951, p. 8.
16Nationa1 Union Farmer. Mav. 1951, p. 1: GTA Digest. June. 1951, p. 8.
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member and a former Eastern Farmers Union official as Communists who had
worked in the party’s youth programs in the 1930’s; that neither man was
any longer affiliated with the Farmers Union made Rushmore’s comments
irrelevant Maurice Malkin, another New York ex-Communist, had little to
say specifically about Farmers Union members but gloatingly noted that
"teachers and preachers were easy marks for the Communists" and that
Eleanor Roosevelt was a typical dupe who "fell for anything." The latter
observation drew a sharp reprimand from Judge Ritter and a request for the
Farm Bureau lawyers to produce facts instead of fantasy and innuendo.
Their inability to do so became even more obvious when North Dakota Farm
Bureau insurance agent John C. Dustin offered as his bit of damning
testimony a recollection of having seen on the lunchroom wall of the
Farmers Union headquarters in Denver in 1946 pictures of Franklin
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Joseph Stalin. Farmers Union General Manager
C.E. Huff denied the charge and tellingly Informed the court that the wall had
never held portraits of either Joseph Stalin or Harry Truman.17
The ineffectiveness of their witnesses forced the Farm Bureau attorneys
to new lines of attack. Lawyer A.H. Nebeker wondered aloud why an agrarian
organization was so intensely interested in foreign affairs.

This subtle

1National Union Farmer. May, 1951, p. 8.
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suggestion of ulterior motivation was abandoned, however, when it was
pointed out that both the Grange and the Farm Bureau Included sections on
foreign affairs in their annual programs and that the Farm Bureau had its
own Department of International Affairs. A similarly misguided attempt to
link the Farmers Union with Communists because of the organization’s
preference for cooperatives over free enterprise came to a quick halt when
Quentin Burdick read from the Farm Bureau letterhead the names of more
than a dozen co-ops affiliated with the Farm Bureau. This attempt to argue
"communist domination" from the angle of parallel attitudes was as valid,
Burdick concluded, as suggesting that because both Communists and
Americans wear pants that all Americans are Communists.18
The Farm Bureau’s condemnation of the Farmers Union through the tactic
of guilt by association was devised by that practiced master of the art,
Robert Cruise McManus.

The author of the "Communist Beachhead in

Agriculture" article had been hired by the Farm Bureau to prove the case
against the Farmers Union, and he had sat side by side with the Farm Bureau
attorneys throughout the week-long trial. His success In impugning Archie
Wright was not repeated in Utah, however, for the jury returned a verdict in
18National Union Farmer. May, 1951, p. 8; GTA Digest. June, 1951, pp.
8-9.
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favor of the Farmers Union.

Impressed with the argument that both the

Farmers Union business ventures and membership drives had been hurt by
the Farm Bureau comment, but perhaps even more overwhelmed by the
absolute failure of the Farm Bureau to offer anything resembling a credible
case, the jury on May 21 awarded the Farmers Union $25,000 In damages.
While the award was only one-tenth of the Farmers Union Initial request,
and although Judge Ritter In denying a Farm Bureau plea for a new trial said
that a verdict over $25,000 would not have been excessive, Jim Patton and
other Farmers Union officials were pleased.

They were even more

encouraged when a federal appellate court in June of 1952 affirmed the
lower court's decision with the observation that, "In the temper of the
times, the communist label Is even more odious and defamatory than the
pro-Nazi and pro-Fasclst label of another day."19
In the same week that the Salt Lake City jury announced Its decision, the
Farmers Union recorded another victory with the retraction by a Texas
American Legion post of a published charge of Communist subversion in the
Union. The accusation was contained in a pamphlet entitled "How You Can
Fight Communism" that had circulated In a number of Farmers Union states
^National Union Farmer. May, 1951, p. 1, June, 1951, p. I, and June,
1952, p. 1; U.S. Court of Appeals, Farm Bureau vs. National Farmers Union, p.
4.
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since the fall of 1950.

The Union's executive committee considered

initiating a libel suit similar to the one in Utah, but chose not to do so when
the Cleburne, Texas, American Legion issued a public apology.20
What gave the Texas accusation and apology more than local significance
was the American Legion's claim that the source for its information on the
Farmers Union was an F.B.I.-prepared list of Communist front organizations
in the United States.

Contacted by Secretary of Agriculture Charles

Brannan, who had been alerted to the pamphlet by a panicked Farmers Union
member in Joshua, Texas, F.B.I. director J. Edgar Hoover heatedly denied that
his agency had ever prepared any such list. The F.B.I., Hoover informed the
American Legion post commander in Cleburne, was “strictly an investigative
organization."

Any decision to place groups on a list of subversive

organizations was made, he concluded, "not by the F.B.I., but by the Attorney
General."21
20Details of the American Legion case can be found in: National Union
Farmer. May, 1951, p. 1; "Minutes of Leaders Meeting," September 7, 1950,
pp. 1-2, Fred Stover Papers; Charles Brannan to L.D. Shipman, March 23,
1951, Box 1, Folder "5," McCune Papers; L.D. Shipman to Charles Brannan,
March 14, 1951, Charles Brannan to L.D. Shipman, April 10, 1951, Charles
Brannan to J. Edgar Hoover, April 10, 1951, J. Edgar Hoover to Charles
Brannan, April 20, 1951, and J. Edgar Hoover to Johnnie Clark, April 20,
1951, Box 2035, Folder "Un-American Activities," Record Group 16 (General
Correspondence); and "Report of James G. Patton to Executive Committee,"
October 31, 1950, p. 4, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers,
University of Colorado.
21 J. Edgar Hoover to Johnnie Clark, April 20, 1951, Box 2035, Record
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Despite his attempt to pass the buck, J. Edgar Hoover was personally
convinced that the Communists had made a concerted effort to infiltrate
American agriculture. "The Communists realize," he wrote in February of
1951, "that if they are ever to be successful, to create a Soviet America,
they must have strong support among farm groups."22

His belief was

typical of a governmental attitude reflected in Congressional, State
Department, and F.B.I. investigations of subversive elements in agriculture
in general and of specific individuals in the Farmers Union. To his credit,
President Truman did not participate in the witchhunt and, in fact,
expressed support for Farmers Union attempts to clear the organization's
name.23
F.B.I. interest in the topic of Communist infiltration of agriculture began
as early as 1944,24 but its specific concern with the Farmers Union dates
from 1950. The primary target of the investigation was the Iowa Farmers
Group 15 (General Correspondence).
22John Edgar Hoover, "Reds Are After Farmers Too," Hoosier Farmer.
February, 1951, p. 21.
23"Visit with President Truman on November 20, 1950," undated inter
office communication, Box 10, Folder 9, Patton Papers; "Confidential
Statement of James G. Patton and Glenn J. Talbott: Interview with President
Truman on February 12, 1951," Box 10, Folder 10, Patton Papers.
24| suspect that F.B.I. interest began even before 1944, but the earliest
record I have located is a November 15, 1955, memo that speaks of “the last
report in this matter dated January 10, 1944." (Box 48, Folder 1, Iowa
Farmers Union Records, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa)
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Union and its outspoken president Fred Stover. Following an April, 1950, J.
Edgar Hoover directive, government agents combed the Iowa countryside for
proof that Stover "associateldl with known Communists and . . . consistently
followed the Communist Party line."25 Their labors produced the meager
bits and pieces of illogical evidence that passed for unquestioned truth in
the hysterical atmosphere of the times.

Stover was found guilty of

supporting government subsidies that would allow a farmer to "make a
decent living on a poor forty acre farm," of holding a tight rein over
membership in the Iowa Farmers Union, of opposing both the Taft-Hartley
and Smith-McCarran Acts, of aligning himself with Henry Wallace’s
Progressive Party movement in 1948, and, most pointedly, of never publicly
criticizing the Soviet Union. On the basis of such flimsy evidence, the F.B.I.
concluded that the Iowa Farmers Union “has been substantially directed,
dominated or controlled by the Communist Party, USA, and has been actively
engaged in furthering or promoting the objectives of the Communist Party,
USA."26
The State Department also followed the activities of Fred Stover and of
other Farmers Union officials. Stover's April, 1950, address to what the
25Des Moines Register. August 7,1983, p. B1.
26F.B.I. reports, January 24, 1956 and August 18, 1956, Box 48, Folder
1, Iowa Farmers Union Records.
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State Department termed the "Communist" Peace Congress in Melbourne,
Australia, was closely monitored; the Iowa farm leader was said "to have
delivered greetings from Communists in the United St3tes."27 For his part,
Stover was aware of the surveillance and contended that the State
Department conspired with Australian officials to suppress news of his
participation in the Congress. The objective of such a strategy, Stover later
wrote, was "to preserve the illusion for the Australian people that the
people of America were united behind the cold war."28 !n addition to its
concern with Stover, the State Department also labelled the Montana
division of the Farmers Union a "Communist front organization" and
criticized the Farmers Union and other groups that

supported the

"Communist-promoted" Stockholm Peace Petition of March, 1950.29
Not to be outdone in the search for reds in American agriculture, the
27Canberra to State Department, May 19, 1950, 743.001/5-1950, Box
3560, Record Group 59. The Canberra office asked for and received State
Department information on Stover, but what specifically was said about him
w ill have to await my Freedom of Information Act request for these "access
restricted" documents.
28F.W. Stover to Mrs. Elizabeth Moos, May 4, 1950, Stover Papers.
29Department of State, Office of Public Opinion Studies, "Organization
Opinion from October 1, 1950 to February 9, 1951," February 21, 1951, p. 2,
Box 19, Folder "Summary of Organization Opinions October 1950-August
1951," Record Group 59, National Archives; State Department press
conference summary on "Soviet Peace Petition," July 12, 1950, Stover
Papers.
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House Un-American Activities Committee staged its own Investigation of
"communist activities among farm groups" In February and March of 1951.
What the committee produced concerning the Farmers Union rivaled Robert
McManus’s talents In impugning guilt by association.

In fact, two of the

charges levelled by H.U.A.C. were Identical to those first published In
McManus's 1944 "Communist Beachhead in Agriculture" article: that the
Farmers Union accepted contributions from the Marshall Fund, and that some
Farmers Union officials were leaders of the American Peace Mobilization.
The farm group was also criticized for participating In the World Youth
Congress, a "Communist conference held 1n the summer of 1938 at Vassar
College," and for calling for the repeal of the Smith and McCarran Acts.30
H.U.A.C. paid particular attention to Farmers Union president Jim Patton.
Among Patton's lengthy list of subversive sins was his role in sponsoring a
1947 American Slav Congress dinner honoring Claude Pepper. The Congress,
H.U.A.C. charged, was a "Moscow-Inspired and directed federation of
30u.s. Congress, House, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, February 28 and
March 9, 1951, Hearings Regarding Communist Activities Among Farm
Groups: Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities:
"Information from the Files of the Committee on Un-American Activities,"
April 1, 1957, pp. 1-2, Series XIV, Box 2, Folder 2, National Farmers Union
Papers. The Committee's intense interest in nailing down Farmers Union
links with the Marshall Fund is discussed in Benton J. Stong to Aubrey
Williams, March 5, 1951, Box 36, Folder "National Farmers Union, Patton,
1950-1951," Williams Papers.
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Communist-dominated organizations seeking by methods of propaganda and
pressure to subvert the 10,000,000 people in this country of Slavic birth or
descent."31 Patton was also condemned for helping to organize an April,
1946, meeting of the Civil Rights Congress in Detroit. Despite its name,
H.U.A.C. noted, the Congress was "an organization dedicated not to the
broader issues of civil liberties, but specifically to the defense of
individual Communists and the Communist Party."32 Patton was not the
only Farmers Union official linked to the Civil Rights Congress, for North
Dakota’s Glenn Talbott and Montana's D.W. Chapman were aiso listed as C.R.C.
sympathizers. Chapman perhaps earned an even greater share of HUAC.’s
animosity when his name was discovered on a list of people calling for the
abolition of the Committee itself. Finally, Patton was criticized for signing
petitions and statements authored by the Union of Concerted Peace Efforts
and by the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, both of which
were condemned as Communist front organizations. The latter group, which
was also supported by Glenn Talbott, was described by H.U.A.C. in terms
almost identical to its characterization of the Civil Rights Congress.

It

was, the Committee argued, one of the "maze of organizations . . . spawned
31 "Information from the Files of the Committee on Un-American
Activities," p. 3.
32"!nformation from the Files of the Committee on un-American
Activities," p. 4.
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for the alleged purpose of defending civil liberties 1n general but actually
intended to protect Communist subversion from any penalties under the
law.“33
In addition to being attacked by domestic opponents and scrutinized by a
host of government agencies, the National Farmers Union was also divided
internally over the issue of Communism.

Negatively influenced by red

baiting hysteria, some organization officials joined in the witchhunt and
added to the chorus of Communist subversion within the Union. As early as
1946, the Nebraska division of the Farmers Union, led by Chris Minus,
accused the national organization of being "Communistic."

In denying the

charge, Jim Patton acknowledged knowing of "four admitted Communist
Party members" in the Farmers Union, but noted that their membership was
protected by the constitutional provision that, "No person shall be
disqualified for membership because of race or on account of his political or
religious affiliations." That there were Communists in the Union, and that
the Communist Party at times supported the positions of the Union, did not
make the organization, Patton wrote, an affiliate of the Communist Party.
33"Information from the Files of the Committee on Un-American
Activities," pp. 3-4; U.S. Congress, House, 80th Congress, 1st Session,
September 2, 1947, Report on Civil Riohts Congress as a Communist Front
Organization by the Committee on Un-American Activities, pp. 12, 21-22,
and 28-29.
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Nebraska's charges were dismissed by Patton with the biting observation
that, "Surely all the world's righteousness and wisdom are not stored up in
narrow creviced minds of a small minority of Mr. Minus’ type."34
Patton's bitter comments about Chris Minus were written one day after
he had composed an even more acrlmonlus letter to Gardner Jackson.
Jackson, who had first met Patton in 1936 and who had served the Farmers
Union in a variety of unofficial capacities since that time, had severed his
relationship with Patton and the National Farmers Union with a lengthy and
scathing August epistle in which he accused the organization and Its
leadership of being "bewitched by the siren song of salvation for humanity
sung by the Communists."

While he told Patton that he still fervently

believed In the principles of the Farmers Union, a series of decisions by the
organization had caused him to lose faith In the Union's leadership. Among
those decisions was the appointment of the "well-known Communist
advocate" Waldo McNutt as head of the newly created National Farmers union
veterans department. Jackson also accused the organization of kowtowing
to the “Communist" organizers of the Marshall Fund for the purpose of
obtaining financial support, and of deliberately Isolating Jackson within the
34James G. Patton to Members of Farmers Educational and Cooperative
Union of America, Nebraska Division, November 15, 1946, Stover Papers.
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organization because of his

"insistent,

un-cagey,

and unsilenceable

opposition to Communist infiltration" of the Union.35
In his response, delayed for three months because of Patton’s belief that
Jackson’s charges were "so preposterous as to warrant disregard," the
Farmers Union president rebuked his friend in terms that clearly revealed
his frustration with the seemingly continuous charges of Communist
influence in the Farmers Union. Patton wrote of Jackson’s "twisted illogical
mind" and accused him of performing “constant intellectual masturbation" in
his role of self-appointed "God of inquiry and final judgement."

"You are

guilty of absolute falsehood," Patton wrote Jackson, "in saying my mind has
turned to the Communists." He referred to the “four announced Communists"
in the Farmers Union, but told Jackson that, "I do not know any state officer
who is a Communist~and you don’t either."36
The falling out between Jim Patton and Gardner Jackson was unfortunate.
Jackson two years later admitted that his letter had "contained exaggerated
interpretations of certain episodes, or even downright misinterpretations of
35Gardner Jackson to Jim Patton, August 3, 1946, Box 57, Folder “NFU
1946/ Jackson Papers.
36James G. Patton to Gardner Jackson, November 14, 1946, Box 57,
Folder "NFU 1946," Jackson Papers. This copy of the letter differs from the
copy sent by Patton to the state presidents that I found in the Stover
Papers. Some of the volatile language had been cleaned up, or simply
omitted. This had much to do with Jim Patton’s style of operation, a subject
dealt with in a later chapter.
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them." But he also insisted that "nothing has occurred In the Intervening
period to make me think that the main burden of the letter was not true." As
avowed an anti-Communist as he h3d become, Gardner Jackson refused to
partlclDate in the "hysteria now enveloping the people of our country. !t Is
precisely," he said, "what the Commies want to have happen." Unlike the
incurable Robert Cruise McManus, whose red-baiting led him to the
outrageous conclusion that communist sympathizers consisted largely of
intellectuals who in their youth had been "too small to play football or too
funny looking to be popular with the girls," Jackson was well-intentioned.
He firmly believed "in the NFU’s fundamental thesis of as many families on
the land owning and operating their own farms as can be at a decent living
standard," and had written his letter, he said, “to protect Jim [Patton] and
that thesis from prostitution by the Commies."37
A year after the Patton-Jackson dispute, the National Farmers Union once
again earned unwanted public attention when a major disagreement erupted
between Patton and National Union Farmer editor James Elmore. The quarrel
arose over Elmore’s decision to publish a St. Louis Post-Dispatch article
37Gardner Jackson to Robert C. McManus, March 31, 1948, and Robert C.
McManus to Gardner Jackson, April 5, 1948, Box 46, Folder "Robert McManus,"
Jackson Papers. McManus's asinine comment about intellectuals leaves one
wondering how he explained the Communist sympathies of women.
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entitled “Red Capitalists, Capitalist Reds" critical of the Soviet Union. The
article, and an accompanying cartoon satirizing “Russian Co-operation/
were seen by Patton as “departing] sharply’ from Farmers Union policy. He
accused Elmore of "deliberately. . . defying the present policy/ and invited
the editor to resign.38

Elmore agreed to step down, but only after telling his side of the story In
a ten-page letter mailed to leading Farmers union officials. Elmore argued
that in publishing the article he was merely trying to get Patton to clarify a
38Nationa1 Union Farmer. September 1, 1947, pp. 5 and 8; James 6.
Patton to James Elmore, September 3, 1947, Box 35, Folder "Farmers Union
Correspondence 1947/ Williams Papers.
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vague organizational policy on foreign affairs.

It was evident from the

letter, however, that the Farmers Union policy, at least as Elmore saw it,
was not as unclear as he claimed.

He accused Patton and other national

leaders of "playing footie’ with the Communists and of following "a procommunist collaborationist line."

Patton's "policy of excusing Russia at

every opportunity" while simultaneously "managing to impugn imperialistic
motives for everything the U.S. does In the international field" led to
Elmore’s

confused

conclusion

that

the

organization

“condemnledl

imperialism Impartially." Elmore also chastised Patton for encouraging a
"top-heavy concern with international affairs’ that he felt diverted the
Farmers Union from the more important goals of "membership, organization
and education."

This "save-the-worldism" Elmore equated with Eleanor

Roosevelt's description of Henry Wallace as ‘a poor Don Quixote sweeping
over Europe fighting windmills." Both efforts were futile, Elmore argued,
and would lead to results as disastrous as the "tragic Chamberlain
appeasement policy."39
Elmore's spurious argument that he was merely seeking clarification of
policy was undermined by actions he took after resigning from the Union.
Adopting the pen-name J.A Spengler, he wrote a brief but bitter book
39James Elmore to James G. Patton, September 9, 1947, and James
Elmore to Aubrey Williams, September 9, 1947, Box 35, Folder “Farmers
Union Correspondence 1947," Williams Papers.
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entitled The Truth About the Farmers Union.

Order forms for the book

described it as dealing with the "confused leftwing leadership" of the Union
who were "lost in their own Socialist smog and tangled in the Communist
web of subversion."40 Elmore also penned "Communist Foot in the Farmer’s
Door," a manuscript that accused the National Union Farmer of reading "more
like a camouflaged, carbon copy of the Communist Daily Worker than a farm
paper," spoke of Jim Patton as "burdened with a Marxian complex," and
argued that the Denver headquarters of the Farmers Union was "safely
weighted in favor of the fellow travelers."41
With only Nebraska’s Chris Milius raising mild objections, the Farmers
Union board of directors backed Patton in the dispute. Board chairman Glenn
Talbott issued a statement criticizing Elmore's red-baiting tactics and
calling for organizational unity. But despite his plea that "communism ‘was
not enough of an issue to be worth fighting about," the Farmers Union had
not

seen the last

of

the

internal

controversies spawned by the

^ J A Spengler to Mrs. Frank P. Leo, March 28, 1956, Series XIV, Box 2,
Folder * 2, National Farmers Union Papers. Order forms for the book were
found in Series IV, Box 4, Folder *8 , National Farmers Union Papers. The
book itself has been missing from the stacks of the National Agricultural
Library for at least a year, and I have been unable to locate another copy.
41 Cited in Congressional Record.
September?, 1950, pp. 14292-14293.

81st

Congress,

2nd

Session,
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organization's position on American foreign policy.42
Wisconsin president Ken Hones, who ironically had proposed the Board of
Directors' vote of confidence for Jim Patton as a sign of organizational
harmony,43 was himself a major contributor to another Farmers Union
fracas over the issue of Communism.

Proudly bearing the title of the

organization's "No. 1 red-baiter," Hones insisted that Communists had
"nearly bored clear through the Farmers Union." He told Patton in August of
1950 that “this problem is far more serious than you have any idea of" and
urged him to "get busy and clean house." What Hones wanted was a change in
the constitution that barred Communists from membership in the Union. The
proposal had been rejected at the organizations's national convention in
1948, and it was rejected again in 1950. For Hones, the 1950 convention
was also disappointing for its adoption of the Stockholm Peace Petition and
for its refusal to re-seat him as a member of the board of directors. Both
actions, he told South Dakota president Paul Opsahl, were "part of the
planning by the commies at the convention."44
42Paily Worker. September 18, 1947, p. 8; Rockv Mountain News.
September 16, 1947, p. 20; William C. Pratt, “Glenn J. Talbott, the Farmers
Union, and American Liberalism after World War II," North Dakota History LV
(Winter, 1988), p. 6.
43Rockv Mountain News. September 16, 1947, p. 20
^^ICW. Hones to Paul W. Opsahl, August 14, 1950, and K.W. Hones to
James G. Patton, August 10, 1950, Box 1, Folder 3, Kenneth W. Hones Papers,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison; William C. Pratt, "American
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Although Hones could not convince the national organization to bar
Communists from membership, he did succeed in adding the prohibition to
the constitution of the Wisconsin Farmers Union. The move coincided with a
serious decline in the state organization’s membership, and critics charged
that Hones' "campaign of red-baiting" and his "purging of a considerable
number of members for their political beliefs" were to blame.

In an "open

letter" to Hones, seventy-three Wisconsin residents praised the National
Farmers Union for "turnling] its back on the present anti-Communist
hysteria" and for "opposing the cold war policy," and called on Hones to
follow suit "by eliminating the discriminatory provision." In his response,
Hones wrote that "there is little doubt that this letter has been promoted by
the communists in this state." Acting on his belief that “there is no place
for communists in our organization," he gave each of the seventy-three
signers one week to issue a retraction, after which time he would pass the
names on to the F.B.I. As for the charge that the anti-Communist provision
had led to the decline in membership, Hones characterized it as "a typical
Communist trick of distorting facts to f it their line of propaganda."

The

drop in membership, he said, was caused not by the prohibition against
Communists, but by an increase in dues and by the failure of the local unions
Liberalism," p. 9.
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to actively seek out new members.45
All of the assaults on the Farmers Union drew local and state attention,
and most of them created a stir nationwide as well. But none got quite the
publicity as that begun by New Hampshire senator Styles Bridges when on
September 7, 1950, he openly attacked the Farmers Union on the floor of the
U.S. Senate.

His comments came in the midst of debate on the anti-

subversive McCarran bill, a piece of legislation that along with the MundtNixon bill had been consistently opposed by the Farmers Union as typical of
a "manufactured jingoistic patriotism" that "actively interfered with the
fulfillment of the best in American traditions." Specifically, the Farmers
Union charged that such "repressive" legislation not only "place[dl a muzzle
on [domestic] freedom of discussion," but also reinforced the Truman
administration’s "reversal on foreign policy." “The one," Fred Stover argued,
"is the child of the other."46
45"An Open Letter" and "Statement of F.u. State Executive Board,
October 12, 1950," Box 9, Folder * 2, Farmers Educational and cooperative
Union of America, Wisconsin Division Records, 1924-1969, State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, hereafter cited as Wisconsin
Farmers Union Papers; "Statement of the Wisconsin Farmers Union State
Executive Board Approved at the Board's Meeting in Chippewa Falls,
Wisconsin, on April 13, 1950," Box 9, Folder 7, Talbott Family Papers,
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
^Address of F.W. Stover to Australian Peace Congress, Melbourne,
Australia, April 19, 1950, Stover Papers; Statement of James G. Patton,
March 31, 1950, U.S. Congress, House, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings
or. Legislation to Outlaw Certain Un-American and Subversive Activities:
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For two hours, Senator Bridges walked his colleagues through a detailed
history of "a carefully planned Communist effort to infiltrate and take over"
the National Farmers Union. His evidence included tales of Farmers Union
affiliations with individuals and organizations that, "according to the House
Committee on Un-American Activities," were either Communist dominated
or Communist fronts. These included Hal Ware, Ella Reeve Bloor, Lem Harris,
the American Peace Mobilization, Farm Research Incorporated, the World
Youth Congress, and the Marshall Fund. Bridges also argued that many of the
key leaders of the Farmers Union were themselves either Communists or
Communist dupes. Included in this list were Glenn Talbott, Fred Stover,
education director Gladys Talbott Edwards, Jim Patton, and, most notably,
Archie Wright.

Patton's unwillingness to "get rid of Archie Wright"

following Wright's unsuccessful suit against the Farm Journal and Robert
Cruise McManus, struck Bridges as particularly revealing.

The favored

treatment afforded Wright, when contrasted with the purging and isolating
of such individuals as Gardner Jackson, James Elmore, Ken Hones, and Chris
Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, p. 2353; Address
by F.W. Stover, New Party Convention, Mitchell, South Dakota, June 27, 1948,
pp. 3-4, Stover Papers. Other examples of Farmers Union opposition to antisubversive legislation include the following, all of which can be found in the
Stover Papers: National Farmers Union press release on "Democratic
Liberties," March 25, 1947; Esten L. Bolland, "A Challenge to Farmers Union
Members," no date; and Fred W. Stover, "Let the Truth Prevail," no date.
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Mlllus, was judged by Bridges as the most convincing evidence of Communist
Infiltration of the Union. Criticizing Patton and his organization for seeking
"to persuade the youth of our country, and adults, too, that nothing Is right
with the United States of America," Senator Bridges concluded that the
Communist effort to bore its way into the Farmers Union "hald] achieved
considerable, 1f not complete, success."47
The New Hampshire senator s lengthy lecture was interrupted twice by
Senator Hubert Humphrey. The Minnesota Democrat strongly protested "any
aspersions being cast upon the Farmers Union" in his state, but was even
more enraged that the United States Congress was being used as a forum for
irresponsible charges. Asked by Bridges how he would explain the refusal of
the Farmers Union to pass a resolution barring Communist membership In
the organization, Humphrey responded that “there are many persons who do
not believe in adopting such resolutions" and that "the fever for such
resolutions seems to be stronger in the Congress than In any other place In
the United States."

Noting that the Congressional charges of subversion

against the Farmers Union followed quickly on the heels of similar
accusations against Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of
47Conqressiona1 Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, pp. 14276-14296.
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Interior Oscar Chapman, Humphrey called for an end to the "spurious
reasoning" that concluded that because a person disagreed with you he was a
Communist. “I submit," he claimed, "that the irresponsible charges which
have been made in the Eighty-first congress, second session, have done more
to undermine the faith of the American people in representative government
than the Communist Party w ill ever be able to do."48
While Humphrey’s response to Bridges was the most immediate, South
Dakota's Karl Mundt, North Dakota’s Milton Young, Montana's Jim Murray, and
Oregon’s Wayne Morse all came to the defense of the Farmers Union in the
days that followed.49

That the rabidly anti-Communist Senator Mundt

would challenge Bridges’s statements was a testimonial both to the
weakness of the charges and, as Alonzo Hamby has argued, to the strength of
the Farmers Union in the Plains states.50
The most effective of the many challenges to Bridges came from William
Langer. In a presentation as lengthy as that initiated by Bridges, the North
Dakota Republican praised the National Farmers Union as a "strong, patriotic
organization" whose program represented, in a complete reversal of
^Congressional Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, pp. 14283-14286 and 14322-14323.
49Conoressiona1 Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, pp. 14317-14318, September 12, 1950, pp. 14570-14573.
-^Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 409.
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Bridges's claims, "one of the greatest bulwarks against communism." Langer
particularly applauded the Union's efforts in battling corporate monopolies
and in fighting for the rights of America's family-sized farms.51
The support the Farmers Union received from Langer and his colleagues
was indicative of the belief that Styles Bridges's charges were, as Senator
Humphrey argued, "nothing more than warmed-over dried biscuits—the same
old accusations coming out again and again in an effort to frighten the
American people."52

Humphrey's assessment was accurate, for Bridges

offered nothing in his address that had not already been hammered upon by
Robert McManus, Gardner Jackson, and James Elmore.

In dredging up the

results of Archie Wright's libel suit and in using them as the cornerstone of
his accusations, Bridges repeated the process of deliberately misconstruing
the case results for the benefit of his argument. Like his predecessors in
the task of Communist finger pointing, the New Hampshire senator
erroneously concluded that the court had found Wright guilty of membership
in the Communist Party, when in fact all the jury had done was exonerate
McManus and Farm Journal from the charge of libelous intent.
The Bridges attack on the Farmers Union cannot, however, be dismissed
51 Congressional Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, pp. 14310-14379.
^Congressional Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, p. 14323.
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as merely "warmed-over dried biscuits."

It was a rehashing of previously

stated charges, but it was also much more. Digging into the story behind the
speech, Farmers Union officials discovered that the "carefully planned . . .
effort" Senator Bridges had accused the Communists of constructing had
been duplicated by Farmers Union opponents bent on discrediting both the
organization and its programs. As more and more details surfaced, even Ken
Hones's Wisconsin Farmers Union News began to wonder "how much
conniving is going on in back of the scenes among the smear brigade."53
The Union's immediate reaction to Bridges's speech was to criticize the
attack as "a disservice to the cause of truth and decency" that resorted "to
the tactics made infamous by totalitarian dictators in Italy, Germany and
Russia." Issued two days after Bridges made the charges, the statement of
the National Farmers Union board of directors also reaffirmed the
organization's commitments to family farmers and to "genuine international
collaboration to build a peaceful and prosperous world."54 In offering the
statement to the press, Jim Patton rebuked Bridges for "vomiting the
innuendoes of irresponsible writers on the floor of the senate."

Arguing

that Archie Wright was “as far from being a Communist as anyone could be,"
53Wlsconsin Farmers Union News. October 9, 1950, p. 4.
54"5tatement of the National Farmers Union," Box 36, Folder “National
Farmers Union 1950-1956," Hickenlooper Papers.
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Patton elaborated on what he felt were the four reasons behind the speech.
Surprisingly, none of the four had anything to do with anti-Communism.
instead, Patton suggested that the Republican Party, the American Farm
Bureau Federation, and "wheat merchants, oil men and Insurance interests"
jealous of the Union’s successful co-op business had been behind what was
not only an attack on the Farmers Union but also on Secretary of Agriculture
Charles Brannan and his program for the nation's farmers.55
Senator Bridges had, in fact,

included Secretary Brannan in his

September 7th comments. After concluding his direct attack on the Farmers
Union, Bridges began the last minutes of his harangue by observing that "the
story of the Communist infiltration of the Farmers Union would not be
complete without some mention of the close ties between the Farmers Union
and the United States Department of Agriculture." He then launched into a
brief history of the Agriculture Department and of the Farm Security
Administration that portrayed the agencies as infiltrated with Communist
agitators.

It was no surprise, he concluded, that such a subversively

influenced branch of government would wholeheartedly adopt a dangerous
program like the Brannan P1an--a plan, he said, that had actually originated
within the Farmers Union, and which could just as easily have been called
55Denver Post. September 10, 1950, p. 3A.
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"the Talbott plan, or the [Lem] Harris plan—or possibly the Stalin Plan."56
Bridges followed these intemperate comments with an observation that
even more vividly tied the attack on the Farmers Union to its support of the
Brannan Plan and inadvertently pointed the way toward the organization at
least partially responsible for his accusations. The New Hampshire senator
was incensed that National Security Resources Board chairman Stuart
Symington, in naming the agricultural members of his advisory board, had
selected Jim Patton and National Grange president Albert Goss, but had
"passed over” American Farm Bureau Federation president Allan Kline in
favor of an Ohio Farm Bureau official, D. Murray Lincoln.

"Mr. Lincoln's

selection," Bridges mourned, was "a direct slap by the administration at the
Farm Bureau.

Is this because the Farm Bureau has strongly opposed the

Brannan Plan?"57
The involvement of the Farm Bureau in Senator Bridges's assault on the
Farmers Union was widely discussed in Farmers Union circles in the weeks
following the speech. The Iowa Union Fanner noted that Bridges was the
perfect choice for delivery of the attack. With no Farmers Union division in
56Conaressional Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, pp. 14285-14286.
57Conoressjona1 Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7,
1950, pp. 14286-14287.
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New Hampshire, he was free to hurl his charges without fear of electoral
retribution.58

His close personal friendship with Allan Kline and his

position as former secretary of the New Hampshire Farm Bureau added to
the suggestion of a Bureau-planned assault on the Union.

Kline's

endorsement of the Chamber of Commerce-Time Corporation proposal to
move 3.8 million farmers out of agriculture, the Farm Bureau's outspoken
opposition to the Brannan Plan, and the Bureau's circulation of reprints of
Bridges's speech only added to the speculation.59
Even more striking was the remarkable similarity between the Bridges
speech and one delivered eight days later by Iowa Farm Bureau president E.
Howard Hill. Speaking to the annual meeting of Iowa's county Farm Bureaus,
Hill repeated Bridges's denunciation of the Stockholm Peace Petition and his
charges of Communist infiltration of the Department of Agriculture.

He

summarized his view of the Farmers Union with the observation that the
organization "consistently advocates Communist causes, parrots Communist
propaganda and refuses to denounce Communistic activities." He concluded
58lt was often suggested that Nebraska's Senator Kenneth Wherry had
first been approached to give the speech but had declined the invitation. The
presence of a Farmers Union affiliate in Nebraska, even one critical of the
national organization's position on foreign affairs, may have convinced
Senator Wherry of the inadvisability of delivering the speech. See, for
example, Iowa Union Farmer. December, 1950, p. 4.
59lowa Union Farmer. September 16, 1950, p. I , and December, 1950, p.
4.
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with the comment that he was "making no accusations" but was merely
"presenting] the facts to the farmers of Iowa and letlting] them draw their
own conclusions."

in his speech before Congress, Senator Bridges had

opened with the charges that "the Farmers Union . . . consistently espouses
Communist causes, parrots Communist propaganda, and refuses to denounce
Communists or their activities

" He had ended by saying, "l have stayed

away from charges. I have presented the evidence." Only an extraordinary
coincidence could have produced two

so similar speeches without

collaboration.60
A debate over the actual origins of Bridges’s vituperative address was
greatly intensified, and the speech Itself took on even greater significance,
when columnist Drew Pearson on September 28, 1950, announced that the
author was Alfred Kohlberg, publisher of Freeman magazine and a leading
figure in the China Lobby. Articles in his magazine followed precisely the
arguments laid out by Bridges, both in their criticisms of the Brannan Plan
and in their charges of Communist infiltration of the Farmers Union and the
Agriculture Department. That Kohlberg was also an ally of Henry Luce in the
60E. Howard Hill, address to the annual meeting of the county Farm
Bureaus, September 15, 1950, Box 9, Folder 5, Hill Papers; Congressional
Record. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, September 7, 1950, pp. 14277
and 14287.
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effort to restore Chiang Kai-shek to power in China was taken by Farmers
Union officials as undeniable evidence of the "unholy alliance" they had
spoken of for years.61
Drew Pearson’s claim that Alfred Kohlberg wrote Styles Bridges’s
address was eventually proven wrong. But the identity of the actual author
reinforced even more the Farmers Union position that a great deal of
"conniving" had taken place behind the scenes. In what surely smacked of
conspiratorial intent, it was revealed in the May, 1951, Farmers Union libel
suit against the Utah Farm Bureau that the writer was none other than
Robert Cruise McManus. The "Communist Beachhead" author testified that on
the advice of a New Jersey acquaintance he had approached Bridges with the
idea for the speech and had then written it when the New Hampshire senator
approved of the plan. The Farmers Union later speculated that the friend had
been Kohlberg, but the charge has not been proven. Whether he was directly
involved or not, however, it is clear that Kohlberg's views were consistently
in line with those of McManus.

In the aftermath of Bridges’s speech,

Kohlberg's Freeman magazine published a McManus article entitled "The Red
Mole." It praised the "accuracy and thoroughness of Bridges's documentation"
61 Iowa Union Farmer. October 21, 1950, p. 1. See, for example, Louis
Bromfield, "Back of the Brannan Plan," The Freeman I (April 9, 1951), pp.
425-428.
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and criticized both Senators Humphrey and Langer for supporting the
"disastrous experiment with hooded socialism."62
While the Involvement of the Farm Bureau in Bridges’s attack on the
Farmers Union is undeniable, Robert McManus’s admission during the Utah
libel case that "politics was involved" in the writing of the speech raised
speculations that the Farm Bureau had not been alone in its desire to impugn
the Union. In presenting his annual report to the North Dakota Farmers Union
two months after Bridges’s address, Glenn Talbott directly accused the
Republican Party of participating In the attack.

With no agricultural

program to rival the Brannan Plan and fearful of losing the farm vote in both
1950 and 1952, the Republicans, Talbott charged, set out to “discredit and
destroy" both the Brannan Plan and the Farmers Union by labelling each as
Communistic. The "opening gun" of the Republican attack was a March 21,
1950, speech in Lincoln, Nebraska, by Republican National Committee
chairman Guy George Gabrielson.

The address, introduced Into the

Congressional Record by Nebraska’s Senator Hugh Butler, read like a
condensed version of what Styles Bridges had to offer six months later.
62Nationa1 Union Farmer. May, 1951,. p. 1; Farmers Union Defense
Committee, "The inside Story of the Outside Interference in the Iowa
Farmers Union," 1951 newsletter, Box 3, Folder 6, U.S. Farmers Association
Records; Robert Cruise McManus, "The Red Mole," The Freeman I (October 16,
1950), pp. 54-56.
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Gabrielson praised the ‘great farm leader, Allan Kline," lambasted the
Brannan Plan as “an instrument for the destruction of free farmers, framed
by the radicals who surround your Secretary of Agriculture," and resurrected
the charges against Archie Wright as a "card-carrying Communist."63
It is clear, then, that the Bridges attack on the Farmers Union, as well as
the other assaults on the organization's loyalty, were welcomed, if not in
fact participated in, by a number of powerful elements. President Truman,
again to his credit, did not have a hand in any of the onslaughts and,
according to Jim Patton, "voiced his indignation at the pattern of mean
slander" practiced against the Union. Nevertheless, the attacks took their
toll. At least one major newspaper called for Patton to clean out the "cardcarrying Communists" and "fellow-travelers," and one Union official noted
that the criticisms "put a stop to any organizing" in Farmers Union states.
Eight months after Bridges made his comments, the New York division of the
Union, the one headed by the much-maligned Archie Wright, was still feeling
the effects, as its chief rival in the state persisted in circulating booklets
summarizing the charges made by the New Hampshire senator.64
65National Union Farmer. May, 1951, p. 1; Annual Report, Glenn J.
Talbott, President, North Dakota Farmers Union, November 15, 1950, pp. 2023, Folder *555, President Truman's Official Files; Congressional Record.
81st Congress, 2nd Session, March 30, 1950, pp. A2364-A2365.
64James G. Patton, Address to South Dakota Farmers Union Convention,
October 5, 1950, p. 1, Box 24, Folder *6 , Patton Papers; Denver Post.
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On the surface, the Farmers Union weathered the storm of protest well.
Referring to the Bridges attack as the result of “political opportunism plus
little minds," Jim Patton maintained that the Farmers Union would continue
to be "an organization of dissent." It would persist, he said, in challenging
those "who say we must accept totalitarian allies of any hue" and would
reject the belief "that atom bombs are the only answer to other
ideologies."65 But beneath the public image of Farmers Union solidarity,
cracks had begun to form.

The pressure of the seemingly constant

criticisms weakened the resolve of some of the organization's key figures,
including president Jim Patton.

His harsh critiques of American foreign

policy were by late 1950 frequently muted, If not entirely absent, and some
of the organization's other leading spokesmen openly questionned Patton’s
dedication to the Farmers Union as "an organization of dissent."
Oddly enough, the event that brought the opposing camps into open battle
actually took place two and a half months before Senator Bridges's
September, 1950, address. Harry Truman’s decision in June of that year to
send American troops to Korea, and Jim Patton’s surprising determination to
September 10, 1950, p. 1A; Homer Ayres to author, April 24, 1992, p. 4;
Archie Wright, ""To All Officers and Delegates," May 15, 1951, Box 1, Folder
"Delegate Letters, 1948-1951," New York Milk Shed Records.
65"Statement on Farmers Union Policy for the Des Moines Register by
James G. Patton," Box 26, Folder #6, Patton Papers.
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support the President in that endeavor, brought to the surface the Union’s
long-festering internal divisions over American foreign policy.

The

organizational rift that followed Patton's controversial decision to back
Harry Truman in the Korean V/ar severely crippled the National Farmers
Union and began both the national organization and its protesting affiliates
on the road to being casualties of the Cold War.
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Chapter Five

Expensive Uncertainty: The Added Costs of War

Studies of American involvement in the Korean War have underestimated
the impact of that conflict on domestic American society.

Focusing on

political and military implications, historians have either ignored or
minimized the social and economic changes that were a direct result of
President Truman's decision to intervene in Korea in the summer of 1950.
Typical of the profession's approach was a 1975 Truman Library conference
organized to provide a 25-year perspective on the war. The participants,
conference organizer Francis Heller later wrote, discussed Korea almost
exclusively "as a world rather than a domestic event."1 Even in sessions
specifically designed to examine the effect of the war on the homefront, the
conversations invariably drifted toward military and political affairs. When
Richard Leopold concluded the conference with recommendations for further
study, he predictably omitted any consideration of domestic implications
beyond the military aspects of selective service, the role of reservists, and

1Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War. A 25-Year Perspective
(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 9.
173
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the status of conscientious objectors.2
On the rare occasions when domestic concerns have somehow worked
themselves into Korean War discussions, the result has been a consensus
focusing on three almost universally accepted tenets. The first of these
was that the American people initially spoke in one unanimous voice in
supporting the sending of troops to Korea, and that opposition to the war
developed only with the introduction of Chinese forces, the debate over
General MacArthur's plans to widen the conflict, and the deadlock in truce
negotiations that dominated the last two years of the war.

The second

tenet, surfacing particularly in works comparing American involvement in
Korea with the nation's later experience in Vietnam, was that whatever
opposition there was to Korea came almost entirely from the political right.
As Alonzo Hamby told the Truman Library conference, "Korean War
protestors waved the American flag; Vietnam protestors frequently burned
it."3 Finally, while not completely denying the significance of the Korean
War as an event in America's history, historians have generally accepted
John Wiltz's conclusion that it was "not a particularly traumatic interlude"
in the nation's life. The domestic economy supposedly thrived, and returning
soldiers, Wiltz argued, "slipped with comparative ease back into their
2Heller, The Korean War, pp. 209-224.
^Heller, The Korean War, p. 170.
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former lifestyles.-4
Each of these three suppositions holds a certain grain of truth. Chinese
entry

into the war, MacArthur's expansionist plans,

and prolonged

negotiations all heightened opposition to Korea, and much of that opposition
was directed by conservative Republicans angered at President Truman's
earlier failure in "losing" China to the Communists.

There was even a

segment of American society for whom the Korean War was, as Wiltz
suggested, not "particularly traumatic" and who even benefitted financially
from U.S. participation in the conflict.
Studies of Korea that avoid the temptation to revert to military and
^Heller, The Korean War, p. 156. The view that initial support for the
war decreased with later events is also put forward in: Rosemary Foot, The
Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Robert J. Donovan, Nemesis: Truman
and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984);
Bernard Brodie. War and Politics (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company,
Inc., 1973); and Park, "American Involvement in the Korean War," pp. 249264. The Vietnam analogy is stressed in: John E. Mueller, War. Presidents
and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973); Frederick D.
Herzon et. al., "Personality and Public Opinion: The Case of Authoritarianism,
Prejudice, and Support for the Korean and Vietnam Wars," Polity XI (Fall,
1978), pp. 92-113; Andre Modigliani, "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and
Public Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy," American
Political Science Review LXVI (September, 1972), pp. 960-978; and Shmuel
Sandler, "The Impact of Protracted Peripheral Wars on the American
Domestic System," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations III
(Summer, 1978), pp. 27-53. The view of the Korean War as economically
fruitful is presented in Donald R. McCoy, The Presidency of Hairy Truman
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984).
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diplomatic topics produce a different image of the intensity and direction of
internal opposition to the war. Steven Geitschier's 1977 observation that,
"From the very beginning, a significant portion of the American people had
dissented from this war," and Matthew Mantell's 1973 argument that this
opposition covered a wider range of the political spectrum than is usually
granted, come closer to describing the American public's reaction to
Korea.5 A focus on domestic implications also uncovers a less optimistic
picture of the American economy in which family farmers in particular were
victimized by the growing power of what would one day be termed the
military-industrial complex. Faced with an uncertain future created in part
by the Truman administration's determination to pursue the anti-Communist
crusade in Korea, America's small farmers spoke out in vocal opposition to a
war that they saw as producing unnecessary manpower shortages,
inequitable corporate profits, and a diminishing emphasis on governmentsponsored programs for agriculture.

As the leading spokesman for

America's smaller farmers, the National Farmers Union was most visible in
stating this opposition.

Its protests, however, were supported by other

^Steven P. Geitschier, "Limited War and the Homefront: Ohio During the
Korean War," Ph.D. dissertation (Ohio State University, 1977), pp. 218-219;
Matthew E. Mantell, "Opposition to the Korean Wan A Study in American
Dissent," Ph.D. dissertation (New York University, 1973).
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agrarian Interests similarly concerned that the conflict in Korea was
detrimental to the economic well-being of the nation's family farms.
The initial reaction of America's agrarian community to President
Truman's introduction of troops into Korea was one of uncertainty. Leading
farm publications featured a number of articles all conveying the same
concern. What affect, they characteristically asked, would war in Korea
have on the nation's farms? Should crop rotations be changed? Should more
land or newer machinery be purchased? Should crops be sold immediately or
held for possibly higher wartime prices? In short, what should farmers do
either to avoid any negative impact or to guarantee themselves of any
possible benefits?6
The anxiety was caused in part by the inability to predict how long the
war would last. Estimates ranged from the Ohio Farmer's reassuring belief
that “there w ill not be war" to the North Dakota Union Farmer's gloomy
prediction that a long war was "certain." But whether the Korean War itself
would stretch out for years or be over in a matter of months was
^Typical articles included: "No Need for Panic," Ohio Farmer CCVl
(July 15, 1950), p. 6; "If We're Going to Have War," Wallace's Farmer and
Iowa Homestead LXXV (July 15, 1950), p. 20; "Farm Market Hit By War
Scare," Wallace's Farmer and Iowa Homestead LXXV (July 15, 1950), p. 44;
“War, Farmers and Korea," Farm Front. August, 1950, p. 1; "Will Korea Change
Your Plans?," Farm Journal LXXIV (August, 1950), p. 31; and "Threats of War-Here is How They Affect Your Farming," Successful Farming XLVIII
(September, 1950), p. 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178
overshadowed by widespread agrarian acceptance of what Successful
Farming labelled a “very clear . . . fact."

The United States, the journal

argued after two months of fighting, was "destined to live for some time in
a state of war preparedness, or in actual war."

Three months after its

optimistic prediction of no war, even the Ohio Farmer agreed that "now that
the cold war has become warm" the nation would be involved in "an
economic, spiritual and military struggle" for many years to come.7
The prospect of this prolonged conflict providing a boost to the agrarian
economy was frequently discussed in the early weeks of the war. Recalling
the economically beneficial results brought about by American entrance into
World War Two, some farm publications speculated on a repeat performance
of "farm prosperity through war."8
August,

1950,

Government figures released in the

issue of The Agricultural

Situation encouraged this

optimistic interpretation. The "proposed increase in military expenditures"
generated by Korea, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics publication
argued, would be "a powerful new force in the economy" that would benefit
7Qhjo-Farmer CCVI (July 15, 1950), p. 6; North Dakota Union Farmer.
July 17, 1950, p. l; Successful Farming XLVIll (September, 1950), p. 35;
Ohio Farmer CCVI (October 21, 1950), p. 3.
8Farm Journal and Michigan State’s "Farm Economics" ietter were
cited by Facts for Farmers (October, 1950, p. 2) as proposing that "farm
prosperity w ill be proportionate to the amount of fighting" done in Korea.
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farmers as well as the rest of American society.

In fact, the study

announced, farmers had done quite well in the first month of the Korean
conflict. The index of prices farmers received had increased by six and a
half percent from mid-June to mid-July, but even more significantly, these
prices were "moving up more than those they pay." As a result, "farmers'
prices exceeded parity in July for the first time since April 1949."°
Farmers were also encouraged by the existence of agricultural surpluses.
Huge reserves of wheat, corn, and cotton, which until Korea had been judged
by many Americans as an example of farmers holding the public hostage for
the sake of higher prices, were now no longer considered a problem. As the
Farm Journal observed in August, suddenly the nation was taking “comfort"
in the fact that such surpluses were available in a time of war. Farmers,
too, were encouraged by the knowledge that a wartime economy would
presumably guarantee equitable prices for the once troubling surplus
crops.10
The optimism, however, was short-lived.

A month after releasing its

promising figures, The Agricultural Situation announced that “the index of
prices received by farmers rose only one and a half percent from mid-July
to mid-August," and prices paid by farmers had caught up to those they
9The Agricultural Situation XXXIv (August. 1950), pp. 13-14.
1°Farm Journal LXXIV (August, 1950), p. 31.
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received. Within a few months, Industrial prices had greatly outdistanced
agricultural prices, and America’s farmers, once temporarily buoyed by
promises of increased profits, complained that they once again were paying
considerably more for goods and equipment than they were receiving from
the marketing of their crops. Even the surpluses were now seen more as a
problem than as a blessing, for as Wallace’s Farmer and Iowa Homestead
remarked in August* “It’s easy to pile up reserves, [but] hard to figure sound
ways of releasing [a crop] on the market when it's needed. It’s also hard to
find a place to put 1,200 million extra bushels in a war reserve."11
The dark economic news was accompanied by the realization that
analogies to World War Two offered false hopes for agrarian prosperity. The
August 19 issue of Ohio Farmer cautioned against comparing the present
situation with the one in 1941, reminding its readers that while the Second
World War had been preceded by a major depression, the years before Korea
had been ones of relative prosperity. As a result, the journal argued two
months later, it was unlikely that agricultural prices would rise in the same
impressive manner that they had in the years of World War Two.

An

additional consideration, one brought out in Wallace’s Farmer and lowa
11 The Agricultural Situation XXXIV (September, 1950), pp. 13-14;
Wallace’s Farmer and lowa Homestead LXXV (August 5, 1950), p. 66.
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Homestead, was that European farmers were "not yet being disturbed as in
World Wars I and II," and so American farmers would not benefit from
increased overseas markets.12
Three months into the war, agrarian spokesmen were no longer hopeful of
"farm prosperity through war." Instead, as both Facts for Farmers and the
North Dakota Union Farmer observed, "every step toward a war economy and
every shift from 'food to guns'. . . aggravated] the problems of the family
farmers...." Higher taxes, shrinking export markets, declining per capita
consumption of food, and, most significantly, increased military spending
created a situation where America's farmers had become “victims" of
Korean War-inflated prices. Such essential items as farm machinery, tires,
and fencing materials had been, both papers observed, "marked up several
times within a few months."13
Recognizing in the economic realities of a wartime economy the
potential for agrarian unrest, the Truman administration began in October a
campaign aimed at alleviating farmer concerns.

Under Secretary of

Agriculture Clarence J. McCormick, an Indiana-born farmer who had taken
12Ohio Farmer CCVI (August 19, 1950), pp. 38-39, and CCVI (October
21, 1950), p. 3; Wallace's Farmer and lowa Homestead LXXV (August 19,
1950), p. 6.
1JFacts for Farmers. October, 1950, p. 2; North Dakota Union Farmer.
November 6, 1950, p. 2.
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office a month after the beginning of the Korean War, set out on what would
be an almost endless national tour in which he attempted to drum up
agrarian support for the war. Aware of the record of the Farmers Union as a
leading critic of U.S. foreign policy, McCormick made one of his first stops
at the annual convention of the South Dakota Farmers Union in Mitchell,
South Dakota. He praised the organization for its "concern with the whole
broad world picture," assured its members that the government appreciated
agriculture as "an essential

part

of

our national

defense against

communistic aggression," and asked them to "keep on producing the food and
fiber the Nation needs to meet any emergency that we may have to face."14
While he spoke to numerous farm groups in his lengthy trek across the
nation, McCormick showed an acute awareness of those issues that played a
key role in Farmers Union opposition to American foreign policy.

He

addressed the organization’s concern with the "unholy alliance” between
1biography of Clarence J. McCormick, July 27, 1950, Box 2, Folder
"April-July 1950," Official Files of the Agriculture Department, Papers of
Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; "Gearing Up,” Talk
by Under Secretary of Agriculture Clarence J. McCormick at Annual Meeting
of South Dakota Farmers Union, Mitchell, South Dakota, October 5, 1950, Box
2, Folder "August-November 1950,” Agriculture Department Official Files,
Truman Library. Copies of both of these documents can also be found at the
National Agricultural Library in Beltsville, Maryland.
Copies of the
numerous speeches made by McCormick on his national tour can be found in
Boxes 2 through 4 of the Agriculture Department Official Files and in Box 2
of the Papers of Clarence J. McCormick, also at the Truman Library.
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business and the military by assuring the agricultural community of the
Truman administration's insistence that "farmers need protection fully as
much as industry" and that food was “as vital as ammunition." He catered
his comments to the Farmers Union concern with small farms by noting
i

President Truman's determination "that the mobilization period shall not be
used as an excuse for trying to weaken the family farm pattern of
agriculture in this country."15
McCormick's appeals met with only limited success, for economic reality
belied his assurances that the American effort in Korea would not harm
agrarian interests. As the initial boost in farm prices brought on at the
beginning of the war faded into memory, farmers realized that what
McCormick had predicted as a Korean War-inspired generation of "expensive
uncertainty"16 would be for family farmers both more expensive and more
uncertain than for the American population as a whole.
Topping the list of agrarian anxieties was the depletion of agricultural
manpower brought on in part by accelerated draft calls to meet American
commitments in Korea.

Demobilization following World War Two had

15Clarence J. McCormick, "Gearing Up," p. 14; "How Mobilization Affects
the Farmer," Talk by Under Secretary of Agriculture Clarence J. McCormick
at Meeting of State Extension and Experiment Station Editors, Washington,
D C., May 7, 1951, Box 3, Folder “April-June 1951," Agriculture Department
Official Files, Truman Library.
16Clarence J. McCormick, "How Mobilization Affects the Farmer," p. 2.
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dropped the nation's military strength to 1.5 million, and although a draft
law had been on the books since 1948 no one had actually been conscripted.
With voluntary enlistments running over 30,000 a month, and with the
nation at peace, the Selective Service System was, as Glenn Talbott
characterized it in an annual report to the North Dakota Farmers Union, "in a
very real sense [as] demobilized" as the military itself.

To most of the

registrants under the system, Talbott concluded, "the probabilities of a call
to active service... seemed so remote... ,"17 The fighting in Korea changed
this.

Congressional conferees promptly extended the 1948 Selective

Service Act through July of 1951, and monthly draft calls aimed at
rebuilding the military to 3 million men began in September.18
The re-activation of the draft was particularly devastating to family
farmers.

Governmental and agricultural leaders on both the state and

national levels were flooded with letters from older or disabled farmers
convinced that the drafting of their sons or of other hired laborers would
17Glenn Talbott, "Annual Report," November 7, 1951, p. 12, North Dakota
Farmers Union Papers, North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, North
Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota.
1S elective Service II (July, 1952), p. 1; U.S. Selective Service System,
Selective Service Under the 1948 Act: June 24. 1948-Julv 9. 1950
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 136-137; U.S.
Selective Service System, Selective Service Under the 1948 Act Extended:
July 9. 1950-June 19. 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1953), p. 42.
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force them to abandon their homes.

Typical was the situation of a

physically disabled South Dakota farmer in his fifties whose operation of a
thousand acre spread relied solely on the work of his only son, a twentyone year old who had received his draft notice.

A North Dakota farmer’s

wife, in a letter to Glenn Talbott, described basically the same difficulty.
Her twenty year old son, who had also received his draft call, was the sole
means of economic survival not only for her and her husband, but also for
the boy's great aunt and uncle, both of whom were over seventy years old.
Wisconsin Farmers Union president Kenneth Hones argued that the problem
was particularly acute in the dairy regions of the nation where, he wrote in
a letter to President Truman, “thousands of 65-year old dairy farmers, along
with their wives, [were] struggling to keep 50 or 60 head of dairy cattle
together for the boy when he comes home.”19
The reaction of farmers to the drafting of farm boys ranged from the
extreme anger expressed by one Kansas farmer who challenged the
19Paul Opsahl to Charles Brannan, March 15, 1951, Box 2006, Folder
“Military Service January I-April 6," Record Group 16 (General
Correspondence); Mrs. Sever Gilbertson to Glenn J. Talbott, January 12,
1951, Box 9, Folder 17, Talbott Family Papers; K.W. Hones to Harry Truman,
December 7, 1951, Box 1974, Folder “Employment 1-1,“ Record Group 16
(General Correspondence). In addition to the numerous such letters in both
the Talbott Family Papers and in the Secretary of Agriculture Records at the
National Archives, impressive collections are also located in the Wint Smith
and Frank Carlson Papers at the Kansas State Historical Society in Topeka.
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government "gestapo" to "come out and try working from 4 am until 10:00
at nite instead of drafting all our farm boys," to the more measured and
insightful observation of a North Dakota farmer who suggested that “if more
boys were left on farms to help produce food, we could send to foreign
countries corn, wheat and meat which would do as much good to write the
peace as sending so much lead and guns." Kenneth Hones put the relationship
between draft procedures and U.S. foreign policy in perspective when he
wondered in a letter to Secretary Brannan, “What sense is there to talk
about land reform in India or Korea to lick Communism when we are
destroying our own family type farmers?"

The anger evident in these

observations occasionally spilled over into physical protests, as when 250
farm people in Frederic, Wisconsin staged an anti-draft rally and issued a
resolution protesting the "indiscriminate drafting of farmers and essential
farm labor

“20

For Jim Patton and other members of the National Farmers Union, the
problem with Selective Service was not that it was "indiscriminate," but
that it particularly targeted small farmers. In a February, 1951, letter to
20Fred W. Heine to Wint Smith, July 17, 1951, Box 25, Folder “Draft,"
Smith Papers; William H. Martin to Milton Young, January 24, 1951, Box 9,
Folder 17, Talbott Family Papers; Kenneth Hones to Charles Brannan, January
16, 1952, Box 2099, Folder "Military Service January 1-February 12," Record
Group 16 (General Correspondence); "Draft Hits Family Farm Hardest," GTA
Digest. April, 1952, p. 26.
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Kansas congressman Wint Smith, Patton argued that the system

"almost

inevitably workled] to weaken the family farmer as compared to the big
farm operators." Given a choice, he told Smith, "between the son of a small
farm operator, however much he is needed on the farm, and the hired man on
a large agricultural operation, the decision almost invariably goes to the
bigger operation." North Dakota Farmers Union member LeRoy Schonberger
offered the same opinion when he wrote to Glenn Talbott that, "When it
came to drafting they took the boys from the smaller farms first because,
as they put it, 'They weren't needed as bad.'"21
Because they were more vulnerable than larger agribusinesses to the
affects of the draft, small family farms were more adversely affected by
the workings of Selective Service. It was not, however, because they were
specifically targeted.

Instead, family farms were victimized by a draft

registration system organized around Intentionally vague guidelines and
manned by individuals whose memories of World War Two generated an
unwillingness to grant deferments to goy: farmers, large or small.
The anti-farmer sentiment of the Selective Service System was a
product of the Tydings Amendment, a law passed as part of the Selective
21 Jim Patton to Wint Smith, February 14, 1951, Box 25, Folder "Draft,"
Smith Papers; LeRoy Schonberger to Glenn J. Talbott, January 12, 1951, Box
9, Folder 17, Talbott Family Papers.
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Training and Service Act of 1942. Deferring from military service everyone
"necessary to and regularly engaged in an agricultural occupation or
endeavor essential to the war effort," the amendment had produced, at its
peak in March of 1944, over 1,700,000 agricultural deferments. While the
necessities of war had dropped this number to Just over 250,000 near war’s
end, even that figure was eight times higher than deferments granted for all
other occupational categories combined.22
The resentment created by the Tydings amendment showed itself in the
attitudes of local draft boards, which were often dominated by large
numbers of World War Two veterans who adopted a punitive approach toward
requests for agricultural deferments.

"They understandably have the

feeling," Patton wrote to Wint Smith, "that if the person being considered is
physically fit, then he ought to go to war just like they did a few years
before." One North Dakota farmer was reportedly told by his local board that
since "the town boys won the last w a r,. . . the farm boys will have to win
this one." The issue also extended beyond the draft boards and into public
debate, with one side observing that "some communities have unfairly
22Albert A. Blum, "The Farmer, the Army and the Draft," Agricultural
History XXXVIII (January, 1964), p. 35; George Q. Flynn, Lewis B. Hershev. MrSelective Service (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1985), pp.
112-115.
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placed a social stigma on these farm boys" and the other charging that
government policy had made the farm "a grand place to creep for
deferments."23
The skepticism toward agricultural deferments was shared by the
director of the Selective Service System, General Lewis B. Hershey.
Although he frequently cited his own persona) farming background, and
although he insisted that in World War Two he had “bent over backwards to
help farmers," his recent biographer accurately concluded that Hershey
believed that, "Farm deferments [in World War Two] had been used in a
disgraceful manner to protect young healthy boys."

Hershey had actively

fought passage of the Tydings Amendment and had told the House Military
Affairs Committee in February of 1942 that, "We cannot defer every farmer,
every farmer's son, and every farmhand merely because the individual
happens to be engaged in the occupation of farming."24 He had not changed
his mind by the time of Korea, and so told a House subcommittee in March of
1951 that there were very few men “between the ages of 19 and 26 whose
skills are so great, and who are so indispensable, that their transfer from
23Jim Patton to Wint Smith, February 14, 1951, Box 25, Folder "Draft,"
Smith Papers; George J. Swartz to Glenn Talbott, January 23, 1951, Box 9,
Folder 17, Talbott Family Papers; Glenn W. Sample, “Farmers Need More
Help," HftPSier Farmer, February, 1951, p. 11; Wisconsin Agriculturalist and
Farmer. November 4 , 1950, p. 17.
24F1vnn. Lewis B. Hershev. pp. 111-113 and 151.
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civilian to military life would create much of a ripple."

Challenged by

Kansas senator Andrew Schoeppel, a strong advocate for agricultural
deferments, Hershey defended his position by repeating the argument that
"some of the boys [in World War Two] overworked the farm deferment."25
A year later, in a letter to President Truman, Hershey took his
skepticism to a more cynical level.

He told the President that, “In the

hundreds of cases that have come to my personal attention," farmers had
always requested deferments only for their sons. "It is never the tenant,
nor the hired man,” Hershey wrote. The work of a son, he suggested, meant
"less outlay in money" for the farmer, and so "the real truth as to the
importance of the son in the farming operation can never be determined
satisfactorily to all persons concerned."26
Besides questionning the necessity of farm deferments, General Hershey
similarly doubted that the draft had as much of a negative impact on
farming operations as farmers charged. "[T]he effect of Selective Service
on the reduction of farm population," Hershey wrote in his letter to
25Testimony of Lewis B. Hershey, March 7, 1951, U.S. Congress, Senate,
82nd Congress, 1st Session, Industrial Manpower: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Manpower of the Select Committee on Small Business, pp.
47-54.
26U.S. Selective Service System, Annual Report of the Director of
Selective Service. 1952 (Washinqton, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1953), p. 28.
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President Truman, had been "overemphasize^]."

The 276,000 farm boys

ordered for induction were but "a small percentage of [the] 4,776,000
registrants in farm areas." In addition, the approximately 90,000 farmers
receiving deferments once again, as in World War Two. far exceeded the
number of deferments in other occupational categories.

On top of this

number, it was pointed out in Selective Service publications, "farmers by
the hundreds of thousands" were also deferred for other reasons, including
age, dependency, and status as veterans.27
Other Selective Service officials produced similar statistics to argue
that farmers were getting a better deal than they claimed. Colonel George
Irvin, chief of the field division of Selective Service, observed in a
February, 1951, visit to St. Paul that for every twenty-five men inducted,
ten received agricultural deferments and only eight received industrial
deferments. The Dakotas, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were, he claimed, among
the states with the highest deferment rates, and Minnesota in particular had
a rate five times the national average. Wisconsin Selective Service director
Bentley Courtenay presented figures in April, 1952, demonstrating that, on
average, local draft boards in his state had taken only one boy off every
27u.S. Selective Service System, Annual Report. 1952. pp. 27-28; U.S.
Selective Service System, Selective Service Under the 1948 Act Extended, p.
56.
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forty-four farms.

Four months later, in a "thorough and heated" all-day

discussion in the Kansas state senate chambers, Selective Service deputy
director Louis H. Renfrow offered similar statistics that showed, he said,
that the farm belt had not been hit as hard as had been reported.26
Despite Selective Service's insistence on the benign impact of the draft
on the nation's farms, both the National Farmers Union and the Agriculture
Department consistently argued otherwise.

The shortage of farm labor

produced by the draft was a persistent topic of Agriculture in National
Defense, a weekly newsletter begun by the Agriculture Department in March,
1951.

The October 10, 1951, issue reported that “the total farm labor

supply for 1951 [was] running short of needs by about two billion manhours, or about 10 percent of the total manpower needed."

It also

announced that the agriculture, labor, and defense departments had adopted
a policy "permitting the use of military personnel for farm work on a parttime basis in the event of emergencies arising out of shortages of farm
labor." The irony of military personnel, some of whom conceivably had been
drafted off the farms in the first place, being used to replace farm workers
29u.S. Congress, House, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Impact of Military
Induction Upon Agriculture: Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture.
February 26, 1951, pp. 35-36; Kansas Union Farmer. September, 1952, p. 1;
Wisconsin Agriculturalist and Farmer. April 5, 1952, p. 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

193
who had been drafted into the military was not missed by Jim Patton, who
in November, 1951, wrote to Clarence McCormick that the "matter of
maintaining a supply of trained workers on family farms [was] becoming
more intense."29
Through late 1951 and into 1952, the problem persisted. McCormick, who
told Patton in March, 1952, that he had been feeling ”reasonably good about
our manpower problems and outlook," nevertheless reported to his friend
that the department had recently been receiving "increasing numbers of
pessimistic reports on the agricultural labor situation from a good many
states." Patton, noting that the problem was made all the more difficult by
the refusal of local draft boards to grant needed deferments, told President
Truman in May, 1952, that the “scarcity situation of farm manpower . . .
[was] becoming more acute with each passing week." By the end of 1952,
Agriculture in National Defense still saw the shortage of farm manpower as
"one of agriculture's most difficult problems," and predicted that things
would only get worse as “in the months ahead . . . men are called into the
armed forces under the rotation system."30
29U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture in National Defense.
October 10, 1951, Record Group 16 (Office of Information); James G. Patton
to Clarence McCormick, November 7, 1951, Box 2005, Folder "Military
Service," Record Group 16 (General Correspondence).
•^Clarence McCormick to James Patton, March 26, 1952, Box 2068,
Folder "Committees January 1 to May 25," Record Group 16 (General
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For small farmers, the main problem with the Selective Service System
was a lack of uniformity created by the autonomous authority of each local
draft board. The national office was unwilling to Impose across-the-board
mandates but preferred Instead to issue vague guidelines instructing the
boards to take into consideration “the average annual production per farm
worker which is marketed for a local average farm." Each state and each
locale took this general yardstick and applied it in different ways.
Pennsylvania, for example, decided that a farm producing enough food to
feed a family of four plus forty-four servicemen would serve as the base
point from which to decide deferments. Local boards in Oklahoma, on the
other hand, told their registrants that whether they farmed one acre or a
thousand acres had no bearing whatsoever on their draft status. What such a
confused system produced were situations, such as the one reported to
Congress by Farm Bureau assistant director Matt Triggs, in which two
adjoining counties with the same population make-up had sixty-five
deferments in one county and none in the other.31
Correspondence); James Patton to Harry Truman, Box 17, Folder "National
Farmers Union-General," Waters Papers; U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Agriculture in National Defense. November 3, 1952, Record Group 16 (Office
of Information).
3 ' U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture in National Defense. April
4, 1951, Record Group 16 (Office of Information); Selective Service i
(October, 1951), p. 3; David F. Foster to James G. Patton, December 6, 1950,
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The lack of uniformity was addressed in complaints received by both
farm organizations and government officials.32 General Hershey, however
denied that the local boards were acting arbitrarily.

He consistently

praised their efforts, and in a January, 1951, letter to the local boards
sarcastically dismissed the charge of a lack of uniformity.

"The lack of

understanding of specific problems of registrants," he wrote:
has been charged generally by those in l-A rather than by those who
had been deferred by the local boards. Umpires are not infrequently
charged with bad eyesight or worse when base runners are called out
on close plays or even in close games.
He concluded the letter by advising the boards to continue their admirable
performance and to not be bothered with the misguided complaints of those
who incorrectly accused them of following an arbitrary approach.33
Hershey's refusal to admit the arbitrary nature of the selective service
system's drafting of farmers was matched by his reluctance to issue
specific directives to fine-tune the procedure.

Asked by Minnesota

Box 1974, Folder "Employment 1-1," Record Group 16 (General
Correspondence); Statement of Matt Triggs, February 26, 1951, Impact of
Military Induction Upon Agriculture, pp. 15-19.
32Again, the voluminous letters in the Talbott Family Papers, in the
Secretary of Agriculture Records at the National Archives, and in the Wint
Smith and Frank Carlson Papers at the Kansas Historical Society contain a
number of examples of farmers making this particular appeal.
33Statement of Lewis B. Hershey, February 26, 1951, Impact of Military
Induction Upon Agriculture, p. 27. See also Selective Service II (April,
1952), pp. 1-2.
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congressman August Andresen to issue an order guaranteeing one ablebodied man on each farm, Hershey refused to do so, saying once again that
such decisions were best left to the local draft boards more aware of the
circumstances in their particular locales.

He similarly opposed the

reinstitution of a point production system as had been used in World War
Two. M[E]very time you begin to be specific," Hershey told Congress, "that
w ill get John out, that same specific excludes James, who may be just as
reputable, but reputable in a little different way that we did not yet get
specific in."34 Hershey did tell Congress that he supported the specific
measure of having at least one farmer on each local board.

But while

farmers had been clamoring for such a reform since the beginning of the
Korean War, no directive was ever issued to implement the practice.35
The minor adjustments that were made as a result of farmer protest had
no meaningful effect.

Agricultural Mobilization Committees created in

April, 1951, to advise draft boards were frequently treated with as much
disdain as had been directed at individual farmers themselves. The longsought addition of agriculture to the Labor Department’s list of “critical
34Statement of Lewis B. Hershey, February 26, 1951, impact of Military
Induction Upon Agriculture, p. 31.
35Among the many examples of farmer requests for one farmer on each
local draft board were Emil Loriks to Clarence McCormick, March 24, 1951,
Box 2006, Folder "Military Service January 1-April 6,” Record Group 16
(General Correspondence) and Iowa Union Farmer. January, 1951, p. 1.
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occupations," which also took place in April, 1951, was likewise a hollow
victory. Being on the list did not guarantee deferments for anyone, but,
more importantly, as was brought out in the congressional hearings on "the
impact of military induction upon agriculture," Selective Service was not
bound by Labor's list.36
In deflecting agrarian criticism from Selective Service, General Hershey
claimed that the draft had a less damaging effect on agriculture than did the
siphoning of labor into war-related industries.37 The relative influence of
each factor is difficult to determine, but farmers as a whole agreed that,
along with the draft, the higher wages and benefits offered by defenserelated industries contributed to the labor shortage on the nation's farms.
The addition of 300,000 jobs in the defense industry between the beginning
36HQosie rf a cm<?r, June, 1951, p. 5; impact of Military induction Upon
Agriculture, p. 86. The congressional hearings revealed the confused state
of the entire deferment program, as representatives from the Labor,
Commerce, and Agriculture Departments, as well as officials from the
Department of Defense and various military branches, presented widely
conflicting interpretations of how the system supposedly worked. The lack
of a clear understanding angered even Kansas’ Clifford Hope, whose
previously held belief that Selective Service had been administered in a
reasonable and fair manner was replaced by a fear that each branch of
government was following its own different rules.
37lnterestingly, Hershey blamed not only the “lure of high wages"
offered by industry but also the "indiscriminate recruitment of farm youths
by the Armed Forces in rural areas without any consideration whatsoever as
to whether or not the youths are needed at home on the farm." Selective
Service II (April, 1952), p. 1.
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of the Korean War and the start of 1951, and the prediction that at least
four million similar positions would be created before the end of the year,
added to the necessity, as the Department of Labor's Robert Goodwin told
the House Committee on Agriculture in March of 1951, of shifting civilian
workers, primarily farmers, into defense-related positions. Addressing the
growing concerns of farmers that such a shift would hurt the ability of
farmers to maintain economic stability, Vermont's George Aiken bluntly told
the Senate's Agriculture Committee that same month that, "The whole
trouble lies in the fact that other things pay better than farming."38
The war-accelerated exodus from the farm to the factory was the
subject of many appeals to government officials.

Indiana representative

Cecil Harden was told by one of her constituents that a number of the
farmers in Vermillion County "don't like the way the Ordnance plant is hiring
our farm help away from us," and that it was getting so bad that “a farmer
can't keep anybody to help him on the farm." Kansas's Frank Carlson received
a similar appeal from a Lawrence farmer who wondered, after observing a
•^Statement of Lewis B. Hershey, February 26, 1951, Impact of Military
Induction Upon Agriculture, p. 29; Testimony of Robert Goodwin, March 8,
1951, U.S. Congress, House, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Farm Labor:
Hearings Before the House Committee on Agriculture, pp. 36-7; Statement of
George Aiken, March 14, 1951, U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st
Session, Farm Labor Program: Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry, p. 71.
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number of his neighbors abandon their farms to go to defense plants, "what
would happen if we all quit and start working for the government." The
Grange's Herschel Newsom likewise remarked in February, 1951, that on a
recent trip to Indiana he had been “asked to fill out six applications for
recommendations to industries [for] people that have worked and operated
farms in my neighborhood." This strong pull of defense industries, combined
with the drain of Selective Service, prompted Jim Patton's rueful, but
inaccurate, observation that the United States in fifteen years would not
have "enough people left in agriculture to produce this nation's food."39
Truman administration officials were more optimistic. The Director of
Defense Mobilization's eighth quarterly report to the president announced
that after two and a half years of war "the manpower needs of the Nation
have with few exceptions been met." Part of the reason for the success, the
report claimed, was the shifting of workers "from less essential activities
to those more important to the national security."40 Administraton figures
39Letter to Cecil Harden rrom "Dana In Vermillion County," included in
1951 transcript of radio broadcast, Box 8, Folder 14, Harden Papers; C.E.
Richards to Frank Carlson, May 8, 1951, Box 1 (81st Congress General
Correspondence 1950-1951 A-C), Carlson Papers; “How We Can Stop Rising
Prices" in Harding, editor, The Age of Danger, p. 290; Jim Patton to Clarence
McCormick, April 6, 1952, Box 2073, Folder "Employment 1 -1 / Record Group
16 (General Correspondence).
^''The Job Ahead for Defense Mobilization (January 1, 1953): Eighth
Quarterly Report to the President by the Director of Defense Mobilization,"
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generally avoided the politically foolish error of publicly labelling farmers
as “less essential," but it was obvious that they felt farmers were over
stating their labor difficulties.

Assistant Secretary of State Anna

Rosenberg described the farm problem as “more one of machinery and
replacement parts . . . than of mass manpower."41 The Department of
Labor's A.W. Motley, in a heated discussion with August Andresen, disputed
that the farm labor problem was as bleak as the Minnesota congressman
suggested. Housing was scarce in industrial areas, Motley argued, and the
improvement in both wages and working conditions on farms made rural
employment much more attractive.

Andresen rejected Motley's analysis,

telling him that the two and a half million farmers with holdings of less
than one hundred acres were “not in a position to build houses to bring out
families to work on their farms and to pay wages in competition with what
they can get in industry.. . . They are paying," Andresen continued, "around
$ 125 a month for good farm labor, but there are not many that are taking the
jobs. And as war production increases there w ill be less and less who will
be willing to go on the farm.-42
pp. 33 and 35, Box 40, Folder 3, Iowa Farm Bureau Federation Records, Iowa
State University.
41 Testimony of Anna M. Rosenberg, March 22,
Manpower, p. 102.

1951,

Industrial

^Im pact of Military Induction Upon Agriculture, pp. 114-115.
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One reason for the divergent perceptions of reality between farmers and
non-farmers was the tendency of the latter group, as the Farm Bureau's Matt
Triggs put it, “to take agricultural production for granted - to assume that
farm people w ill be able to continue to produce abundantly irrespective of
the facilities and manpower available to them." This erroneous assumption
led policymakers to overlook what Triggs calied the "essential question where can each individual make the maximum contribution to the national
defense effort?"43

This oversight produced both the indiscriminate

drafting of essential farm labor as well as the siphoning of that labor into
supposedly more “essential" defense-related industries.

It also led to

legislation that, despite its well-intentioned efforts to alleviate the farm
labor problem, actually angered small farmers and increased their
suspicions that the crisis in Korea was being used, as the Farmers Union's
Robert Engler told the Senate in March, 1951, as an excuse to further
“damage. . . their already insecure economic position."44
Enacted in early 1951, the Mexican Labor Importation Law provided for
the temporary entry of Mexican laborers into the United States. The Farm
43American Farm Bureau Federation Official Newsletter. March 5,
1951, p. 1.
^"Statement of Robert Engler, National Farmers Union, Before the
Senate Agriculture Committee, On Farm Labor, March 14, 1951," Box 36,
Folder "National Farmers Union 1950-1956," Hickenlooper Papers.
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Bureau praised the law for helping to maintain and Increase agricultural
production, Tor providing a "feasible alternative source of labor" supposedly
unavailable in much of the country, and for adding to both the dollar
earnings and the agricultural knowledge of the Mexican nationals fortunate
enough to be a part of the program.

But with the exception of the

Associated Farmers of California, a group that ironically also supported the
importation of South Korean farm workers so that they could "see how
democracy works," the Farm Bureau stood alone in calling for Mexican
laborers as replacements for American farm workers moved off the land as
a result of the Korean War.45
For the majority of American farmers, the passage of the Mexican Labor
importation Law showed how little the administration understood the
requirements of farming in a mechanized world. The government seemed to
be saying that one agricultural worker was as good as any other, so that
when one person was moved off the land he could easily and quickly be
replaced by any other warm-blooded body.
Farmers reacted to this mindset by emphasizing the necessity of skilled
45"Reso1utions of the AFBF for 1952, Adopted at the 33rd Annual
Meeting, December 13, 1951, Chicago, Illinois," Box 1, Folder ’AFBF 19521953,” Hickenlooper Papers; The Associated Farmer. March-April, 1952, pp.
1-4.
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labor and by questioning the ability of unskilled immigrants to adequately
perform the tasks essential to the running of a mechanized farm. ”ln this
highly mechanized age," one woman wrote to Kansas senator Frank Carlson,
'it is not every Tom, Dick and Harry that can operate" a farm.

Carlson's

office was flooded with letters arguing that unskilled Mexican laborers
were incapable of running the essential equipment and that the necessity of
hiring an additional foreman to train them was financially prohibitive.
Carlson’s Kansas colleague, Senator Andrew Schoeppel, also received a
number of letters opposed to the plan, as did Farmers Union officials Glenn
Talbott and Jim Patton. Schoeppel told the Senate in March, 1951, that a
Kansas farmer with ”$25,000 or $30,000 invested in machinery" would not
be pleased at the prospect of trusting that equipment to unskilled laborers.
Talbott made the same point a year later when he told the Senate that the
necessity of running a "$6,000 combine [or] a $5,000 Diesel tractor," made it
impractical to "replace trained year-around skilled farm help with just
common labor." In a February, 1952, appeal to President Truman, Patton
wrote that, “Obviously, the importation of untrained aliens from Mexico, or
elsewhere, won't do the job." Even Ladd Haystead, the agrarian commentator
contemptuous of farmer claims of second class citizenship, agreed that the
"labor import will not help greatly because of that labor's lack of knowledge
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of how to operate and maintain complex machinery."46
Iowa congressman H.R. Gross went beyond the charge that

the

importation of Mexican agricultural labor demonstrated the administration’s
lack of understanding of the agrarian way of life.

In comments before the

House Committee on Agriculture, the former editor of the Iowa Union Farmer
directly tied the program to America’s participation in Korea. Speaking of
"good American farmers, some of them aged and ailing, some overworked,
and some forced to sell out or seriously curtail production because the
military has stranded them, grabbing their sons and hired hands," Gross
painted an image of farmers being "on the block, to be traded off to the
military for foreigners.

I had hoped," he 3rgued, "that human auctions of

this sort ended with the Civil War." Gross also wondered aloud why there
was such a surplus of foreign laborers. If the fighting in Korea, he asked,
was “supposed to be a united fight against communism, why are not these
importable foreigners serving in their own armed forces in the front lines?"
Adding to Gross’ anger was his belief that the alien importation program
specifically, and perhaps even deliberately, discriminated against farmers.
^M rs. AA. Zoeller to Frank Carlson, February 3, 1951, Box 2 (81st
Congress General Correspondence 1950-1951), Carlson Papers; Industrial
Manpower, p. 55; Testimony of Glenn Talbott, April 16, 1952, Farm Price
Supports and Production Goals, p. 106; James G. Patton to Harry Truman,
February 12, 1952, Box 10, Folder *11, Patton Papers; Haystead, "4th SemiAnnual Agricultural Report,” p. 11.
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"I have heard,” he said:
of no proposals to import foreign industrial workers, businessmen,
lawyers, teachers, ministers, doctors, dentists, bankers, and so forth,
so that Americans in those fields can be drafted out of their jobs.
Why then single out farmers for this brand of travesty?47
Gross’ comments were an extension of the Farmers Union's continued
claims of the "unholy alliance" between government and the more powerful
elements of American society. In fact, the Farm Bureau’s outspoken support
for the importation of alien agricultural labor convinced the Farmers Union
that the program was, as Robert Engler said, ”a threat to the well being of
all family farmers."

It provided, Engler argued, "a plentiful and docile

supply of itinerant labor which can be turned on and off, as the need
develops, by regional government officials sympathetic and attentive to the
demands of large growers, canners, packers and processors.”48 Unable to
compete with the cheaper foreign labor, America's small farmers would
continue to be forced off the land.
The release in February, 1951, of a Congressional study entitled
47Statement of H.R. Gross, March 12, 1951, Farm Labor, pp. 139-143.
One other agrarian group, the National Farm Labor Union, also made a direct
connection between the immigration law and world affairs. The Californiabased A.F.L. affiliate opposed the program because it offered “Latin
American Communists" the opportunity to infiltrate "the United States
disguised as agricultural workers from Mexico." Farm Labor News. January,
1951, p. 2, February, 1951, p. 1.
^"Statement of Robert Engler,” March 14, 1951, p. 1, Hickenlooper
Papers.
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"Underemployment of Rural Families" further suggested that the government
was continuing what Facts for Farmers called

a policy of "forcible

displacement" of small farmers. Known informally as the Sparkman Report,
after the Alabama Democrat who chaired the committee investigating the
status of America's farming community, the study argued that two million
of America's farmers produced so little that both they and the nation would
be better served if they could be encouraged to move off the land and into
more productive jobs in industry. This was particularly true, Successful
Farming argued in approving the report, because of the "vast expansion in
our military strength" brought on by the Korean War and by the necessity of
meeting “the threat of world Communism."49
While Successful Farming and others supportive of Farm Bureau-style
commercial farming hailed the findings of the Sparkman Report, the
National Farmers Union and other representatives of family farms denounced
the study as a continuation of the assault on their existence begun by the
Chamber of Commerce in 1945 and followed up on by Henry Luce's U fa
magazine in 1947.

The proposals offered in the report seemed to be

4^U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 82nd
Congress, 1st Session, February 2, 1951, Underemployment of Rural
Families: Materials Prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report: Facts for Farmers. March, 1951, p. 4; Lauren Soth, "America's No. 1
Farm Problem," Successful Farming XLIX (March, 1951), p. 46.
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designed, Facts for Farmers charged in March, 1951, "to increase the size of
the big farms by eliminating the smaller farms."

Iowa’s Fred Stover, who

judged the main theme of the report to be that "lower income farms are
chiefly reponsible for underemployment," claimed that it was all part of the
overall effort to do away with government-sponsored price supports and,
eventually, America's small farmers themselves. Acknowledging that in the
furor brought on by Korea “the draft boards have already adopted a tough
policy in dealing with small and family-size farms," Facts for Farmers
concluded that "the committee's recommendations cannot be expected to
discourage this procedure."50
Six months after the release of the Sparkman Report, a 60-member panel
of “top manpower men in Government, industry and university circles" met
at Stanford University's Institute on Manpower Utilization and Government
Personnel.

The group’s findings, released after three days of meetings,

repeated the Congressional charge that small farmers were “one of the
worst-utilized sources of labor" in the country. Robert Clark, the director
of the Truman administration's National Security Resources Board and one of
the conference participants, ignored the usual administration reluctance to
^Facts for Farmers. March, 1951, p. 4; Iowa Union Farmer. April, 1951,
p. 1.
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label farming as relatively less important than other occupations when he
suggested that "it might not be a bad idea to close up the Nation's submarginal farms and free their manpower for more essential use.”

The

recommendations of the conference, which the San Francisco Chronicle
predicted would have "great weight in influencing future Government
manpower policies," confirmed for Fred Stover what the Farmers Union had
been "warning about for a year - and more - that the family farmers were
going to be thrown into the maw of the war machine." Stover argued that
what the conference was telling American farmers was that, “You fellows
don't turn out enough of the sinews of war, so we're going to put you in
places where we can see to it that you do."51
Opposition to the war-facilitated consignment of the family farmer to
what one Wisconsin writer called "the scrap heap designed for us by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce,"52 was matched by small farmer opposition both to
the increased corporate profits generated by American participation in
Korea and to the reluctance of the Truman administration to take action to
limit these corporate gains. When business profits hit an all-tim e high of
$40 billion for the third quarter of 1950, climbed an additional $8 billion
51 San Francisco Chronicle. August 25, 1951, p. 3; Iowa Union Farmer.
September 14,1951, p. 1.
52Harvey Witt to Farmers Union State Office, February 14, 1951, Box 1,
Folder 4, Hones Papers.
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for the final quarter of the year, and then continued in an ever-upward
spiral, farmers reacted bitterly.

Facts for Farmers accused American

businessmen of "boosting their prices with the first headlines of war,"
while Fred Stover's Iowa Union Farmer decried corporations for deliberately
"fanning the flames of war" and charged the Truman administration with
pursuing a policy of "globalarceny."

Spurred by the U.S. News and World

Report's observation that American business activity was “being supported
by a rising tide of defense orders," Stover labelled the corporate-propelled
"war hysteria" as the "nation's number one racket." The lowa farm leader's
views were echoed in other farm journals, particularly the Northeastern and
Eastern editions of the National Union Farmer, and in letters to farm state
congressional figures. One Kansas woman, particularly incensed that the
war in Korea primarily would benefit American corporations, laid the blame
on "a corrupt group of politicians . . . who don’t give a damn about anything
but the almighty dollar."

A group of Montana farmers, returning from a

peace rally in Chicago in the summer of 1951, described their weariness at
"sending our boys to act as robots for the good of a few."53
53lowa Union Farmer. November, 1950, p. 5, May, 1951, p. 8, and
November, 1951, p. 8; Facts for Farmers. October, 1950, p. 3; Northeastern
Union Farmer, August, 1950, p. 2, October, 1950, p. 2, and November, 1951, p.
4; Eastern Union Farmer. October, 1950, p. 2, February, 1952, p. 1, and
September, 1952, p. 2; Virginia Lee Kenyon to Wint Smith, July 18, 1950,
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A House Ways and Means report offering the opinion that industrial
production "cannot be achieved through patriotism alone, and that business
must be left with a reasonable profit incentive," increased farmer concerns
that the government was assisting businesses in their quest for profits.
How much more "reasonable," Fred Stover asked, could the billions in
industrial profits be?54 Able to pass any government-imposed taxes on to
their customers and capable of hiding war-time profits through depletion
allowances and accelerated amortization, American businesses seemed
immune to any pressure to pay their fair share of the increased costs of a
wartime economy.
In truth, there was very little such pressure applied to American
corporations. Although at the beginning of the Korean War President Truman
had proposed paying for the conflict through a combination of higher
individual income taxes and an excess profits tax, the second of these was
initially delayed and then finally killed by proponents of big business. The
National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and
the Committee for Economic Development united in their successful claims
that an excess profits tax unfairly discriminated against corporations by
Box 20 (81st Congress Correspondence), Folder “Korea Situation," Smith
Papers; Montana Farmers Union News. August 22, 1951, p. 4.
54lowa Union Farmer. February, 1951, p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211

removing what the C.E.D. called the “incentive to economical operation of
business."55
What was most galling to the National Farmers Union and to other
advocates of small farmer equity was that while corporations seemed to be
exempt from sharing the burden of increased wartime spending, the farmers
themselves were being asked not only "to do the fighting and dying," but also
“to finance [Wall Street's] profitable wars." Citing “conditions arising as a
result of the Korean war," the Budget Bureau, with the approval of President
Truman, at the end of 1950 cut $580 million in non-derense related
spending. Many of the cuts were made, Facts for Farmers complained, “at
the expense of farm programs."

These included reductions in funds for

conservation, rural telephones and electrification, and farm tenancy and
housing.

The Agriculture Department simultaneously announced its own

changes in the farm housing loan program. The new guidelines, requiring
that the amount of the loan plus a farmer's other indebtedness could not
exceed 95% of the appraisal value of the farm, made loans more difficult to
obtain, but were necessary, the department argued, "to curtail the use of
building material for non-defense purposes.’ To Fred Stover, however, such
adjustments indicated that despite its announced intention of throwing its
S^North Dakota Union Farmer. December 4, 1950, p. 8.
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weight "behind the family farm," the Agriculture Department could more
accurately be portrayed as throwing its weight "AT the family farm."56
Administration budget plans for fiscal year 1952, following President
Truman's desire for a "rigid economy" in the nation's non-defense activities,
included further cuts for agriculture. The R.EA's new loan authorization
program was reduced from the $297 million available in 1951 to only $109
million for 1952.

Overall, the agriculture budget was sliced in half,

dropping from $3 billion to $1.5 billion.

The reduction was particularly

devastating to the price support program, as the $238 million authorization
represented but one-seventh of the 1950 allotment. Of equal concern to the
Farmers Union was the administration's acquiescence in the National Tax
Equality Association's attempts to destroy agricultural co-ops through
taxation. Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder was described by the lowa
Union Farmer as a key figure in the N.T.EA's "relentless and vicious
campaign" to convince Americans that co-ops were “war-time tax dodgers."
Truman's failure to discipline Snyder for participating in the N.T.EA's
"attempt to capitalize on the war crisis to smear co-ops" convinced the
Farmers Union "that while Truman and his apologists in the farm movement
56 low a Union Farmer. November, 1951, p. 8, and February, 1951, p. 8;
Facts for Farmers November, 1950, p. 3; Rockv Mountain Union Farmer.
October, 1950, p. 3.
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claim he’s a friend of the farmer, in actions he is not.”57
By the end of 1951, the Farmers Union accurately concluded that small
farmers had taken "a terrific beating" at the hands of both the 82nd
Congress and the Truman administration. The organization attributed the
beating to the "fantastically high war spending" that had produced both
increasingly burdensome income taxes as well as a number of excise taxes
on such items as gasoline, diesel fuel, and truck parts and accessories that
directly impacted on family farmers. Fully aware that the increased taxes
also struck at non-farmers, the Farmers Union nevertheless pointed out that
the decreased take-home pay of urban residents would "cut the buying power
of city workers and their families" and so produce an "indirect cost to the
farmers in the form of a contracting market and, with this, a further decline
in the price of their products. . . .“ When Leon Keyserling, chairman of
President Truman’s Council of Economic Advisors, offered his opinion that
“economies have not been wrecked because the people decided to . . . get
healthier by eating less," the Farmers Union interpreted his perhaps wellintentioned effort toward universal belt-tightening as another example of
the administration’s inability to appreciate, understand, or even be
concerned about, “the fact that such a happening would hurt the farmers’
5?Facts for Farmers. February, 1951, p. 1; lowa Union Farmer. February,
1951, p. 8, September 14, 1951, p. 8, and December, 1950, p. 5.
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market."58
Arguing against heightened military spending, the lowa Farmers Union at
the end of 1951 offered an alternative budget for the United States focusing
on "tractors instead of tanks" and promising to give Americans "something
in return for [their] tax dollars." The proposal’s suggestion to raise teacher
salaries by 50 percent and its Francis Townsend-like social security
program to provide citizens over 65 with a monthly stipend of $150 were
both out of the mainstream of American political reality. But the bulk of
the $64.7 billion budget proposal involved more realistic and attainable
measures.

Increased funding for public works, an accelerated program of

river valley development designed "to put the TVA pattern into effect
nationally," and a $3.7 billion program for public health insurance all clearly
reflected the Farmers Union s lingering allegiance to the New Deai.59
Not surprisingly, the Farmers Union "budget for peace" also included a
program of agricultural subsidies. It was modeled, in fact, on Secretary of
Agriculture Charles Brannan’s 1949 proposal to have the government pay
family-type farmers the difference between market price and a fair return.
The Brannan Plan, however, had been an early casualty of American
58lowa Union Farmer. November, 1951, p. 8, and February, 1951, p. 8.
59jowa Union Farmer. November, 1951, p. 8.
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involvement in Korea, as the administration and other elements of the
Democratic Party had backed off from the program as unnecessarily
expensive in light of increased military spending. Four months after U.S.
troops first landed in Korea, Vice President Alben Barkley told a Milwaukee
audience that neither he personally nor the administration in general were
committed to the Brannan Plan. While he changed his story the next day in
Sioux City, denying that he had ever suggested that the administration was
not behind Brannan's program, the vice president nevertheless repeated his
personal disapproval of the plan and this time added that "the Democratic
Party wasn't committed to it." Barkley's convoluted distinction between his
personal views, the views of the administration, and the views of the
Democratic Party created a situation that, Facts for Farmers reported, was
“not exactly reassuring."60 „
The same could be said of the overall economic position of America’s
small farmers in the years of the Korean War. Contrary to the long-standing
image of the conflict as having a negligible impact on the national economy,
American involvement in Korea actually accelerated the decline of the
nation's small farmers.

The drain on agricultural labor produced by a

combination of draft calls and the lure of higher paying jobs in defense60lowa Union Farmer. July 15, 1950, pp. 4-5; Facts for Farmers.
November, 1950, p. 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216
related industries forced a number of family farms either to reduce their
output to the point of economic disaster or to close down altogether.
Particularly discouraging to these often displaced agrarians was the
simultaneous growth in war-generated corporate profits.
The federal government's seeming failure to understand their plight made
the farmers' position even more unstable. Responding to the war-related
crisis in agricultural labor with an ill-advised call for increased foreign
workers, with an often unstated but frequently understood suggestion that
farmers were less essential to the American economy than other workers,
and with a general reduction in government sponsored programs for
agriculture, the Truman administration and the congress together created an
impression that America's small farmers were dispensable. As the leading
spokesman for the nation's family farmers, the National Farmers Union
responded to the government attitude by questioning the uncertain, but
increasingly negative, future that American involvement in Korea seemed to
portend for America's small farms.
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Chapter Six

Carrying Forward the Tradition of Dissent
Farmers Union officials opposed the Korean War not only because of its
devastating impact on the domestic livelihood of America's small farmers,
including tne manpower drain caused by both the draft and the lure of warrelated industries, but also because the "police action" continued what the
organization perceived as the misguided direction of President Truman's
overall approach to foreign policy. Following through on organizational
themes expressed since 1946, Farmers Union figures charged that American
actions in Korea denied oppressed peoples the opportunities of true
democracy, continued the selfish expansion of

America's corporate

Interests, and further entrenched the nation's unilateral approach to world
affairs. From the opening of hostilities in the summer of 1950, through the
ebb and flow of combat and the stalemated peace talks of 1951, Farmers
Union groups across the nation vehemently opposed the war. Although
occasionally differing In their specific reasons for criticizing the conflict,
those groups expressing opposition collectively agreed that American
involvement in Korea was neither good for the nation nor for the future of
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world peace.
Among state and regional affiliates, the most vocal opponent of
American involvement in Korea was Fred Stover's lowa Farmers Union. In
its first publication following the beginning of hostilities, the lowa Union
Farmer auestionned U.S. support of Syngman Rhee and charged that the chief
beneficiaries of America’s actions would be Wall Street interests eager to
profit from what a 1947 Farmers Union resolution had characterized as "a
corporate imperialism . . . more virulent and viscious than any colonial
imperialism of the past."

The July,

1950, issue reprinted the 1947

resolution and contained as well a number of supporting statements: a 1948
Stover speech anticipating the end of America's "own pet 20th Century brand
of corporate imperialism;" New York's American Labor Congressman Vito
Marcantonio’s argument denying the inevitability of war; W.E.B. DuBois' July,
1950, letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson protesting the Secretary's
public attack on the anti-nuclear World Peace Appeal; and a cartoon
lampooning Cold War profiteers eager to soak the American people for the
profits of war. The newspaper reminded its readers of the Farmers Union's
repeated predictions that America's corporate-dominated foreign policy
would eventually lead to war and suggested that after years of such
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warnings the Korean Incident offered Americans truly Interested in peace
the opportunity to take a stand. ‘This Is the Test," Stover charged, ‘Now Is
the Time."

Encouraged by an "avalanche" of positive responses, Stover

ordered the printing of an extra two thousand copies of the July 15 Issue
and vowed to pursue the protest against American Involvement In Korea.1

cold

fcp.w*85B

One of the great challenges for Americans, Stover believed, was to
somehow get to the truth concerning the war. He accepted the view, later
developed In I.F. Stone’s The Hidden History of the Korean War, that the
United States had Jumped the gun by ordering troops into Korea prior to
official United Nations action. Having done so, Stover charged, the Truman
1J.owa Union Farmer. July 15, 1950, pp. 1-8, and August 12, 1950, p. 1.
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administration, with support of the press, presented to the American public
a "maze of distortions and jingoistic war propaganda" to reinforce the
impression that the United States was merely one participant in a U.N.centered effort toward peace. "The special emphasis" given by President
Truman and by Secretary of State Dean Acheson "to supporting the United
Nations," Stover wrote on June 30, "is phony."2
To

counter

the

government's

alleged

program

of

deliberate

misinformation, Stover distributed to Farmers Union members materials on
the war obtained from W.E.B. DuBols' Peace Information Center and from the
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. Intelligent discussion of
the war, Stover argued, required an informed public, and if the only
information Americans had on Korea came from the government, such
intelligent, informed debates would be impossible.

Doing his part to

promote an "intensified campaign for peace," Stover accepted Invitations to
speak at a number of in-state and out-of-state Farmers Union meetings 1n
July.

The positive responses he received following these addresses,

particularly

those

in Minnesota,

reinforced

his

conviction

in the

righteousness of the Farmers Union's "anti-monopoly, anti-militaristic
2Fred W. Stover "To the Directors/ July 14, 1950, Fred W. Stover "To
All Officers," July 19, 1950, and F.W. Stover to Elmer Bendiner, June 30,
1950, all in the Stover Papers.
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policy," and convinced him even further that the Korean War would prove to
be "a bad blotch on the history of our country."3
Stover’s lowa Farmers Union affirmed Its opposition to the war at its
34th annual convention held in Des Moines on September 21-23, 1950.
Coming two weeks after Styles Bridges' charges of Communist infiltration
of the Farmers Union, and only six days after the successful Inchon landing
had reversed the previously desperate situation of allied forces In Korea,
the convention faced the challenges of repudiating Bridges’ claims and of
denouncing a military effort that because of General MacArthur’s success
was now more widely supported by the American public.

Organizational

leaders and convention guest speakers dauntlessly addressed both tasks. In
their addresses before the convention and In a series of strongly-worded
resolutions, they reiterated the Farmers Union’s long-held belief in peaceful
cooperation in the International arena and its insistence that American
foreign policy was tied too closely to corporate profit.
Addressing a banquet crowd on the second night of the convention,
Reverend Irwin Gaede of the Madison, Wisconsin, Pilgrim Congregational
Church warned against a growing trend toward fascism in America. Echoing
3Fred W. Stover "To All Officers," July 19, 1950, F.W. Stover to Peace
Information Center, August 7, 1950, and F.W. Stover "To the Directors,"
August 11, 1950, all in the Stover Papers.
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a long-cherished Farmers Union credo, Reverend Gaede argued that the trend
was created in part because the nation ‘no longer [had] Franklin Delano
Roosevelt upon whom to depend."4

Earlier that same day, convention

delegates had approved six resolutions, half of which directly addressed
American foreign policy and the Korean War. Outlining in great detail the
declining status of America's family farmers, one resolution placed the
blame squarely on the shoulders of U.S. policies abroad:
Since the recent military actions ordered by the President, the
Wall Street squeeze play on the farmers and the rest of the common
people has shifted into high gear. Implement manufacturers boost
prices to the lim it as plans for a total war of unlimited duration are
taken from their locked compartments. These plans provide for
allocation of vital materials for war purposes and a scarcity program
of farm equipment as the tanks-not-tractors era is ushered in.5
Other resolutions reaffirmed the 1947 National Farmers Union position
against American corporate imperialism, condemned the use of atomic
weapons by all nations, and repudiated Senator Bridges' charges against the
organization.
The focus of the convention involved a resolution in which delegates
urged "a settlement of the present war in Korea." It could be accomplished,
they argued, by following a three-step approach: seating of the People’s
4 lowa Union Farmer. October 21,1950, p. 7.
5"Convention Resolutions of the 34th Annual Convention of the
Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America," p. 3, Stover Papers.
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Republic of China in the U.N., having the U.N. Security Council call for an
immediate truce, and bringing representatives of North Korea before the U.N.
to "work out a basis for establishment of a truly representative government
in Korea.” The emphasis upon United Nations action, like Reverend Gaede's
appeal to the memory of Franklin Roosevelt, served as a reminder of the
Farmers Union's consistency In demanding international over unilateral
solutions.

Passed by a better than two-to-one vote, the resolution also

"callled] upon our government to abandon the position that military force is
the road to peace" and requested an immediate Security Council conference
"for the purpose of working out an overall agreement ending the cold war in
Europe and hot wars in other parts of the world."6
Before the convention closed on the 23rd, Fred Stover addressed the
delegates on the topic of Atomic Blessing or Atomic Blasting. The speech,
later published as a 23-page pamphlet, summarized the Cold War history of
American foreign policy and added a racial dimension to a critique that until
then had focused almost exclusively on economic concerns. Stover asked the
convention delegates to place themselves "In the position of the people of
Korea and look at things from their point of view." To do so, he said, meant
^"Convention Resolutions of the 34th Annual Convention of the
Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America," pp. 4-6, Stover
Papers.
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recognizing America's historic financial and commercial aggression against
the “red brothers* found in the United States "by Its discoverers" and against
the "black brothers . . . brought there to be mere 'hewers of wood and
drawers of water.'" Such inequitable treatment would likewise be imposed
on Asians if the "leather-lunged war patrioteers who contend that differing
ideologies cannot exist in the same world" were allowed to pursue their
policies. The way to avoid such an occurence, Stover argued, was "not by
fanning the flames of this w a r. . . this police action. . . Into a world atomic
holocaust, but by continuing to seek peaceful alternatives regardless of the
odds that are against us.

This Is an obligation," he concluded, "that we

cannot evade with honor."7
As the Chinese counteroffensive of late November once again reversed
the tide of battle In Korea, Stover and the lowa Farmers Union continued
their appeals for a peaceful resolution as well as their angered criticisms
of American and South Korean policies and actions. The December, 1950,
issue of the lowa Union Farmer alerted readers to reports of mass
executions carried out by Syngman Rhee's troops in which men, women, and
7Fred Stover, Atomic Blessing or Atomic Blasting. (Hampton, lowa: U.S.
Farmers Association, 1950), pp. 13-16. Additional information on the 1950
lowa Farmers Union convention can be found in George Rinehart's 1955 lowa
State Masters Thesis, "The lowa Farmers Union: An Historical Survey," pp.
93-97.
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children were roped off In pairs, led into trenches, and shot in the back of
the head. “U.S. military authorities," the lowa newspaper declared, "were
'reluctant' to Interfere . . . since the executions [were] being carried out
under sentences imposed by Korean courts and Korean citizens." Noting that
U.S. authorities already controlled "the movements of Korean troops,"
Stover's newspaper rejected the claim of Inadequate authority and argued
that U.S. officials should take similar control in stopping the executions.8
In back-to-back "Special Reportls] to lowa Union Farmer Readers," Stover
in December, 1950, and January, 1951, decried "The Debacle in Korea" and
called for "the sanity of mediation [to] replace the madness of atomic war."
The Chinese counteroffensive had produced, he wrote, a number of alternate
proposals that seemingly aimed at peace but which were simply redrawn
plans for war. stover was particularly critical of the suggestions offered
by Herbert Hoover, Joseph Kennedy, and Robert Taft. Hoover and Kennedy, he
wrote, proposed the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but also suggested that the
nation “go Into the heavy hardware business on a large scale by building a
great navy and air force." Taft itkewlse called for a re-focusing of U.S.
military might, with a particular emphasis on "tailing up Chlang Kai-shek on
Formosa with American guns and dollars." For Stover, the suggestions of
8 lowa Union Farmer. December, 1950, p. 5.
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withdrawal

from Korea would solve very

little

if

they

did not

simultaneously contain a reduction in American military forces both at
home and abroad. To do one without the other would solve the "debacle in
Korea," but would also perpetuate the growth of the nation’s militaryindustrial complex and the accompanying decline in the economic stability
of America's small farmers.9
For Fred Stover, the most promising event in the first ten months of the
war was Harry Truman’s April, 1951, firing of General Douglas MacArthur.
The lowa farm leader hailed the President’s action, which he argued had
been delayed by Truman’s fear of the political repercussions of dismissing
the popular "emperor" of Japan, as an overdue but genuine victory for the
advocates of peace.

Stover, in fact, credited the pressures exerted on

Truman by domestic and international peace advocates as the "key reason’
for MacArthur's dismissal.10
Despite his pleasure at seeing MacArthur removed, Stover lamented that
Truman’s action in dismissing the popular military figure did very little in
terms of actually altering American policy. While the deed seemingly moved
the United States, and the world, farther away from the dangerous precipice
of world war that MacArthur’s more belligerent recommendations had
9 lowa Union Farmer. December, 1950, p. 4, and January, 1951, p. 4.
1Qlowa Union Farmer. April, 1951, p. 4.
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threatened to bring to reaiity, the U.S. nevertheless remained locked in an
Aslan land war that exhausted national resources which Stover believed
would be more wisely spent on a domestic economic agenda !n one respect,
Stover argued, MacArthur's removal made the situation even worse.

By

eliminating the immediate concern over a major war In Asia, a war that
would have detracted from American business Interests in Europe, the
President’s action reinforced the Europe-first preference of American
capitalists who viewed investments in Europe as the key to priming the
American economic pump.

The reinforcement of that view offered little

hope that economic priorities would be adjusted to the benefit of America’s
family farmers. Having hoped that Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur would
lead to the logical next step of total withdrawal from Korea, Stover rather
quickly realized just the opposite.

Immediate withdrawal was not a

consideration, for the United States was not about to "lose face" in Korea by
abandoning ship.

Whatever hope Stover had harbored at the initial

announcement of the general's dismissal that a shift in policy was imminent
faded into an angry acceptance that the whole Truman-MacArthur debate
was little more than a "big public circus."11
Equally discouraging to Stover were events surrounding the initiation of
1 Mowa Union Farmer. April, 1951, p. 4, and May, 1951, p. 3.
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peace talks In the summer of 1951.

Having supported the unsuccessful

attempts of lowa Congressman H.R. Gross and Colorado Senator Edwin
Johnson to Implement an armistice on the one-year anniversary of the war
on June 25, Stover and his fellow lowa Farmers Union members at first
welcomed the opening of the July truce talks In Kaesong as a “real victory"
for the forces that for thirteen months had pushed for peace. "While at this
writing the results of [the] cease-fire talks are not final," the lowa Union
Farmer announced on July 23, "it is significant that they at least are being
held." But when the talks broke down one month later, lowa Farmers Union
officials were not terribly surprised. The United States, they argued, had
been dragged kicking and screaming into the talks, forced by public opinion,
and by the realization that victory would not come as easily as they had
initially supposed, to unwillingly participate in the negotiations.12
The reluctance to seek a cease-fire was attributed primarily to wall
Street. Monitoring of stock market trends convinced Stover and other lowa
Farmers Union members that increased news of war produced rising
markets, while reports of possible peace produced corresponding declines.
Homer Ayres, who wrote a regular lowa Union Farmer column entitled "The
Farmer's Angle," summarized the trend by observing that:
The men who reap the big profits from making gadgets and heavy
12iowa Union Farmer. July 23, 1951, p. 1, and August 20, 1951, p. 3.
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hardware for killing do not take kindly to suggestions that they retool
their plants and look for markets not connected with war
With so
much of the heavy and light industry making instruments for legal
murder, any talk that the nations might sit down around a table hits
the stock market a sickening lick in the solar plexus.13
Acting on this premise, and convinced that "the breaking off of truce taiks
in Korea can become a disaster for our nation and the world," Fred Stover
joiRed with nine other affiliates of the American Peace Crusade in
telegramming President Truman on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the
dropping of the A-bomb on Hiroshima. Calling for "a spirit of reasonableness
and compromise," the telegram asked the President "to instruct (MacArthur's
replacement] General Ridgway to resume truce talks immediately in a
conciliatory spirit of give and take and fair exchange."14
Negotiations were still in limbo when the lowa Farmers Union opened its
35th annual convention in Des Moines on Friday, September 21, 1951. The
two day conference focused once again on "war mobilization and its
accompanying inflation" as "the chief factor in the family farmers' many
13lowa Union Farmer. August 20, 1951, p. 3
14"Text of Telegram Sent by the American Peace Crusade," August 5,
1951, Stover Papers. The other nine signers were: Robert Morse Lovett,
former governor of the Virgin Islands; nuclear physicist Philip Morrison;
artist and Progressive Party official Paul Robeson; Clementina J. Paolone,
chairman of the American Women for Peace; Episcopal theologian Joseph
Fletcher; labor leader Ernest DeMaio; writer Dorothy Brewster; Thomas
Richardson, former chairman of the National Anti-Discrimination Committee
of the United Public Workers; and Methodist minister Willard Uphaus.
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serious problems." Conference participants demanded that "in place of a
costly program which can only spread the flames of war and lead to a
military dictatorship at home" the Truman administration adopt instead "a
positive program of peace, a program to strengthen democracy and protect
our civil rights, a program to achieve full parity for the farmers and
maintain our families on the land

",5

Although the conference resolutions, unlike those in 1950, made only one
direct reference to Korea, the war and American foreign policy In general
nevertheless dominated the spirit of the proceedings. The essential tie
between domestic and foreign policy wound like a unifying thread through
resolutions calling for full parity, for a stop to the National Tax Equality
Association's campaign “to smash co-ops through unjust taxation," for the
creation of a Missouri Valley Administration, and for the appropriation of
federal funds for programs of soil conservation and "proper land use."
Decrying the nation's "reactionary foreign policy" rooted in the 1898
"acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, Cuba and the Philippines," the lowa
Farmers Union called for “trade with all people of the world regardless of
religion or politics."

Opening of restricted markets, the organization

argued, would "furnish untold numbers of jobs to the city people 1n the
^5 lowa Union Farmer. October, 1951, p. 4.
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factories and also a market for farm commodities."16
While Fred Stover addressed the convention at both the opening and
closing sessions, the most riveting presentation was delivered Friday
evening by David Bryn-Jones, a professor of international relations at
Minnesota's Carleton College.

Placing the Korean War in a broad global

perspective, Bryn-Jor.es acknowledged that both the United States and the
Soviet Union shared responsibility for the tensions of the Cold War. Both
sides, he said, erroneously assumed that the complexities of international
relations could be reduced to the over-simplified theme of "democracy
versus communism." Despite the fact that neither side had anything to gain
from war, leaders of both nations also assumed, incorrectly in Bryn-Jones'
view, that their Cold War counterpart was preparing for war.

Criticizing

both the American and Soviet leaderships as "[inadequate to the occasion,"
he warned that, "If you get enough people to believe that war is inevitable
and prepare for it, you w ill get your war. You may not get the consequences
you want but you w ill get your war."17
Bryn-Jones was particularly critical of the United States for acting too
hastily and for wasting the nation's resources. The Truman administration,
{6 lowa Union Farmer. October, 1951, p. 4.
I?"Address of Doctor David Bryn-Jones, to
Convention, September, 1951," Stover Papers.

lowa Farmers Union
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he charged, had too quickly concluded, in the aftermath of World War Two,
that the United States could not peacefully co-exist with nations whose
political and economic systems diverged from those of democracy and
capitalism. That conclusion had led to the needless policy of containment
and to the adoption of the Truman Doctrine, which he described as 'an act of
defeatism." Worse s till, the narrow-minded focus on containing the Soviets
had contributed to Truman's failure to follow through on Point Four, even
though the financial outlay for the entire program was less than the total
expenditures for one American battleship. Such misallocation of funds gave
clear evidence that the United States did not understand what was
happening In the world. While impoverished nations “raised their hands to
grasp at anything that would give them salvation from . . . misery and want,"
the United States chose to fight poverty not with practical measures but
with political pressure and guns. It was that misguided policy, Bryn-Jones
concluded, that produced the non-recognition of the People's Republic of
China and U.S. involvement In a war in Korea that had lasted "too long. So
long that there won't be any real Korea left when It is over."18
Three months after the convention, the Iowa Union Farmer published,
under the by-line of "Frank Talk," a full page article entitled "Debunking the
1®“Address of Doctor David Bryn-Jones, to
Convention, September, 1951/ Stover Papers.

Iowa Farmers Union
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Lies About Korea.”

Citing the nation’s “growing war hysteria" and the

attempt of the Truman administration to make support of U.S. action in
Korea a test of patriotism, the article blamed the "ever increasing
appropriations for a world arms race" for "bankrupting the U.S. taxpayers"
and for “kllUlng] all hopes" for needed domestic programs.

Written to

encourage readers to "join In the demand for settling the cold war," the
report aimed not at debating limitation or expansion of the war, and not at
debating the relative benefits of sea versus land forces. Instead, the paper
argued, Americans must debate whether the United States had any business
in Korea in the firs t place.19
Answering Its own question with a resounding "No," the Iowa Union
Farmer listed four specific “lies" that It said had been fed to the American
public to gain support for the war. that It was a joint U.N. effort, that It was
"properly . . . supported by the U.S.," that It was being fought for “freedom
and democracy," and that it was begun "to stop North Korean aggression."
Each "lie" was dismissed as "bunk!"

United Nations action, the article

charged, was little more than a rubber stamping of American-made
decisions, and even those decisions, as North Dakota’s Senator William
Langer was cited as charging, were unconstitutional because they had not
19lowa Union Farmer. December, 1951, p. 2.
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been approved by Congress.

The "graft-ridden, fascist dictatorship" of

Syngman Rhee, "where farm and labor leaders have been beaten, jailed and
executed in Hitler fashion," was enough to refute any claims of “freedom and
democracy." The article devoted most of Its space, however, to the fourth
"lie." Contrary to beginning as an attempt to repel a North Korean invasion,
the war, the Iowa paper charged, had actually been Initiated, "with
assurances of U.S. support," by Rhee's South Korean government.

The

evidence behind the claim was a lengthy list of newspaper reports and U.S.
government statements, all of which indicated that Syngman Rhee had for
months prior to June, 1950, prepared for an attack on the north, and that the
United States had similarly planned for the event.20

The cumulative

evidence was sufficient, the paper argued, "to cast a terrible cloud upon the
entire ■aggression' charge involved in the Korean War."

That the United

20The specific items in the list, most of which were dealt with in
great detail in I.F. Stone's The Hidden History of the Korean War, included: a
March 14, 1950, New York Times report that Koreans had been imprisoned
for opposing an invasion of North Korea; a June 25, 1950 A.P. report that
South Korean troops had crossed the 38th parallel; Assistant Secretary of
State John Hickerson's June, 1951, report to a Senate sub-committee that
the U.S. had a skeleton resolution prepared prior to June 25, 1950,
condemning the North Korean attack; New York Post and New York Herald
Tribune reports of extensive U.S. military and diplomatic activity in Korea
just prior to the outbreak of war; and Drew Pearson's report suggesting that
wealthy Chinese affiliated with the China Lobby had made a huge killing in
the soybean market by being tipped off concerning the impending hostilities.
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States would acquiesce in Rhee's plan was, "Frank Talk" concluded, not a
surprise, for the concept of “preventive war" was supported by Truman
administation figures, including Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews and
Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson.21
Returning to a persistent Farmers Union theme, “Debunking the Lies
About Korea" also emphatically argued that economics played a major role in
U.S. interest in Korea. Readers were encouraged to examine Fred Stover’s
1951 pamphlet, The Contest Between the People and the Plunderers, to
understand how the "money power" in America encouraged the preservation
of colonialism for the sake of profit.22 In the case of Korea, "Debunking
the Lies" argued, economic interest in South Korean mineral resources and
the desire to increase profits

through war-related

spending were

accompanied by the political designs of the China Lobby in re-establishing
Chiang Kai-shek's authority in all of China. “Using the communist bogyman
to fan the flames," these various interests had succeeded in involving the
United States and the United Nations in "an evil, immoral action" that
211owa Union Farmer. December, 1951, p. 2.
22There is currently some question over the authorship of this
particular pamphlet. Merle Hansen, a Farmers Union fieldman in the 1940's
and 1950‘s, claims that it was written not by Fred Stover but by Homer
Ayres. “Fred was a very capable writer on a variety of subjects," Hansen
wrote in a 1992 tribute following Ayres’ death, "but this pamphlet Homer
authored." (Merle Hansen, "Homer Lee Ayres 1898-1992 (Revised)," a copy of
which Hansen forwarded to me in a letter of August 6, 1992.)
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neither party “had any business in the first place."23
The U.S. State Department took a special interest in "Debunking the Lies
About Korea," and in February, 1952, prepared a lengthy reply refuting the
article’s claims. The Department’s response was precipitated in part by a
January 10, 1952, request for clarification from Minnesota’s Jim Youngdale.
A Farmers Union supporter, and a long-time reader of and occasional
contributor to the Iowa Union Farmer. Youngdale seemingly toyed with the
State Department when he wrote:
Someone recently sent me a copy of some farm paper from Iowa
with an article entitled "Debunking the Lies About Korea." I am
enclosing a copy of this article.
I would like to know the fallacies in this article and how one
would refute it. I have been challenged by a neighbor to refute this
article and I find it difficult to do so from my first hand knowledge. I
would appreciate a prompt reply 24
If Youngdale's intent in sending such a cryptic request was to elicit a
government response short on specifics and long on rhetoric, he got his
23lo_wa Union Farmer. December, 1951, p. 2.
24Jim Youngdale to Dean Acheson, January 10, 1952, 795.00/1-1052,
Record Group 59. Described by Michael Rogin in 1976 as "a Minnesota farmer
and laborite-tumed academic," Youngdale was a twenty-year farmer and
occasional populist congressional candidate who, after earning a doctorate
in American Studies in 1972, joined the faculty of the University of
Minnesota.
[Michael Rogin, review of Youngdale's Populism: A
Psvchohistorical Perspective, in American Historical Review LXXXI (October,
1976), pp. 982-983.] That a copy of the State Department reply to Youngdale
was found not only in the State Department records but also in the Stover
Papers provides further evidence that he may have been playing games with
his request.
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wish.

Written by John M. Patterson, the Acting Chief of the state

Department’s Division of Public Liaison, the government reply did little
more than repeat what the administration had been saying all along: that a
total of forty-six nations had willingly made contributions of some kind to
the war effort, and that no nation had been forced to rubber stamp a U.S.
decision; that as commander-ln-chlef the President had the authority to
send troops anywhere in the world, and that both Congress and the courts
had frequently upheld that right; that Syngman Rhee was a freely elected
official who had wide popular support; and that North Korea had instigated
the war "without provocation and without warning."

Patterson carefully

crafted the response to highlight the image of the United States as but one
participant in a cooperative fight for world democracy, revising his earlier
drafts to eliminate any impression of the U.S. as a separate and powerful
actor within the United Nations. This meticulously constructed argument
was dismissed by Fred Stover and the Iowa Farmers Union as another
example of deliberately manufactured misinformation. It was also rejected
by other Farmers Union affiliates who in the first eighteen months of the
war joined the Iowa group in protesting U.S. participation in the "police
action" in Korea.25
25John M. Patterson to Jim Youngdale, February 28, 1952 (and earlier
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Typical of these other affiliates was the Oregon Farmers Union, an
organization that in July, 1950, attacked the Truman administration for
"propping up the same discredited faces whom the people have learned to
fear and hate."26 Led by president Ronald E. Jones, the Oregon group was
particularly concerned that support for such figures as Syngman Rhee,
Chiang Kai-shek, and Inochina's Bao Dai signalled a lack of understanding on
the part of the United States of "the very evils that the masses are
determined to end." While democracy, the Oregon Farmer Union argued, was
“the most revolutionary idea which mankind has ever heard of," U.S. foreign
policy did nothing to promote its advancement. Instead, by attempting "to
make peace and prepare for global war at the same time," the newspaper
declared at the end of 1950, the Truman administration had:
failed in any adequate measure to render those constructive services
to the impoverished masses of the world for which our wealth and our
skills fitted us and which might have made friends for us among the
peoples rather than among the puppet regimes.27
The Oregon group agreed with Fred Stover that this failure to support the
undated draft), 795.00/1-1052, Record Group 59.
In re-drafting the
response, Patterson replaced a reference to North Korean aggression
“against the principles and aims of the United States and the United Nations"
With the simpler and less revealing charge of aggression "against the
Republic of Korea." He also dropped a reference to the United States as the
“most able member of the U.N."
26Oreqon Farmer Union. July 15, 1950, p. 2.
27Oreqon Farmer Union. December 15, 1950, p. 2.
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democratic appeals of the world's peoples was the result of U.S. policy being
controlled by proflt-and-power-seeking elites.
Oregonians proclaimed,

Events In Korea, the

demonstrated the futility

of

"expectling]

a

democratic foreign policy to emerge from the thinking of Wall Street
lawyers, ex-Wall Street bankers, big industrialists, and ex-generals."
Before we couid get “a foreign policy based on economic democracy," the
Oregon Farmer Union announced, "we must get foreign policy makers who
believe In economic democracy."28
Unlike Fred Stover, the leaders of the Oregon Farmers Union anticipated
that such new leadership might, be found In

Robert Taft or in Herbert

Hoover. Their peace proposals, which called for withdrawal of U.S. troops
accompanied by a simultaneous build-up of American military forces, had
been rejected outright by stover.

Oregon officials, however, were more

receptive. The Hoover-Taft program, they felt, could potentially "buy time
for peace" and was therefore "a calculated risk we can afford to take."
Whatever Its impact, they argued, 1t would be an immense Improvement over
the policies of Harry Truman, whose actions In the field of foreign affairs,
with the exception of his dismissal of General MacArthur, were judged both
inadequate and potentially destructive. Truman’s occasional proposals for
28Oreqon Farmer Union. July 15, 1950, p. 2.
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peace, the Oregon group believed, weren't “meant to be taken seriously."
Until the administration abandoned its position that “any settlement on
terms short of unconditional subservience to American policy" was
"appeasement," the President's calls for peace would remain nothing but
"blast[s] in the cold war which Truman [had] started in 1947 with the
announcement of the Truman Doctrine

"2®

In its opposition to the Korean War, another northwestern affiliate, the
Montana Farmers Union, similarly emphasized both American support for
non-democratic regimes and the economic gains sought by U.S. business.
Following the vocal lead of its secretary-treasurer, N.J. Dougherty, the
Montana group pointed to the irony of "United States diplomats, as
representatives of the truly democratic form of government and believing in
democratic ideals . . . wholeheartedly backing such . . . fascistic leaders as
Franco, Tito, Chiang Kai-shek, and Syngman Rhee." In doing so, Dougherty
argued in a Christmas wish editorial in 1950, the Truman administration
was "misrepresenting [American] ideals."30
Like their Iowa counterparts, Montana Farmers Union members applauded
the dismissal of General MacArthur, supported Colorado Senator Edwin

29Qceflon f armer Union. January 15, 1951, p.
November 15,1951, p. 4, and March 15,1951, p. 4.

2, April 15,

1951 ,

30Montana Farmers Union News. December 27, 1950, p. 8.
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Johnson's 1951 call for a cease-fire, and participated In the Chicago Peace
Congress held in the summer of 1951. state affiliates passed and sent to
President Truman resolutions calling not only for an end to the Korean War,
but also for the removal from Korea of all non-Korean combatants and for
the elimination of foreign exploitation of that nation's natural resources.
The latter implication that the United States had an economic interest in
Korea was one of the key features of the very lengthy international affairs
resolution passed at the state organization's 1951 annual convention. Most
notably, that resolution called for a full investigation of the China Lobby
and its role in the war.31
The Eastern and Northeastern divisions of the Farmers Union, with
headquarters 1n, respectively, New Jersey and New York, also vocally
opposed U.S. involvement in Korea. The Eastern Division, headed by president
Alvin Christman and executive secretary Louis Slocum, stressed in
particular the onerous impact of the war on the ability of small farmers to
make financial ends meet,

m the month that fighting began, the

organization reacted bitterly to an Atlantic Monthly article arguing that the
nation's “best defense" rested in part upon a lowering of agricultural prices.
3 1Montana Farmers Union News. April 25, 1951, p. 8, September 26,
1951, p. 3, August 22, 1951, p. 4, November 22, 1950, p. 4, November 28,
1951, supplement p. 2.
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Harvard economist Sumner H. Slichter, in writing the article, had
emphasized that American survival In the Cold War required an "adjustment
in the prices of farm products to long-run conditions of supply and demand."
In arguing against the cherished Farmers Union beliefs in parity and price
supports, Slichter proposed that "lower food prices [would release] dollars
for the purchase of houses, automobiles, television sets, and many other
things." To Christman, Slocum, and their Farmers Union membership, what
Slichter was proposing was that farmers alone should make financial
sacrifices "so the rest of the population will be able to buy cheap food and
have enough left over for television sets." Two weeks into the war, the
board of directors of the Eastern Farmers Union held a special meeting to
discuss this issue of the impact of the war on farmers. The result of the
meeting was an urgent request to both President Truman and the Congress to
pursue, through the United Nations, an immediate peace in Korea. The appeal
received broad organizational support seven months later when it was
Included as part of the foreign policy resolution passed at the Eastern
Division's annual convention.32
Following a theme advanced by other Farmers Union affiliates, the
32Sumner H. Slichter, "Our Best Defense," Atlantic Monthly CLXXXV
(June, 1950), pp. 21-22; Eastern Union Farmer. July-August, 1950, pp. 1 and
4, February, 1951, p. 5.
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Eastern Division coupled an opposition to American business ventures
abroad with a strong advocacy of the right of national self-determination.
The foreign policy resolution adopted In February, 1951, cited the "desire of
millions of colonial peoples for self-determination and economic security"
and recommended that American policies "be re-oriented towards a policy of
non-interference In the struggles of these people for self-determination."
The convention Itself

resoundingly applauded Fred Stover's keynote

presentation In which he quoted radical sociologist Scott Nearing's
commentary on American business as "stand[1ng] for the proposition that the
U.S. economy requires military spending as the price of its continuance." In
the address, which was printed word for word in two successive Issues of
the Eastern Union Farmer. Stover reminded the audience of Henry Luce's
dream that Asia one day would be worth billions of dollars to the United
States, but he predicted that the Asians themselves would not cooperate.
"(Tjhey do not intend," Stover claimed, "to substitute an American Century
for the British Century, now that they are shed of the latter."

Stover

further argued that while the American people valued the United Nations,
they did not believe that It “should be used by the American century crowd
as a fig leaf to cover its nakedness in Asia."33
33Eastem Union Farmer. February, 195i, pp. 2 and 5, and March, 1951, p.
4. See also the Iowa Union Farmer. February, 1951, p. 2, and, for details of
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Like other Farmers Union affiliates, the Eastern Division also supported
Senator Edwin Johnson's senate resolution calling for a cease-fire on June
25, 1951, the one-year anniversary of the war, and for the return of all
prisoners of war and the departure of all non-Korean military personnel
from North and South Korea by December 1, 1951. Christman and Slocum
were so impressed with the resolution that they printed it in full In the
June, 1951, issue of the Eastern Union Farmer.

The Colorado Senator's

eloquently worded appeals to avoid the insanity and destruction of war, to
deter the potential breeding of "bitter racial hatred," and to allow Aslans to
decide their own fate in the spirit of "Asia for Asiatics," climaxed with the
hope that "It is never too early for God-fearing and peace-loving people to
earnestly endeavor to stop needless human slaughter."34
The Northeastern Division of the National Farmers Union also reprinted
the Johnson Resolution and, noting that the commercial press had generally
burled news of the proposal, called upon its members to contact their
congressmen expressing support for the measure. Division president Archie
Wright, one of the most outspoken figures In the National Farmers Union and
a close friend of Fred stover, shared the Iowa farm leader's nostalgic
other Stover addresses in New Jersey in early 1951, Eastern Union Farmer.
May, 1951, p. 1, and June, 1951, pp. I and 3.
E a s te rn Union Farmer. June, 1951. p. 2.
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attachment to the policies of Franklin Roosevelt, his mixed feelings about
the usefulness of the firing of General MacArthur, and his sixth sense
impression weeks before the war that something was about to break. But
the persistent focus of Wright’s commentary on the Korean War was its
devastating impact on small farmers.

Whether decrying the evolution of

America’s "warfare state," as he did at the Northeastern Division's annual
convention in October, 1951, or generating an analogy between the Truman
administration’s "containment" of Communism abroad and its simultaneous
"containment" of farmers at home, as he did in a letter to Northeastern
Division officials in December, 1951, the colorful Wright never strayed far
from his argument that the farmer was the “forgotten man" in the American
economy and that the war would only make it worse.35
In addition to Wright’s focus on the war’s damning Impact on American
farmers, the membership of the Northeastern Division joined Iowa, Oregon,
Montana, and the Eastern Division In criticizing President Truman’s actions
In Korea for their broader Cold War implications.

Two months after the

fighting began, the Northeastern Union Farmer argued that America’s
35Northeastem Union Farmer. July. 1951, p. 8, May-June, 1951, p. 2, and
November, 1951, pp. 1-8; Iowa Union Farmer. October 21, 1950, p. 7; Archie
Wright, “To All Officers and Delegates," June 6, 1950, and Archie Wright, "To
All Officers and Delegates," December 11, 1951, Box 3, New York Milk Shed
Records.
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"planned mobilization goes far beyond anything necessary to pulverize
Korea."

By April, 1951, despite the removal of General MacArthur, the

organization was

charging U.S.

policymakers

purposeful brutalization of a whole people."

with

"the

deliberate,

After encouraging American

officials, at its annual convention In 1950, to "seek openly the ways of
peace and not war," the Northeastern Division in 1951 demanded that the
American military "be kept . . . out of civilian and diplomatic affairs," that
the U.S. military budget "be brought into conformity with that of other
nations," and that the administration actively pursue a policy of world
disarmament. Reaffirming the Farmers Union position that American troops
encircling the globe contributed to an "aggressive policy of business
penetration In foreign lands," Archie Wright and the membership of the
Northeastern Division asked that such encouragement of "business profits at
public expense" be ended. As 1951 closed, the organization added to the
suggestion of business collusion by running a front-page story entitled "Soy
Beans and the Korean War," repeating Fred Stover's charge that nationalist
Chinese business interests, in cooperation with the China Lobby, had
profited through advance knowledge of impending hostilities.36
36Northeastem Union Farmer. August, 1950, p. 2, April, 1951, p. 8,
November, 1951, pp. 1-8, and December, 1951, p. I; Iowa Union Farmer.
October 21, 1950, p. 7.
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Chester A. Graham, who had served as secretary-treasurer of the
Michigan Farmers Union in the 1930's and as a National Farmers Union
organizer and recruiter in the 1940’s, was in the years of the Korean War
the radio voice of the North Dakota Farmers Union. In that capacity, Graham
added to the growing Farmers Union opposition to the war through daily
broadcasts that focused almost exclusively on the dangers of an all-too
powerful military in American life.

The French political figure Georges

Clemenceau's observation that "peace is too important to be left to soldiers"
became the guiding theme of Graham's broadcasts. He praised newspapers
that criticized the growing militarization of American society and hailed as
"an historic day of victory for our form of government" the decision by
President Truman to dismiss General MacArthur.

Unfortunately, Graham

argued, "the tragic bungling of the so-called cease fire talks" that followed
MacArthur's dismissal symbolized both the persistent desire of the military
to save face and its inability, or unwillingness, to remember the
fundamental goal of the Korean War "a united and free Korea, free from
domination by any outside nations."

Military domination of policymaking

conjured up for Graham images of past civilizations that had erroneously
relied on "what they thought was invincible military power."

Continued

advocacy of such a program, Graham suggested, would lead the United States
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down the same unfortunate road once traversed by Egypt, Assyria, Rome, the
British navy, and the followers of Kaiser Wilhelm 1137
Whether focusing on the growing power of the military, on the negative
impact of Cold War events on America’s small farmers, on the expansion of
U.S. business interests into foreign lands, or on the unilateral character of
American policy, Farmers Union affiliates opposing the Korean War found a
common voice in a 1950 pamphlet entitled Let’s Join the Human Race.
Written by Stringfellow Barr, president of the Foundation for World
Government and a University of Virginia history professor, the pamphlet
was praised by Farmers Union officials who, in the states of Montana,
Oregon, and North Dakota, ordered extra copies for their memberships. One
North Dakota county organization invited Barr to speak at its quarterly
convention in June, 1951, where, the organization reported, he "stressed the
importance of this country taking the lead in winning the battle for
peace."38
37Radio transcripts of Graham's broadcasts of December 29, 1950,
March 17, 1951, April 13, 1951, May 5, 1951, and September 15, 1951, Box
12, Chester A Graham Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor.
38Montana Farmers Union News. January 24, 1951, p. 3; Oregon Farmer
Union. May 15, 1951, p. 1; Glenn Talbott to Palmer Weber, January 3, 1951,
Box 9, Folder 16, Talbott Family Papers; "Minutes of Quarterly Convention,"
June 23, 1951, Box 1, Folder 3, Williams County Farmers Union Records,
State Historical Society of North Dakota, Bismarck. I discovered a copy of
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Let's Jotn the Human Race was a powerful and clearly worded statement
that mirrored many of the Ideas offered in Fred Stovers Atomic Blessing or

Atomic Blasting

and in his The Contest Between the People and the

Plunderers. Just as Stover had questlonned a number of the premises upon
which American decision makers established policy, so, too, did Barr
criticize the Truman administration for a series of "false assumptions"
guiding or, Barr more accurately charged, misguiding the American approach
to world affairs. Let's Join the Human Race critiqued four such assumptions
that, Barr suggested, collectively contributed to the erroneous policy of
"containing Russia* and prevented the United States from "doing our share to
see that the human race dwells on this planet with decency and dignity."39
The first of the assumptions, that "Russia Is all that stands between
mankind and a stable peace," was dismissed as a "childish belief" that
misread reality. Most of the world’s population, Barr argued, was concerned
not with the Ideological or economic confrontation between capitalists and
Communists, but with physical survival from day to day.

Misery, not

Communism, was the basic problem for the vast majority of the world's
Let's Join the Human Race in Box 22 of the Elmer A. Benson Papers at the
Minnesota State Historical Society in St. Paul.
39Stringfellow Barr, Let's Join the Human Race (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 25.
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people. And so, Barr concluded, "if all the Russians in the world obligingly
died this evening, and if all the Communists of whatever race were so kind
as to commit suicide tomorrow at noon sharp," poverty, hunger, and disease
would remain, and the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America would still
insist on better lives.40
The second assumption, that "American ’know-how* and American money"
were enough to guarantee improvements in the world economy, was rejected
as a fatal failure to comprehend that misery was a world problem, not a US.
problem to be settled by U.S. funds.

Repeating almost word for word an

analogy previously Introduced by National Farmers Union president Jim
Patton. Barr claimed that It was counterproductive for the United States "to
go on playing Santa Claus." Santa Claus, after all, distinguished between
good little boys and girls and bad little boys and girls, and at Christmas
time provided gifts only to those in the first category. The United States, in
similar fashion, provided post-war aid only to "good" nations outside of the
"bad" Soviet orbit, and even then provided the bulk of assistance only to
those nations deemed most vital to American security.

Barr pointed

specifically to Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe, which he observed was
then used by the Dutch, French, and British to "shoot down" Indonesians,
Indo-Chinese, and Malaysians. By playing Santa Claus, and by picking and
^B arr, Let's Join the Human Race, p. 7.
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choosing who would get the gifts, the Truman administration created a
wealth of disappointed nations “who hope[d] to get even with Santa some
day."

More generally, though, the American approach missed the key

argument that "the world economy Is a world problem, not one facet of an
American foreign policy, not the fourth point of anything, but the first point
In the world’s agenda."41
Stringfellow Barr devoted the bulk of his argument in Let’s Join the
Human Race to the third "false assumption": that “free enterprise can do the
Job better than government." in a critique that clearly mirrored the Farmers
Union disdain for the supposed greed of American capitalism, Barr observed
that "private capital goes only where those who manage It think it can make
the most money." This desire for profit, and the accompanying business
desire to avoid investment In areas of the world that had the potential for
disruptive revolution, meant a selective dispersal of private funds to
relatively safe areas of the world and the omission of funds from regions
perhaps more in need. World misery could not be successfully challenged
through such a selective process, but even 1f It could be, Barr argued, there
41 Barr, Let’s Join the Human Race, pp. 7-13. Barr's observation about
the “fourth point" was part of his running assessment of Truman's Point Four
program, which he approved of for the general principle of economic aid but
which he opposed for its insufficient funding and for its Americancenteredness.
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was "not enough private capital available" for the magnitude of the task.
What was therefore needed was a greater pool of funds, a pool generated
through a combination

of

national

and international

governmental

resources.*12
The need for a broader approach to the problem of world misery,
including the necessity of greater funds, led to Barr’srejection of

the

fourth "false assumption": that "the jobcan be done onthe basis ofsmall
yearly appropriations."

Massive resources were needed, resources that

matched perhaps the two trillion dollars that World War Two had cost
mankind. Yet, Barr lamented, annual funding for the United Nations, the only
agency then in existence with the potential for tackling world hunger and
poverty, amounted to less than one fifty-thousandth of that World War Two
total. Until sufficient funds were allocated, he argued, there was no hope
for the human race. And as long as the United States insisted on "treating
symptoms" by, for example, dispatching troops to Korea, instead of treating
the disease of world despair itself, the world was "in for very rough
weather."43
Barr’s assessment of American foreign policy differed in certain
42Barr, Lets..Join.the Human Race, pp. 13-14.
4^Barr, Let’s Join the Human Race, pp. 22 and 30.
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respects from the one offered by the membership of the Farmers Union. As
president of the Federation for World Government, Barr was interested in
establishing an international body whose role was not, as he felt the United
Nations' was, "subject to the whims of national governments."44

His

Wendell Willkie-like "one worldism" went beyond what most members of the
Farmers Union, who still believed in the efficacy of the United Nations,
were willing to pursue.

In addition, Barr's belief that U.S. businesses

avoided investment in potentially volatile areas was at odds with the
Farmers Union insistence that U.S. capitalists, backed by military might,
eagerly sought expansion to every corner of the globe. Yet there was more
agreement than disagreement.

Let's Join the Human Race was widely

praised by Farmers Union leaders, and its words and sentiments were echoed
in a number of organizational documents, including a 1951 Minnesota
resolution claiming that "the issue of ’communism' in foreign affairs is not
the basic one, [for] the common people in many nations are revolting against
centuries of starvation, corruption and peasantry under feudalism."45
The refusal to accept U.S. action in Korea as a necessary step in
containing Communism represented a logical continuation of Farmers Union
^ a r r , Let’s Join the Human Race, pp. 23.
45"An Open Letter to Farmers Union Members," Box 23, Folder
"Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers undated 1351," Benson Papers.
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positions that had been organizational dogma since the end of World War
Two: rejection of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, negative
assessments of universal military training and a peace-time draft, and
vocal criticisms of both N.AT.O. and administration attempts to corner the
market on atomic energy. In raising their voices against the sending of U.S.
troops to Korea, the Iowa, Oregon, Montana, Eastern, and Northeastern
Farmers Union affiliates carried forward the banner of protest first
unfurled in 1946 by National Farmers Union president Jim Patton.

His

characterization that year of President Truman’s policies as "imperialist
adventures backed to the hilt by American diplomacy and American arms"46
had set the tone for the Farmers Union denunciation of U.S. foreign policy. It
also had set In motion a growing image of the National Farmers Union as a
cohesive body whose Insistent opposition to America’s Cold War rhetoric
had allowed it to escape its earlier organizational history of Internal
bickering.

But the Korean War. it quickly became clear, shattered that

image.

^ National Union Farmer. October 1, 1946, p. 3. See Chapter 2, p. 52.
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Chapter Seven
An A irin g of Differences

The consistency of the National Farmers Union criticism of American
foreign policy from 1946 to 1950 led to the understandable assumption that
the same organizational condemnation would greet U.S. action in Korea. But
as the fighting in Korea moved from the initial invasion to prolonged
stalemate and slowly toward peace, the American public witnessed not a
united front but a surprising and bitter split within the Farmers Union over
President Truman’s policies abroad. Guided by Farmers Union precedents, a
number of organizational affiliates continued the assault on American
policies, others, however, made a startling reversal by falling in line with
the Truman admini s tr a in 's denunciations of Communist expansion. With
Farmers Union members and affiliates across the nation scrambling to
choose sides, the organization, by the end of the Korean War in 1953, lost
its cherished position as a leading critic of US. foreign policy.

It became

instead a disoriented group, divided, as was much of the nation, by the
tensions of the Cold War.

255
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The split in the Farmers Union surprised Americans accustomed to the
organization's consistently negative critique of Truman’s policies.

But

observers more familiar with the group recognized that what spilled over
into public debate after June, 1950, were differences of opinion that had
been developing for years, differences that were most evident in the
increasingly divergent views of National Farmers Union president Jim
Patton and Iowa Farmers Union president Fred Stover.

Although the two

men, from 1946 to 1950, had stood side by side in public opposition to
President Truman's foreign policy, in private their views had steadily parted
company. While Stover held fast to Farmers Union tradition, Patton had
begun to dismiss even the quintessential Farmers Union belief that profitdriven U.S. expansion abroad crippled the nation's small farmers at home. By
the time of the Korean War, he and his adherents no longer stressed the
connection between the nation's foreign and domestic policies as a driving
force in the organization's program. Nor did they continue to emphasize, as
Stover and his followers did, two other arguments that until Korea had been
publicly-stated organizational dogma: that unilateral American action
impacted negatively on international harmony, and that the American focus
on national security negated a needed emphasis on international and
cooperative programs for humanitarian and social progress. In short, with
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the beginning of the Korean War, Fred Stover and his adherents continued
their role as administration critics, while Jim Patton and his proponents
abandoned the role of foreign policy critic and openly adopted the Cold War
rhetoric of the very administration they had been criticizing since the end
of World War II.
Without descending too deeply into the pit of psychohistory, much of the
explanation for this remarkable shift lies in the personal backgrounds of the
two men who figured prominently as the chief spokesmen for the opposing
factions. Jim Patton and Fred Stover had come to the National Farmers
Union bearing one piece of similar baggage: experience with and adherence
to the domestic and international policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Patton's
earliest successes in the Farmers Union had been facilitated by his desire to
champion New Deal legislation.

He had likewise supported President

Roosevelt's pre-Pearl Harbor desires to contribute to the fight against Nazi
Germany by supporting, as a member of William Allen White's Committee to
Defend America by Aiding the Allies, both lend-Iease and the destroyersfor-bases deal with Britain.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor a

year after Patton's election as National Farmers Union president in 1940,
the Kansas-born farm leader extended to Roosevelt the organization's allout support for the Allied effort.

Impressed by Patton's work, Roosevelt
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appointed Mm to a series of wartime agencies, including the Economic
Stabilization Board and the War Mobilization and Recovery Administration.
With Allied success apparent in 1945, the President honored Patton even
further by inviting him to serve as a member of the U.S. delegation to the
United Nations conference in San Francisco.1
Fred Stover’s experience with Roosevelt paralleled that of Patton, except
that the Iowa farm leader served the 32nd President not only on boards
dealing with foreign affairs but also as a member of two New Deal domestic
agencies. Oddly enough, Stover’s Involvement with Roosevelt began when he
was a member not of the Farmers Union but of the rival American Farm
Bureau Federation. As president of the Cerro Gordo County Farm Bureau,
Stover

was

asked

to

administer

the

Agricultural

Adjustment

Administration's com and hog program in Iowa. Success at this endeavor led
to similar positions in Michigan and Pennsylvania, and to Stover’s 1939
appointment with the Commodity Credit Corporation In which he monitored
t|n addition to Charles H. Livermore’s dissertation, biographical
information on Jim Patton's early career can be found in: Crampton, Ideology
of a Pressure Group, pp. 115-120; Hamby, Bevond the New Deal, pp. 149-150;
Dyson, Farmers’ Organizations , pp. 224-227; Dyson, Red Harvest, pp. 189192; Carey Longmire, "Colorado Cyclone," unpublished March 13, 1946,
article in Box 27, Folder 17, Patton Papers; and Steven A Chambers,
"Relations Between Leaders of the Iowa and National Farmers Union
Organizations, 1941 to 1950," Honors thesis (Iowa State University, 1961),
pp. 15-24.
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the corn program in ten states. Following American entrance into World War
Two,

President

Roosevelt

appointed Stover

to

the

Department

of

Agriculture’s War Board. When the American Farm Bureau Federation, partly
as a result of President Allen Kline’s opposition to government involvement
in the free enterprise system, withdrew its support from Franklin
Roosevelt, Stover abandoned the Farm Bureau and joined the Iowa division of
the Farmers Union.

Elected vice president of the organization in 1944,

Stover succeeded to the presidency a year later following the resignation of
President O.B. Weber.

Fittingly, Weber’s resignation came partially as a

consequence of his anti-New Deal positions.2
Aside from a dedication to President Roosevelt, Jim Patton and Fred
Stover shared little else in common. The son of a mining engineer, Patton
grew up on a Colorado cooperative, earned business administration and
economics degrees at Western State College, and entered tne Farmers Union
through the door of the Farmers Union Life insurance Company, an agency he
began in 1932 at the age of thirty. This route led one observer to note that
Patton resembled less a farmer and “more a well-tailored bureaucrat of
2While no historian has yet attempted a biography of Stover,
information about his life can be found in: Chambers, ’’Relations," pp. 25-41;
U.S. Farmers Association, Biographical Sketch: and in documents scattered
throughout the as-yet unprocessed Stover Papers at the University of Iowa.
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private industry who spends his days in conference."3 Patton’s persistent
emphasis throughout his years as president of the Farmers Union on the life
insurance aspect of the organization reinforced the impression of a man
more in touch with the business side of farming than with the actual dayto-day aspects of tilling the soil.
Fred Stover was more the farmer than the businessman. Born in 1898 to
German immigrants, Stover grew up in Iowa in a conservative environment
stressing family values and hard work. Although he briefly attended a local
commercial college, as the oldest son in the family he spent far more time
working in the fields than he ever did in any classroom. The experience led
him to value the ideal of the family farm and to argue that his "first and
last real ambition was to be a farmer. ..." Starting with what he called a
"modest ideal of 160 acres" that he rented from his father in 1924, Stover
eventually expanded his holdings to the 240-acre property that he
maintained throughout the rest of his life.4 Described on one occasion as
"a crusader, not a politician,"5 Stover was, more than anything else, a
family farmer of the Jeffersonian mold.

His 240 acres disqualified him

from literal "yeoman" status, but he nevertheless prided himself on his
3Crampton, Ideology of a Pressure Group, p. 115.
^F.W. Stover, "An Epistle to Our Offspring," 1978 open letter, Stover
Papers.
5Chambers, "Relations," pp. 60.
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independence and viewed the primary and even exclusive role of the National
Farmers Union as helping to preserve the threatened lifestyle of America's
small farmers.
While Jim Patton gave what frequently qualified as lip service to this
same goal, his attention focused more often on the world of political power.
This “smooth political

operator,”6 as Alonzo Hamby accurately has

described him, publicly criticized the growing influence of the larger Farm
Bureau, partly because, like Stover, he was offended by its support of
corporate agriculture.

But Patton’s opposition to the Bureau, unlike

Stover’s, was dictated even moreso by a fear that the growth and influence
of that group detracted from the potential power of the Farmers Union. To
Patton, then, the Farmers Union was less a vehicle for the preservation of
family farmers and more an avenue for both organizational and personal
power.

Whereas Stover only infrequently appeared before Congressional

committees and even more infrequently was sought out by government
officials for advice, Patton was a constant guest in Washington and, despite
his vocal opposition to President Truman’s foreign policy, was recognized as
a “quiet power in [the] capital.-7 The two Farmers Union leaders, then,
6Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 150.
7Mac Lowry, "Farm Union’s Patton Quiet Power in Capital," Atlanta
Jourr.s j. October 20, 15*49, p. 31.
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were motivated by distinctly different agendas. If forced by circumstances
to choose between furthering the welfare of individual farmers and
preserving the political power of the National Farmers Union, Stover would
quickly take the first course, while Patton would not hesitate to take the
second.
The Korean War presented just such a choice.

While its criticism of

American foreign policy between 1946 and 1950 had occasionally focused
the nation's attention on the Farmers Union, and while that attention had
from time to time stressed the suspected subversive nature of the group,
the fairly inept charges of Communist infiltration had been rather easily
dismissed by the membership of the Farmers Union.

But when American

boys began fighting and dying in Korea, against what the nation was told
was blatant Communist aggression, the stakes involved in challenging the
Truman administration got higher. When Senator Styles Bridges ressurected
the charges of Communist infiltration in the Farmers Union so soon after
the start of the war, it was clear to Patton that the organization would lose
whatever power and prestige it had earned through the years should it
continue its openly adversarial role. He therefore publicly abandoned the
aggressive criticism of American foreign policy out of a fear that to
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continue to do so would mean the end of the Farmers Union as a political
force. Patton's decision, in the opinion of Homer Ayres, started the Farmers
Union on its path toward being a "political group" and away from its
traditional role of "being simply for the good of farmers and ranchers,"8
Fred Stover, for his part, continued to maintain that acquiescence in an
aggressive U.S. policy remained inconsistent with the future of America's
small farmers and so persisted in his role as critic. These opposite roads
led to the bitter conflict that featured Patton and Stover as the chief
adversaries, but which quickly enveloped the entire membership of the
Farmers Union.
Jim Patton's about-face on American foreign policy had been anticipated
even before Korea.

Starting in m id-1949, Stover and others witnessed

events within the Farmers Union that pointed not only to a shift in
organizational policy but also to a purging of the organization's most
progressive elements. The rationale behind the change seemed to Stover to
be a combination of political opportunism and fear. Responding in November,
1949, to National Guardian editor Cedric Balfrage's concern that Patton was
"about to be captured by the Democratic Party,"9 Stover described Patton
as a "big hearted" individual whom he believed would much rather continue
8Homer Ayres to the author, April 24, 1992, p. 5.
9Cedric Balfrage to Fred Stover, November 17, 1949, Stover Papers.
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going "our direction than the other direction." But, he added:
the pressures on him . . . have been tremendous and he shows
signs of getting old and tired. No doubt he has that feeling of futility
when he looks in our direction and can see many easy gains for his
organization and for himself when he looks the other direction. I do
not like to peg him as an opportunist; I love him too much for that.
But, at the same time, I have to admit that all signs point that
way

10

The view of Patton as an individual who had "lost a lot of his best fighting
qualities" and who had "been taken in" by the desire to fit into the
mainstream politics of the Democratic Party was repeated by Stover in
letters to Montana Farmers Union member Harold Ridenour in September,
1949, and to the Peace Information Center's Elizabeth Moos in June,
1950.11
While Fred Stover viewed Patton with pity, he held nothing but pure
contempt for other Farmers Union leaders whom he described as "schemers"
looking "to make of the Farmers Union a farm front for the pitiful and
incompetent Truman administration." High on this list of "grand-standing
peacocks" determined to “leave no stone unturned to tie the Farmers Union
to the donkey's tail"12 were North Dakota Farmers Union president Glenn
10F.W. Stover to Cedric Balfrage, November 22, 1949, Stover Papers.
11 F.W. Stover to Harold Ridenour, September 30, 1949, and F.W. Stover
to Mrs. Elizabeth Moos, June 2, 1950, both in the Stover Papers.
12F.W. Stover to Archie Wright, December 21, 1949, and F.W. Stover to
Lee Fryer, November 23, 1949, Stover Papers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

265
Talbott and Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association boss M.W. Thatcher.
Condemned by Montana’s Harold Ridenour as "the political assassins from the
twin city axis,"13 Talbott and Thatcher were seen by Stover, Ridenour, and
Northeastern Division president Archie Wright as the architects behind the
attempt to rid the Farmers Union of f igures whose views were deemed too
"progressive" for the climate of the times. Talbott and Thatcher walked a
fine line in their efforts, wanting on one hand to maintain the illusion of
their own progressivism, while simultaneously judging, to borrow a phrase
from another era, the political correctness of their Farmers Union
associates.

In the purge that ensued, Talbott and Thatcher, Stover’s

"Machiavellian prima donnas,"14 joined with Jim Patton in orchestrating
the changing nature of the Farmers Union.
Between 1949 and m id-1950, in a process that reminded Archie Wright
"of the Massachusetts witchcraft hunt of 1692,"15 a number of Farmers
Union officials either left or were forced out of the organization. Lee Fryer,
who had worked in Jim Patton’s office in Denver, felt the frustration of
working for a group whose personality was shifting so rapidly and so left
Denver in 1949 to begin, in Seattle, Washington, a farm service organization
'^Harold Ridenour to Fred Stover, September 14, 1949, Stover Papers.

,4 F.W. Stover to Cedric Belfrage, November 22,1949, Stover Papers.
*5 Archie Wright to Fred Stover, December 9, 1949, Stover Papers.
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that he hoped would be of more value.16
Cliff Durr, described by Alabama Farmers Union president Aubrey
Williams as "one of the ablest and most brilliant lawyers in America," did
not have the opportunity, as Lee Fryer did, of leaving the Farmers Union on
his own accord. Instead, after serving briefly as a legal counsel for the
group, Durr was fired in 1950 when his wife, Virginia, an outspoken peace
advocate, signed a peace petition sponsored by a group described in the
media as a "Communist-front" organization.

In letters to both Jim Patton

and Glenn Talbott, Aubrey Williams labelled the event a regrettable "turning
point in the affairs and future of the Farmers Union." The firing of Durr, he
wrote, represented “the acts of men caught up in a national hysteria" and
brought to his mind an assessment of hypocrisy represented by the phrase,
‘what you are speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say." Williams
directed to Patton a personal observation that accurately reflected what
Stover, Wright, and Ridenour had by now accepted as truth - that the
Farmers Union president had succumbed to the temptations of the political
limelight:
I have wished for a long time that you would get out of Washington,
and spend your time out among farming people. Washington has a way
of corrupting a man, and making him seek glamour - and tinseled
articles. He gets unconsciously bitten with the bug of seeing his
picture and name In the papers, and that w ill do something to even the
,6 Lee Fryer to Fred Stover, November 15, 1949, Stover Papers.
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strongest of men.17
The witchhunt impacted not only on individual Farmers Union members
but on state organizations as well.

Minnesota’s Einer Kuivinen, who had

written to President Truman that the nation’s "present foreign policy [was]
leading us into a biind alley," was accused by the national leadership of
"administrative inefficiency" and was forced out as state president.

In

Montana, President Don Chapman used what Harold Ridenour described as
“bona fide red baiting" in his attempt to block progressive measures at the
state organization's 1949 convention.

Chapman’s "unprincipled war on

progressive individuals, tactics, and policies" ripped the convention wide
open, pitting Chapman and Jim Patton’s supporters against a membership
that "showed no enthusiasm for the aid and comfort given the Truman
policies by top leadership."18 Among the Montana organization's elected
officials, only secretary-treasurer N.J. Dougherty remained steadfast in his
17Minutes of the Alabama Farmers Union Board of Directors Meeting at
Montgomery, April 12, 1951, Box 33, Williams Papers; Aubrey Williams to
Glenn Talbott, May 16, 1951, and Aubrey Williams to Jim Patton, May 14,
1951, both in Box 36, Folder "National Farmers Union, Patton 1950-1951,"
Williams Papers.
,8 Einer Kuivinen, "Peace is Paramount," undated leaflet published by
the Committee for a Progressive State Legislature, Stover Papers; F.W.
Stover to Harold Ridenour, November 30, 1949, Stover Papers; F.W. Stover to
Archie Wright, December 21, 1949, Stover Papers; Harold Ridenour to Fred
Stover, November 8, 1949, Stover Papers.
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opposition to American foreign policy.19
Because of his widely-publicized rejection of Truman's policies, Fred
Stover had every reason to believe, as he told Archie Wright in December,
1949, "that Iowa IwasJ next on the purge list."20 He had, in fact, already
seen signs of what was to come. Writing to Cedric Belfrage in November,
1949, Stover described an attempt by Glenn Talbott and M.W. Thatcher to
financially squeeze the Iowa Farmers Union to death by withholding from
the group educational funds traditionally distributed to state affiliates by
Thatcher's Grain Terminal Association. The two men also had ordered the
closing of the Farmers Union Livestock Association's Commission House in
Chicago which was, Stover explained, "the house where most Farmers Union
members in Iowa ship their livestock."

The closing, he argued, was

prompted by a fear that because Iowa was the only state:
that drastically increased its livestock marketing to the Farmers
Union in recent years and since the voting strength in F.U.L.A. rests in
volume of livestock marketed, there seemed to be danger to some of
them that the progressive element in Iowa might have a real voice in
the Farmers Union Livestock Association.
19Dougherty’s refusal to support Chapman’s endorsement of Truman's
policies may have contributed to his mysterious "resignation" from the
organization in October, 1952, in order "to enter other work." (Montana
Farmers Union News. October 22, 1952, p. 8.)
2°F.W. Stover to Archie Wright, December 21, 1949, Stover Papers. The
Fred Stover/Archie Wright correspondence from December 1949 to October
1950 sheds more light on the internal dissension in the Farmers Union than
any other source!
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Although Stover admitted that the motives behind these actions "cannot be
proven/ he was nevertheless convinced that they were prompted by the
"many counts against us/ primarily the group's role in “leading the fight
against the Truman foreign policy

" The financial squeeze left the Iowa

Farmers Union in "pretty tough circumstances/ but, as Stover told Harold
Ridenour, he "would rather be bankrupt financially than be bankrupt
politically and ideologically as some of our Farmers Union people are."21
Fred Stover eventually concluded that the most "bankrupt" of the Farmers
Union figures was Glenn Talbott.

Although Stover had chided Talbott on

numerous occasions in 1949 as a "prima donna" and as a "grand-standing
peacock," his anger at the North Dakota Farmers Union president peaked only
in May, 1950.

Having returned in April from his appearance at the

Australian Peace Congress, Stover was invited by Willard Uphaus to share
his Australian experience in an address to the Mid-Century Conference for
Peace held in Chicago in late May. Placed on the conference program along
with such figures as Thomas Mann, Harris Woffcrd, W.E.B. DuBois, and
(interestingly) Cliff Durr, Stover was surprisingly bumped at the last
minute. He blamed the decision on Talbott, whom he accused of "red baiting"
him off the program out of jealousy. Talbott, Stover wrote Elizabeth Moos,
21 F.W. Stover to Cedric Belfrage, November 22, 1949, Stover Papers;
F.W. Stover to Harold Ridenour, September 30, 1949, Stover Papers.
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had "suddenly found out at [the National Farmers Union convention in March,
1950, in Denver] that the peace issue was popular." Since he had “usually
tried to pose as the outstanding ‘progressive’ in the Farmers Union," Talbott
could not tolerate another Farmers Union figure assuming anything near that
role. He, therefore, Stover charged, had contacted the conference organizers
and had suggested that Stover's active involvement in Henry Wallace's
Progressive Party and in other left-leaning political organizations would
create a black mark, in the public’s eye, for the conference.22 Talbott’s
action, Stover later wrote Archie Wright, forced his blood "near the boiling
point." "What I think of this guy is not f it to print," Stover told Wright. "I
know,’’ he continued:
of no creature in the animal kingdom that 1 would want to compare
him with, because I am sure it wouldn’t be fair to the creature. We
w ill settle that score some day and it will be settled before a large
Farmers Union group after this opportunist has just finished one of
his "spread-eagled, star-spangled" speeches 23
Despite his anger at

individual

Farmers Union figures and his

disappointment with the paths taken by state affiliates such as Minnesota
and Montana, Fred Stover remained surprisingly optimistic that the
22F.W. Stover to Mrs. Jessie M. Street, May 12, 1950, Stover Papers;
Program of the Mid-Century Conference for Peace, May 29-30, 1950, Stover
Papers; F.W. Stover to Mrs. Elizabeth Moos, June 2, 1950, Stover Papers.
23F.W. Stover to Archie Wright, June 13, 1950, Stover Papers; F.W.
Stover to Archie Wright, June 3, 1950, Stover Papers.
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membership of tne Farmers Union would be able to keep the organization
from shifting Into open support of Truman's foreign policy. The Union, he
told Cedric Belfrage, "has done too good an educational Job and has too many
well informed people 1n It to be taken on a sharp swing to the ■right; or to
be made a ‘front’ for the Truman administration."

Patton, Talbott, and

others of like mind, Stover wrote Archie Wright, would probably try to
"water down our foreign policy position by ambiguous language and doubletalk" in an attempt to curry political favors, but they "wouldn’t dare" come
out publicly for a total reversal of "our good position on foreign policy."
Stover and Wright even held out hope that Jim Patton possibly could be
"saved" and suggested that one way to begin the process would be to
convince him to represent the Farmers Union at the World Peace Congress in
Milan, Italy, in October, 1950.24
The optimism ended in the firs t week of June, 1950, when Stover read
Patton’s report on the economic state of western Europe.

Written as a

follow-up to his participation in the Economic Cooperation Administration’s
survey of the impact of the Marshall Plan, the National Farmers Union
president’s assessment was in some respects critical of American policy.
24F.W. Stover to Cedric Belfrage, November 22, 1949, Stover Papers;
F.W. Stover to Archie Wright, December 21, 1949, Stover Papers; F.W. Stover
to Archie Wright, May 2, 1950, Stover Papers; Archie Wright to Fred Stover,
May 22, 1950, Stover Papers.
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However, 1n listing the elements that he believed had contributed to
Europe's economic difficulties, Patton included, in Stover's words, "the
gigantic losses by the Western European countries of their colonies.” The
suggestion that "social and economic decay Is the result of ending
imperialism" was the kind of "distorted thinking," Stover wrote, to be
expected from Truman, but not from "a man with Jim Patton’s background,
training, and broad knowledge." Patton's betrayal of Farmers Union principle
alarmed Stover and led him to believe that the organization would "become
hereafter but a supine adjunct to the military machine."25
Jim Patton was still in Europe when the fighting began in Korea and so
did not issue an immediate statement either In support of or in opposition
to President Truman's decision to go to war. That time lag allowed both
Fred Stover and Archie Wright to harbor one last optimistic hope that the
Farmers Union would continue Its role as Cold War critic by denouncing
America’s action. Telling Stover that "all is not yet lost by any means,"
Wright encouraged his friend to write a letter to Patton urging him to
oppose the war. It could be waiting for him, along with Wright's "two cents
worth," when he arrived back in the states. Both men knew, however, that
they faced long odds. The fact that Patton's “brain trust," including Glenn
25F.W. Stover to Archie Wright, June 30, 1950, Stover Papers; F.W.
Stover to Archie Wright, August 30, 1950, Stover Papers.
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Talbott, had joined him for the last leg of his European trip seemed to
preclude the possibility of Patton coming out against the war. Accepting
what was by now increasingly obvious, Stover wrote Wright that, "I suppose
when they get back in the next few days from their trip they will probably
issue a statement telling the world how loyal they are to the Korean war
and completely upholding the President’s stand

"26

The prediction was right on target. Arriving in the states in mid-July,
Patton quickly met with Truman to assure him that the Farmers Union
supported the President in his efforts in Korea. On the same day that he met
with Truman, Patton forwarded a letter to Tom Connally, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The letter, which began with the cry
that "the flag of the United Nations is waving in Korea," called on Connally
to support passage of H.J.R. 334, a bill designed to raise the ceilings on U.S.
contributions to non-military agencies of the United Nations.

America's

military action in Korea, Patton argued in the letter, would be "far more
impressive" if supplemented by increased support for the non-military,
technical assistance agencies of the U.N., particularly, from a farmer's point
of view, the U.K.'s Food and Agriculture Organization.27
26Archle Wright to Fred Stover, July 1, 1950, Stover Papers; F.W.
Stover to Archie Wright, June 30,1950, Stover Papers.
27Undated inter-office communication of the National Farmers Union,
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One week after meeting with President Truman, Jim Patton conferred
with the Executive Committee of the National Farmers Union in Tacoma,
Washington. The July 24-26 conference, attended by Patton, Glenn Talbott,
National Farmers Union vice president Herb Rolph, Montana president Don
Chapman, Oregon president Ronald Jones, and Rocky Mountain president
Harvey Solberg, spent 'several hours" discussing the Korean conflict.

As

they had in his letter to Senator Connally, Patton’s remarks to his fellow
Farmers Union leaders emphasized the role of the United Nations.

He

admitted that the U.N. action in Korea was perhaps not “all that might be
desired," but he nevertheless approved of the fact that "for the first time in
the history of the world, we are at war under the flag of the Federation of
National States - the United Nations." That reality convinced Patton that
the Farmers Union had no choice but to "support the Government of the
United States in the attempt to put down the aggression in Korea." Despite
the rhetoric in support of U.N. action, Patton’s report to the committee
ended with a statement clearly revealing the agenda closest to his heart the survival of the Farmers Union as a viable political force. "I believe," he
summarizing the July 18, 1950, meeting between Jim Patton and President
Truman, Box 10, File Folder * 9 , Patton Papers; James G. Patton to Tom
Connally, July 18, 1950, Box 1867, Record Group 16 (General
Correspondence); Press release, "Strengthening the United Nations NonMilitary Agencies," July 18, 1950, Stover Papers.
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concluded:
that the primary function of the Farmers Union and its officials is to
preserve that Union. And I am sure if our Union is to be preserved and
looked upon and heard as a responsible organization in the United
States, it is absolutely necessary for us to support the United Nations
and to support our Government which is now at war.28
After receiving consensus support from the Executive Committee, Jim
Patton issued a statement to the organization’s membership announcing the
"Farmers Union position in the present crisis in Asia." The eight-paragraph
statement opened with the argument that the United States was "involved in
a war not of its choice or making," went on to remind Farmers Union
members that the organization had "openly criticized" U.S. foreign policy in
the past, but concluded that the “evil" actions of the Soviet Union in
"fomenting armed aggression" in Korea had created the necessity for United
States and United Nations action.29
Six weeks after issuing the statement, Jim Patton asked for ratification
from the entire Board of Directors of the Farmers Union.

In a three-day

28"riinutes of the Executive Committee of the National Farmers Union,"
July 25, 1950, and “Report of James G. Patton, President, National Farmers
Union, to the Executive Committee," July 24-26, 1950, both in the Stover
Papers.
29The July 29, 1950, statement is included in "Policy Statement of
James G. Patton, President, Natonal Farmers Union," September 6, 1950,
Series V, Box 4, Book 1 ("Exhibit File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biennia!
Convention, Dallas, Texas, March 10-14"), National Farmers Union Papers. A
copy will also be found in Box 124, Folder 1, Wisconsin Farmers Union
Papers.
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meeting in Denver

in September,

Patton once more spoke of the

organization's history of dissent and acknowledged that the government of
South Korea “was by no means as true a popular government as could be
desired." He also admitted that "the vote of the United Nations Security
Council for United Nations participation in the Korean War might have been
had under more favorable circumstances," and that "there were innumerable
border incidents and provocations on both sides before the North Koreans
launched their attack." These admissions aside, Patton claimed, “the fact
remains that South Korea was invaded and that the United Nations clearly
has stamped that action as an aggressive action and one to be resisted by
member nations."30
The discussion over approval of Patton's request for organizational
support was fairly one-sided. Fred Stover, who as a state president was a
member of the Board of Directors, spoke out in opposition, but his was the
single such voice. Archie Wright, who surely would have stood by Stover in
opposition, had for health reasons been unable to make it to Denver.31
Other figures who might have voiced dissent similarly missed the meeting,
30-poiicy statement of James G. Patton," September 8,1950.
31 Alfred Kuchler to Fred Stover, September 11, 1950, and F.W. Stover
to Archie Wright and A1 Kuchler, September 14, 1950, both in the Stover
Papers.
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as did, in fact, some state presidents, particularly Wisconsin's Kenneth
Hones, who would have applauded Patton’s stand against the "evi?" Russians.
The meeting was dominated by Patton and Glenn Talbott and by the voices
that through purge and political persuasion had risen to the top of the
Farmers Union affiliates in their respective states.
The increasingly "un-progressive" nature of the Farmers Union leadership
was not, however, Jthg. leading reason why the Board of Directors voted to
support Patton's stand on Korea, instead, the fact that the Denver meeting
took place while Styles Bridges was simultaneously attacking the Farmers
Union as a Communist-front organization on the floor of the U.S. Senate had
a greater impact.

Fearing that if left unchallenged the New Hampshire

Republican's charges would damage the Farmers Union reputation, the Board
of Directors responded with a resolution that, as Fred Stover accurately
described it, used "Jim's position on Korea as proof that we were not
communistic."32 The resolution, written somewhat hurriedly by Russell
Smith, C.E. Huff, and newly appointed Director of Publications J. Lewis
Henderson, described Bridges' attack as "a disservice to the cause of truth
and decency," for:
As every honest observer knows, the Farmers Union is not
Communistic and is not a Communist-front organization. Farmers
32F.W. Stover to Archie Wright and A1 Kuchler, September 14, 1950,
Stover Papers.
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Union officials on many occasions have denounced Communism as well
as other forms of totalitarianism. For example, on July 29, an
official statement of the President, approved by the Executive
Committee, charged the North Korean aggressors had been ‘trained and
agitated into waging war on South Korea by Russia.*33
The desire of Farmers Union officials to run from the charges of
Communist affiliation was reinforced in a meeting of the organization's
educational leaders held concurrently with the Board of Directors gathering
in Denver. Chaired by Glenn Talbott’s sister, Gladys Talbott Edwards, the
group of state representatives and Education Department staff discussed
the State Department’s claim that peace petitions being circulated in the
United States were sponsored by the Soviets and suggested that Farmers
Union members therefore avoid suspicion by refusing to be affiliated with
or to sign any such documents.34
The beginning of the Korean War combined with Styles Bridges’ attack on
the Farmers Union created an opportunity for a public affirmation of the
changing nature of organization policy. Seizing the moment, Jim Patton and
other figures for whom preservation of the Farmers Union reigned as the
number one priority emerged from the closet and adopted as their own the
popular language of the Cold War.

Where once the organization had

33Reso1ution of Board of Directors of National Farmers Union,
September 9, 1950, Eastern Union Farmer. November, 1950, p. 2.
34Minutes of Leaders Meeting, September 7, 1950, Denver, Colorado,
Stover Papers.
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condemned U.S. imperialism and the profit-oriented mentality of America's
"corporate totalitarianism," it now joined President Truman in placing the
blame for the world's postwar ills solely on the shoulders of the Soviet
Union.
A September 21, 1950, letter from Jim Patton to Stuart Symington
illustrated how far the Farmers Union president had shifted in his views.
After complimenting Symington for his work in running President Truman's
Committee on Mobilization Policy, the same Jim Patton who in 1946 had
vigorously protested the need for an annual defense budget of eighteen
billion dollars wrote that:
My own personal opinion is that we should spend $50 billion a year for
the next three years on the defense effort just on the basis that we
are going to present a stronger armed position. If we must get ready
for a major war with Russia then I think we should do our planning on
the basis of spending half of our national income for that effort, or
somewhere in the neighborhood of $150 billion a year.35
It would be unfair to brand Jim Patton as an individual who had
completely sold out, for he occasionally expressed second thoughts about a
blanket endorsement of U.S. policy. Writing to Department of Agriculture
official John Baker in August, 1950, Patton noted his "100 percent" support
35Jim Patton to Stuart Symington, September 21, 1950, Box 7, File
Folder 9, Patton Papers. Patton, by the way, had a month earlier accepted a
position on Symington's mobilization committee. For details of Patton's
1946 rejection of an eighteen billion dollar defense budget, see Chapter 2,
pp. 52-3.
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of Truman's actions in Korea, but he also argued that the United States had
to end "this silly business of always kowtowing" to undemocratic forces in
foreign lands.

Patton concluded his apparent reference to Syngman Rhee

with the hopeful observation that American policymakers could find "fresh
new leaders and people who have some concern for the rank and file."
Writing to Chester Bowles two years later, Patton once again criticized U.S.
policy in his lament that America's "over-emphasis on militarism is
shocking."36
Such sentiments, however, were few and far between. More typical of
Jim Patton in the years of the Korean War were statements echoing
American policy. Addressing the South Dakota Farmers Union on October 5,
1950, Patton followed the administration line in his claim that U.S. policy
needed to be based on the realization “that aggression anywhere in this
closely knit world is an eventual threat to our security at home." Writing
once again to Stuart Symington in late January, 1951, Patton seemed even to
go beyond the administration in his claim that more forceful steps needed to
be taken beyond the inadequate approach of "modified containment."37
36Jim Patton to John Baker, August l, 1950, Box 5, File Folder 14, and
Jim Patton to Chester 3owles, April 1, 1952, Box 5, File Folder 21, both in
the Patton Papers. Incidentally, John Baker left the Agriculture Department
and joined the Farmers Union as legislative secretary in May, 1951.
37James G. Patton, "Address to South Dakota Farmers Union Convention,
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In his commentaries on the war, Glenn Talbott often followed Jim
Patton's lead in supporting administration policy; his words, in fact, were
frequently identical to those used by Patton.

Addressing his own North

Dakota Farmers Union in November, 1950, Talbott reiterated Patton's
criticism of the non-democratic nature of South Korea's government but
repeated the claim that the Farmers Union had "no sound or logical choice
but to support the United Nations

"38

At the same time, and despite Fred Stover's claims that Glenn Talbott
was the ringleader of the Farmers Union's anti-progressive element, the
North Dakota president exhibited a commendable level of moderation and
understanding. This was particularly evident in his 1951 annual report in
which he charged that “the assumptions upon which many of [America's]
actions have been taken have not been adequately supported by facts."
Sounding remarkably like Stringfellow Barr, Talbott argued that poverty, not
Communism, was the real problem in the world, and that the United States,
by assuming that the world's trouble spots had been created by Communist
October 5, 1950," Box 24, File Folder 6, and Jim Patton to Stuart Symington,
January 22, 1951, Box 7, File Folder 26, both in the Patton Papers.
38Glenn Talbott, Annual Report to the North Dakota Farmers Union,
November 15, 1950, Box 1, Folder "1950," North Dakota Farmers Union
Papers. Copy is also available in Folder *555 of President Truman’s Official
Files.
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aggression, had credited the Communists "with a great deal more strength,
Intelligence and resourcefulness than they are entitled t o. .

.

The report

also argued that an annual defense budget of between sixty and eighty
billion dollars "within the framework of our present assumption of what the
problem is" could be reduced to between twenty and forty billion dollars If
policymakers could be convinced of the true nature of the world crisis.39
Talbott was especially angered by the American refusal to offer
diplomatic recognition or to push for the United Nations seating of
Communist China. He had wisely pointed out, in his annual address of 1950,
that diplomatic recognition had nothing to do with

agreement or

disagreement "on questions of philosophy, ideology, the type or kind of
government, or the [nation's] social or economic programs

" Recognition

meant merely, Talbott argued, "that each government recognizes that the
other government is in power

“ If the United States had extended such

recognition to Communist China in 1949, Talbott suggested, the nation could
have avoided what turned out to be the eventual clash of Chinese and
American troops in Korea.

By following instead a policy of "particular

exclusion," the United States and the United Nations had reneged on the
promise of providing "a world wide sounding-board and a vehicle for settling
39Glenn Talbott, Annual Report to the North Dakota Farmers Union,
November 7, 1951, Box 1, Folder" 1951," North Dakota Farmers Union Papers.
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disputes and differences between countries." They had also contributed to
the development of the United Nations as "nothing more than a regional
military alliance."40
Despite his occasional vocal opposition to American foreign policy, the
enigmatic Talbott

more

often

than not

supported

administration direction of the National Farmers Union.

the

new,

pro-

Having backed

Patton both in his initial support of Korea and in his September, 1950,
statement to the organization's membership, Talbott once again stood
behind the Farmers Union president when in the summer and early fall of
1951 Patton offered to the Executive Committee and to the Board of
Directors the Farmers Union's most strongly worded support of Truman's
policies to date.

Entitled "A Resolution on Building Strength for Peace,

Prosperity, and Democracy," the July, 1951, resolution opened with the
observation that:
There are today two major threats to true world brotherhood and
peace. One is the existence in the free world of uncorrected and
indefensible evils which provide the seedbed for agitation, uprising
and revolt. The other is the fact that Russian rulers, instead of
cooperating to end these conditions under free governments, have
revealed imperialistic world aims and a determination to exploit
every wrong for her own imperialistic purposes.41
^Glenn Talbott, Annual Reports to the North Dakota Farmers Union,
November 15, 1950, and November 7, 1951, Box 1, Folders "1950" and
" 1951," North Dakota Farmers Union Papers.
41 "Resolution

on

Building

Strength

for

Peace,

Prosperity,
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Adopted by the Executive Committee and, over the opposition of Fred Stover
and Alvin Christman, by the Board of Directors, the resolution cited the
Soviets for failing to work with other nations toward peace, with
establishing "totalitarian regimes in satellite countries," with engaging in
“subversion and destruction," and with sponsoring "armed revolts and
military

aggressions."

Charging that

immediate Soviet

intentions,

particularly in Korea, were uncertain, the resolution offered three possible
scenarios for the administration to consider in its planning for the future:
(1) no cease-fire in Korea, or a cease-fire in Korea but outbreaks elsewhere;
(2) a cease-fire in Korea but no early general peace settlement in Korea, or
a Korean peace settlement accompanied by saber rattling elsewhere; and (3)
an early Korean peace settlement accompanied by concrete Russian peace
moves. Calling the third option "improbable," the Union acknowledged its
belief that the Soviets would cause trouble somewhere in the world and
suggested that to prepare for the eventuality the United States begin a rapid
buildup of its economic, military, and political strength.42
Democracy," Adopted by Executive Committee of National Farmers Union,
July 27, 1951, contained in the Minutes of the Executive Committee
meeting, July 26-27, 1951, Denver, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union
Papers. A copy can also be found in Box 17 (General File), Folder “National
Farmers Union-General," Waters Papers.
^••Resolution on Building Strength for Peace, Prosperity, and
Democracy." For voting on the resolution, see Minutes of the Regular
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The

apocalyptic

tone,

structured

format,

and

concluding

recommendations of "A Resolution on Building Strength for

Peace,

Prosperity, and Democracy" bore an uncanny resemblance to NSC-68, the
Truman administration’s April, 1950, in-house, secret re-evaluation of its
foreign policy agenda. Combined with Patton’s NSC-68-like recommendation
to Stuart Symington that the nation’s defense budget be hiked to $50 billion,
the resolution strongly suggests that Jim Patton's conversion to Truman’s
Cold War policies had made him such a key player in the administration that
he actually had first-hand knowledge of the secret document.
Patton’s increasingly visible role in and support of President Truman's
administration generated a great deal of organizational criticism.

Fred

Stover and Archie Wright naturally protested, just as they had when the
organizational rift had been more private than public.

With Patton now

openly espousing Truman auminisir-dLiun policy, Stover in particular offered
for public consumption what previously had been only a privately expressed
negative critique of Patton.
Stover’s December, 1950, special report to Iowa Union Farmer readers
Meeting of the Board of Directors, September 11,1951, Washington, D.C., and
Report of James 6. Patton to the Board of Directors, September 11, 1951,
Washington, D.C., both in Series I, Box 4 of the National Farmers Union
Papers.
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entitled "The Debacle in Korea" contained the charge that Patton had come
out In support of the war "to prove that he was not a Communist."

One

month later, in an editorial critical of "jingoistic flag waving," Stover
refrained from naming Patton directly but clearly included him In the list of
“pusllanlmous leaders who scrambled for a seat on the war machine . . . and
volunteered as pled pipers of the war mobllizers."

Citing the words of

Samuel Johnson, Stover wrote that the actions of men like Patton helped
him to understand what the eighteenth century English writer had meant
when he claimed that, "Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel."
Addressing the Montana Progressive Party's state convention in April, 1951,
Stover once again indirectly indicted Patton as one of the “otherwise
intelligent, but politically anemic, people" who “fold up when the going gets
tough [and] forget about the resolutions of the past which they wrote or
voted for opposing the 'extension of corporate monopolies into the markets
of the world under the protection of a world-wide American military
force.’"43 Considering their long-standing differences of opinion, it was
not surprising that Jim Patton and Fred Stover publicly parted company with
43Iowa Union Farmer. December, 1950, p. 4, and January, 1951, p. 2;
Speech delivered by Fred W. Stover, president of the Iowa Farmers Union, at
the Montana Progressive Party's state convention at Great Falls, Montana, on
April 8th, 1951, Box 5, Folder "FW Stover Speeches, 1948-1953," U.S.
Farmers Association Records.
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the beginning of the Korean War.

Jim Patton had to have known - and

expected - that his support for Truman wouid create a public rift with his
old friend.
What Patton perhaps had not expected was the huge outpouring of
opposition from rank-and-file members of the Union.

He heard, either

directly or indirectly, from a host of Farmers Union members who felt, as
South Dakota's Mrs. Reynold Locken put it, that Patton was "succumbing to
reaction."

Searching for an explanation for Patton's about-face, these

critics unanimously pointed to his participation in the E.C.E.'s tour of
Marshall Plan recipient nations. The image of the Farmers Union president
travelling through Europe, side by side with hated Farm Bureau president
Allan Kline, on a government-sponsored junket, was too much for Farmers
Union members to stomach, it gave, as a Minnesota group of rank-and-file
members noted, "the rotten Plan the apparent approval of the Farmers
Union." "Free trips may be fun for Patton," the group argued, but they did not
justify organizational support for an American policy of "propping up
reactionary governments

in Europe."

Patton's willingness,

as

the

Progressive Party's C.B. Baldwin told him, to collaborate “with the
Administration in accepting appointments to the various advisory bodies
charged with carrying out the policy [he was] on record as opposing,"
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cancelled out his "pious statements" against Truman’s foreign policy.

A

long-time friend, Baldwin was particularly hurt by Patton’s decisions and
told him that he ’hopeld] for a change because . . . I know that deep in your
mind and heart you know you are wrong."44
His friend’s admonitions aside, Jim Patton refused to admit that he was
wrong. He argued instead that in supporting American involvement in Korea
he was In fact maintaining the Farmers Union's tradition of support for the
United Nations. Since American action in Korea had been taken as part of an
overall U.N. effort toward peace, and since support for the U.N. had been a
cornerstone of Farmers Union policy, Patton rejected the charge that
44Mrs. Reynold Locken to James 6. Patton, September 30, 1950, in the
Farmers Union Defense Committee pamphlet Which Shall It Be For the
Farmers Union? Democracy From the Rank and File or Dictatorship From the
Tod Down (Des Moines, no date), pp. 17-19, Box 3, Folder 4, U.S. Farmers
Association Records; Minnesota Rank and File Committee, “The Truth About
Jim Patton," Box 22, Folder * 2 of “Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers
undated, 1950," Benson Papers; C.B. Baldwin to James Patton, March 22,
1951, Box 23, Folder "Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers March-April
1951," Benson Papers (copy also in Box 6, Folder "National Farmers Union
1951-1952," C.B. Baldwin Papers, University of Iowa.) Other examples of
Farmers Union members blaming Patton's turn around on his participation in
the E.C.E. tour include: a Scott County (Iowa) resolution cited in Iowa Union
Farmer. November, 1950, p. 1; a letter to the editor from Leo Ars of Erwina,
Pennsylvania, Iowa Union Farmer. November, 1950, pp. 6-7; and letters to
the editor from Solon C. Phillips of Reading, Pennsylvania, and Hy Litwen of
Lakewood, New Jersey, in the Eastern Union Farmer. October, 1950, pp. 2 and
5. The last two letters also criticized Patton for sponsoring Lucius Clay’s
"Freedom Crusade," a group whose chief accomplishment, according to
Phillips, was “the restoration of Nazis to power in Western Germany."
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defense of U.S. involvement in Korea signalled what one group of
organization critics referred to as the Union's "contamination] with
reaction." Such charges were dismissed by both Patton and Glenn Talbott as
either unfounded, misinterpreted, or misinformed.45
What stands out most clearly in their responses to organizational
criticism is that both Jim Patton and Glenn Talbott had succumbed to the
paranoid tone of the times. They rejected out of hand the suggestions of
Fred Stover and others that U.N. action in Korea could have resulted from
South Korean wrongdoing or that the supposedly international response to
the fighting was little more than American unilateralism in disguise. Such
doubts and questionnings, which in the past had characterized Farmers Union
thinking,

were

replaced

by a

conciliatory

submission

to

Truman

administration policy. Even more revealing than this act of acquiescence
was the vindictive tone taken by Patton and Talbott in responding to their
critics. Adopting the ianguage of the Red Scare, the two Farmers Union
figures charged their critics with “peddling lies, innuendoes, and half
45“Statement of Principles, Farmers Union National Rank and File
Committee," no date, Box 53, Folder 6, Wisconsin Farmers Union Papers; Bob
Dugan (editor, North Dakota Union Farmer! to Francis Holte, February 14,
1951, Box 9, Folder 14, Talbott Family Papers; Bob Dugan to Ernest Sylte,
February 14, 1951, Box 9, Folder 15, Talbott Family Papers; Glenn J. Talbott,
"A Re-Declaration of Principles," no date, Box 10, Folder 7, Talbott Family
Papers.
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truths." But in defending their support of the Korean War, they themselves
were guilty of twisting the truth, erroneously accusing their critics of
"trying to prove that Russia and her satellites have all the answers and can
do no wrong."46
The most glaring example of this misrepresentation of fact was Jim
Patton’s response to a February, 1951, letter from a Minnesota Farmers
Union member whose situation contained in a nutshell the frustrations of
young American farmers. Facing an impending draft, Ed Smogard, Jr. told
Patton that "the young farmers of America, such as myself, are being
marched off to fight for colonialism and landlordism abroad only to leave
our farms to be grabbed off eventually by big landlords here at home."
Wondering what his membership in the Farmers Union had earned him,
Smogard wrote that Patton had "betrayed the Farmers Union program and the
Farmers Union members by attempting to force a decrepit Truman foreign
policy upon them unwillingly." Suggesting that Patton was "maneuvering for
a place in the sun," Smogard charged that the Farmers Union president had
“been duped and mislead" and had become as a result "a bona-fide member in
the house of Truman’s prostitutes."47
^James Patton to Oscar Hereford, March 28, 1952, Box 10, Folder 5,
Talbott Family Papers.
47Ed Smogard, Jr. to James G. Patton, February 14, 1951, Box 10, Folder
3, Talbott Family Papers.
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Despite the volatile tone of the letter, what Ed Smogard did not do was
defend the Soviet Union. He specifically wrote of "the unholy intervention
[in Korea] of foreign aggressors, one bearing a United Nations flag the other
spirited by the hammer and sickle." In his reply, however, Patton unfairly
and innacurately accused Smogard of coming "to the conclusion that the
United States can do no good and that Russia can do no wrong." He was, he
told the Minnesota farmer, "just as sick and tired of war as anyone else,"
but he was "not going to be so dishonest as to put forth the prattle and tripe
that Russia's hands are lily white and that the people of the United States
and their Government are always wrong."

Patton's response, which Ed

Smogard later accurately described as "veiled red baiting" and as
“McCarthyism. . . in a clever form," was, Smogard astutely noted, no answer
to serious questions on foreign policy."48
The truth was that with the coming of the Korean War the national
leadership of the Farmers Union became Incapable of seriously analyzing
American foreign policy. Striving to avoid extinction as an influential voice
in determining the nation’s direction, the National Farmers Union yielded to
the pressures of conformity and Joined In lock step with the Cold War
^James G. Patton to Ed Smogard, Jr., February 22, 1951, and Ed
Smogard, Jr. to James Patton, March 9, 1951, Box 10, Folder 3, Talbott
Family Papers.
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mentality of the age. Just as Dean Acheson once remarked that Korea saved
the Truman administration’s plans for increased military budgets, so too did
the conflict provide the national leadership of the Farmers Union with a
reason to publicly reverse its long-standing position as the nation’s leading
agrarian critic of U.S. foreign policy. Acting on the desire to survive, Jim
Patton and other organizational figures orchestrated a reversal

of

organizational tradition and saved, for the moment at least, the political
clout of the Farmers Union.
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Chapter Eight
Purging the Heretics
In a 1954 statement entitled “Let the Truth Prevail/ Fred Stover wrote
that, “To be smeared and red-baited by reckless unsupported charges from
outside the organization . . . is today quite natural." “But/ he argued, “it is
not natural that some of the leadership of our National organization . . .
should join in the attack, and by their action give credence to the wild
charges, with its slanderous imputations."1 Yet, natural or not, from the
beginning of the Korean War through its immediate aftermath in the mid1950's, the National Farmers Union experienced just such a conflict. What
once had been merely privately expressed differences of organizational
opinion that occasionally surfaced for public viewing became, with the
beginning of Korea, a war itself, one waged prominently in the public eye.
Relying on innumerable “reckless," “wild," and frequently contrived charges,
the national leadership attempted to purge from the organization those
individuals and affiliates who, by refusing to support President Truman's
Cold War policies, brought negative publicity to the National Farmers Union.
1-Let the Truth Prevail," Statement by Fred W. Stover, President, !owa
Farmers Union, [1954], Stover Papers.
293
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The most contrived, but also most frequently used, charge was that a
number of state and regional organizations had declining memberships that
made it impractical for the Farmers union any longer to carry them as
affiliates.

Jim Patton expressed concern at the end of 1949 that

memberships In both Michigan and Iowa would need "some attention” In the
coming year, but he optimistically reported to Wisconsin's Ken Hones In
September, 1950, that all state presidents except those in "Oregon and one
other small state reported . . . rather substantial membership increases."2
This awkward summary of events was complicated by Patton's highlighting
of Michigan and Iowa as the two states in trouble in 1949, since both state
organizations experienced membership growth between 1948 and 1950.
The truth, however, was that in the two years preceding Korea, Farmers
Union membership trends varied significantly from state to state.

From

1948 to 1949, six of the eighteen state and regional affiliates lost
membership, while between 1949 and 1950 that number increased to ten.
Most of the losses were offset by gains in other affiliates, allowing the
Farmers Union to maintain a consistent national membership throughout the
2Report of James G. Patton to Executive Committee, November 14-16,
1949, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers; James G. Patton to
K.W. Hones, September 21, 1950, Box 53, Folder 4, Wisconsin Farmers Union
Papers.
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period.3 What is most clear from the figures, however, is that claims of
declining membership as a justification for the revoking of affiliate
charters was a fraud.

If it had been a legitimate concern, far more

affiliates would have lost their charters.
The excuse of limited membership nevertheless was used successfully by
the national

organization

in dealing with

Alabama, Ohio, and the

Northeastern Division. The first two had serious membership problems and
by the time of the Korean War had less than 500 paid members each. The
third

group,

Archie

Wright's Northeastern

Division,

had sufficient

membership, but its people were behind in their dues obligations to the
national organization. Meeting in Denver in March, 1951, the Farmers Union
Board of Directors, acting on the January, 1951, recommendation of the
Executive Committee to revoke the charters of all affiliates having less
than the constitutionally-mandated minimum of 1000 paid members, ended
the ties between the national organization and these three groups.4
What was curious about the Farmers Union action was its timing. The
3 1948-1949 Membership Lists, attached to Vice President H.D. Rolph's
Report to the 1950 Convention, Series IV, Box 3, File Folder 8, National
Farmers Union Papers; 1950 Membership List, attached to Minutes of Board
of Directors Meeting, March 10-15, 1951, Denver, Series I, Box 4, National
Farmers Union Papers.
^Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting, March 10-15, 1951, Denver,
Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers.
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Ohio organization for years had been below the 1000 minimum requirement,
largely because of the strength of the Farm Bureau in its state; yet its
membership status had been long condoned.

Alabama, too, had been

suffering membership decline for a number of years, primarily because the
liberal philosophy of the Farmers Union did not match well the conservatism
of the South.

And the Northeastern Division had been beset, as Archie

Wright explained in a letter that was read at the March, 1951, Board
meeting, by a number of problems: the Increasing influence of labor unions
In the farm field, strong competition from both the Grange and the Farm
Bureau, and the negative economic impact of the Korean War. "We have, in
the past," Wright wrote "survived much more serious and stringent times. I
have no doubt of our ability to survive now." Despite Wright’s request for
"sympathetic consideration" in maintaining affiliation with the Union,
despite concern expressed by several Directors that charter revocation
"would have a bad effect on membership building," and despite South Dakota
President Paul Opsahl’s suggestion to give Wright's group a four-month
grace period to straighten out Its dues situation, the Board nevertheless
revoked all three charters.5
5 Archie Wright to Tony DeChant, National Farmers Union SecretaryTreasurer, March 3, 1951, Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting, March 1015, 1951, Denver, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers. In
addition to the minutes, detailed information on this meeting w ill be found
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It was clear to both Archie Wright and Alabama's Aubrey Williams why
the Board had, at this time, chosen to enforce technical constitutional
provisions that it had for years ignored. Although neither man had been as
vocal as Iowa's Fred Stover in criticizing the national leadership’s recent
alignment with President Truman, Wright had spoken out in opposition to the
Korean War and Williams had signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal that had
been critiqued by the administration as Communist-inspired. Explaining the
Board's decision to his membership, Wright wrote that:
The technical reason for revocation of our charter probably was not
the real reason. While we had not been spectacular about it, we were
for peace and, behind the scenes, we had objected vigorously to the
national's cosy arrangement with the Truman administration and its
quasi endorsement of the defense preparations and its growing anti
communism, all fatal to any people's organization in the long run. I
feel that the national officers thought that a charter revocation in
our case would free them from Truman criticism

6

Williams was more conciliatory, reporting to Alabama members his doubts
in the Iowa Union Farmer. March, 19 5 1, p. 1.
6Archie Wright to Ulster Local, April 3, 1951, Box 3, Folder "Ulster
County Miscellaneous Correspondence 1941-1953," New York Milk Shed
Records, interestingly, after asking the Farmers Union for “sympathetic
consideration" in his March 3, 1951 letter, Wright five days later, in a
second letter that was also read to the Board, rescinded that request and
accepted the impending charter revocation. In that second letter, Wright
lashed out at Jim Patton's "tacit endorsement of the Truman administration"
and his poor treatment of Aubrey Williams and Ohio's Charley Few. Perhaps,
after what he termed "mature reflection of the matter," Wright realized the
futility of seeking conciliation with the national office. (Archie Wright to
James 6. Patton, March 8, 1951, Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting,
March 10-15, 1951, Denver, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers.)
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that the charter revocations were completely motivated by Jim Patton's
anti-peace group sentiment. Nevertheless, he recognized that they would
be, with some degree of accuracy, interpreted that way and would
contribute to the "hysteria the country has found itself in."7
The removal of Wright and Williams was but a sideshow to the national
organization's primary objective. Having struggled with the persistent
criticisms of Fred Stover, the national leadership turned its attention to
lowa and resolved to banish from the National Farmers Union the most vocal
critic of the Union's recent conversion to Truman's Cold War policies. Since
membership in the lowa Farmers Union was significantly above the required
minimum of 1,000, the task involved a more complex attack plan than that
used against Ohio, Alabama, and the Northeastern Division. But Jim Patton,
Glenn Talbott, and other leading national figures concluded that the
silencing of Stover would be well worth the effort. No longer would they be
compelled to explain to the American public the activities of the man C.E.
Huff described as “a tool o f . . . the Reds," and who was therefore not only an
embarrassment to the organization but also, as Huff put it in language
suitable to the exaggerated rhetoric of the times, a threat "to decent social
7Summary of Alabama Farmers Union Meeting, April 12, 1951,
Montgomery, Box 33 (Personal Files 1945-1958), Folder "Alabama Farmers
Union Meeting 4/12/51," Williams Papers.
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and economic order."8
The attempt to unseat Fred Stover began in September, 1950, when the
lowa Farmers Union held its annual convention in Des Moines.

Writing to

Stover that he was unable to attend or to address the convention, Jim Patton
forwarded instead a statement that he asked be read to the delegates.9
His comments, which he released to the press on September 22, focused
exclusively on “the international situation" and repeated, word for word,
both his July 29 statement and the Board of Director's September 9
resolution supporting American involvement in Korea.

He concluded his

written remarks with what amounted to a direct threat to the lowa
8C.E. Huff to Glenn Talbott, February 25, 1952, Box 9, Folder 44,
Talbott Family Papers. The story behind the attempt to purge the lowa
Farmers Union Is clouded by Jim Patton's practice of selectively
maintaining both Farmers Union and personal records. I immediately noticed
significant chronological gaps in both the Patton Papers and the National
Farmers Union Papers at the University of Colorado. Charles Livermore, who
interviewed Patton In 1978 for the Columbia Oral History Project, also
discovered the same phenomenon and wrote in the introduction to his study
of Patton that, "official records are plentiful, but apparently 'laundered.'"
(Livermore, "James G. Patton," p. ix.) When he asked Patton about it, the
response was that the decision had been made to take minutes of meetings
in such a fashion that the Farmers Union could not be sued; he also felt that
the internal workings of the organization were no business of the
newspapers. Such secretiveness reinforces the impression of a man quite
concerned about the political side of things and for whom the title of
"Twenty-First Century Visionary" seems inappropriate. (Charles Livermore,
interview with Jim Patton, August, 1978, Box 2, pp. 93-94, Patton Papers.)
9James 6. Patton to Fred W. Stover, September 19, 1950, Stover
Papers.
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organization. Noting his "sincere hope that the lowa Farmers Union, in a ll of
its actions, w ill give full support to the position of the National Farmers
Union," Patton reminded the delegates that:
Our National Farmers Union is a federal organization. State Farmers
Unions exist upon the grant of a charter under the National
Constitution and by-laws. The power to revoke such state charters is
held by the National Farmers Union, to be exercised in stated
membership situations and in the case of intolerable departures from
the democratically-adopted policies of a majority in convention.10
In addition to releasing the charter revocation threat to the general
press, Patton also wrote a "Statement on Farmers Union Policy" to be
published exclusively in the Des Moines Register. The Register, following
Styles Bridges' attack on the Farmers Union, had defended the national
organization in a September 9 editorial arguing that, "Because it is the
voice of farm protest does not make the National Farmers Union a
Communist ’front."

Thanking the Register for this "splendid editorial,"

Patton on September 22, the second day of the lowa convention, used the
pages of the Des Moines newspaper to announce that he was ‘ totally in
disagreement with Fred Stover's present position on international policy"
and that he fe lt "certain that the members of the lowa Farmers Union, too,
almost to a man, disagree with him." After carefully pointing out that he
1Ojames G. Patton, "To the Delegates and Members of the lowa Farmers
Union in Convention at Des Moines, lowa," September 19, 1950, Stover
Papers.
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did not believe that Stover was a Communist, Patton described the lowa
leader instead as a "sensitive lowa farmer, embittered and enraged by the
undeniable inequities and injustices which he has seen," but who was
"honestly mistaken in his solutions on international affa irs

1

Despite Patton's cautious avoidance of the Communist issue and the
seemingly sympathetic identification with Stover's intentions, his use of
the Register as a vehicle for criticizing Stover "hit the convention," Homer
Ayres wrote, "like a ton of bricks." Jim Patton surely realized that the Des
Moines newspaper had for years been a constant critic of the lowa
organization.

In fact, in the same September 9 editorial in which the

Register defended the Farmers Union against Senator Bridges' charges, the
paper had drawn a clear line between the national organization's role as the
"voice of farm protest" and the state unit's "fellow-traveling, or just plain
naivete." Stover's group, the Register had claimed, was "a tiny fringe of
little consequence" that "quite often seemed to be following closely the
Communist line . . . .,2 Patton's decision to use the Register as a forum
n Des Moines Register. September 9, 1950 and September 22, 1950.
The original “Statement on Farmers Union Policy for the Des Moines Register
by James G. Patton" is in Box 26, File Folder *6 , Patton Papers.
12lowa Union Farmer. October 21, 1950, p. 4; Des Moines Register.
September 9, 1950. Details on the poor relationship between the Register
and the lowa Farmers Union are discussed in Fred Stover's August 11, 1950,
letter "To the Directors." (Stover Papers)
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struck many tn lowa as further evidence that the national president had
given In to the antl-Communist hysteria of the times.
Although the opening salvo in the National Farmers Union's war on lowa
had used the threat of charter revocation against the entire organization, it
was clear that what Patton and other national figures would have preferred
was simply the removal of Fred Stover from a leadership position in the
state. In his September 22 statement in the Register. Patton had spoken of
his certainty that "almost to a man" the membership of the lowa Farmers
Union disagreed with Fred stover. Two days after the lowa convention, the
Register added to the portrayal of Stover as the primary problem with a
malicious front-page cartoon showing the lowa leader dragging the lowa
Farmers Union unwillingly into the "Communist International line."

The

argument of the Register, and of Jim Patton, was that the lowa organization
could be saved if Fred Stover simply would agree to "step aside."13
Stover was unwilling to accomodate Patton’s request and, considering
his continued role as state president, it Is clear that the lowa membership
did not view their leader as negatively as Patton supposed. A group of state
members, however, did agree more with Patton than with Stover, and in the
13Des Moines Register. September 25, 1950, p.1. Jim Patton admitted
in his 1978 interview with Charles Livermore that what the organization
wanted was for ‘Fred to step aside." (Livermore interview, p. 96.)
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months following the convention staged a national-assisted coup to oust
Fred Stover. The leader of the movement was Leonard Hoffman, who until
this point had served as Stover's vice president.

Immediately following the lowa convention, Hoffman wrote Jim Patton
asking his opinion on a legal question: Did holding an office in a national
political organization prevent a Farmers Union member from holding office
in the Union?

The question came as a result of the Farmers Union's

constitutionally-stated mandate for the organization to be "non-partisan" in
nature. It was aimed specifically in this case at Fred Stover, who, as cochairman of the national Progressive Party, had, in 1948, read the speech
nominating Henry Wallace for U.S. President. Patton directed the question to
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Washington, D.C., attorney Carl Berueffy, who returned the opinion that
Stover had been required to resign as lowa Farmers Union president before
accepting the position in the Progressive Party.

He was, therefore, no

longer state president, but would have to relinquish the role to his vice
president, Leonard Hoffman.14
The argument was clearly a contrived effort to eliminate Stover. That
Berueffy's response was in Patton’s hands less than a week after the end of
the lowa convention strongly suggests that Hoffman or Patton, or both, had
concocted the scheme in advance.

Patton's decision to consult Berueffy,

someone unaffiliated with the Union, could be considered an extraordinary
attempt at impartiality; it also, however, could be seen as an attempt to
avoid the lengthy battle that might have ensued had Patton either consulted
a host of "impartial- outsiders In the hope of bulwarking his case with
numbers, or referred the question to the Farmers Union’s Executive
Committee, Board of Directors, or entire membership.

By relying on the

advice of one attorney, Patton got what he wanted - a quick solution to a
sticky problem. He also managed to avoid any discussion of the facts that
1Report of James G. Patton to the Executive Committee, October 31,
1950, Denver, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers; Carl Berueffy
to James G. Patton, September 29, 1950, Series VII, Box 2, File Folder *5 ,
National Farmers Union Papers.
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Stover had by this time resigned his position in the Progressive Party or
that he himself, having served as national vice president of the C.1.0.
Political Action Committee, might have fallen victim to a ruling more
widely debated. Patton's involvement with the C.1.0. organization had, in
fact, brought allegations in 1944 that he was in violation of the Farmers
Union's "non partisan" rules and had prompted an unsuccessful move to
replace him as national president.

Nevertheless, a ploy that Patton had

opposed when used against him in 1944, he fully supported when used
against Stover in 1950.15
Despite its contrived nature, Leonard Hoffman used Berueffy's decision
for all it was worth. Noting the changing nature of the Progressive Party,
including Henry Wallace’s surprise support for the Korean war, Hoffman
announced that the party now consisted of “a core of designing people, and a
fringe of once fine people who are too naive to understand what is going on or have deliberately decided to go along with Communist policies." Although
Hoffman did not specify which category Fred Stover fit, his four-page
"Report to the lowa Farmers Union Members"

released on November 20,

1950, included references to Stover's "activities in the pinko Progressive
^Chambers, "Relations," p. 30. See also Fred Stover's closing speech to
the September, 1951, lowa Farmers Union annual convention, Box 6, Folder
“F.W. Stover Speeches 1948-1953," U.S. Farmers Association Records.
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party" and to the lowa Union Farmer's "slavish following of the Moscow
line." It also contained the argument that Stover was officially out as lowa
president.15

This announcement, combined with a September, 1950,

constitutional change in the structure of the state organization's Board of
Directors, threw the lowa Farmers Union into a chaotic struggle for power
that eventually had to be resolved by the courts.17
Jim Patton insisted time and again that neither he nor any other national
organization officials played a role in the struggle for control of lowa.
Patton in particular denied that he personally participated in any direct
attacks on Fred Stover, either publicly or behind the scenes. Responding to
Archie Wright s charge that he had "kicked Stover around," Patton retorted in
March, 1951, that he had "not at any time attacked Stover in the Nat ional
Union Farmer or otherwise." Writing to Glenn Talbott two months earlier,
the Farmers Union president argued that he had “not participated in the lowa
situation" and that any statements he had made regarding it had been m3de
"directly by a written message." When reminded that his charter revocation
,6 "A Statement to lowa Farmers Union Members By Leonard E. Hoffman,"
October 7, 1950, Stover Papers.
17The constitutional battle over who legally comprised the Board of
Directors is an issue too removed from my present purposes. Details are
discussed in Rinehart, "The lowa Farmers Union," and in a number of
documents in the Stover Papers, including “A Statement to lowa Farmers
Union Members by Leonard E. Hoffman" and "An Open Letter to Leonard
Hoffman by The Farmers Union Defense Committee."
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address to the lowa convention certainly seemed an intrusion into the
affairs of the state,

Patton announced that his actions

had been

"misinterpreted and exaggerated. . . to make them appear undemocratic." All
he had done In the address, he wrote in a letter to Washington state's Ward
King, was merely direct attention to the organization's constitution. "I did
not feel then nor do I feel now," he told King, "that directing attention to the
constitution is improper in a democracy."

When Wisconsin’s Ken Hones

praised him for "the manner in which [he had] handled the Stover situation,"
but suggested that the charter revocation threat had not been wise, Patton
answered that his language had not been intended as a threat to Iowa's
charter.18
The image Jim Patton tried to convey was that the fight between Fred
Stover and Leonard Hoffman was an internal matter in which the national
organization would have no part and whose resolution would be le ft to the
courts. “Action in lowa," he reported to the Executive Committee at the end
,8 Archie Wright to James 6. Patton, March 8, 1951, Box 3, New York
Milk Shed Records; James G. Patton to Archie Wright, March 19, 1951, Box
10, Folder 5, Talbott Family Papers; James G. Patton to Glenn Talbott,
January 19, 1951, Box 10, Folder 3, Talbott Family Papers; James G. Patton
to Ward King, quoted in the Oregon Farmer Union. January 15, 1951, p. 4; K.W.
Hones to James G. Patton, September 29, 1950, Box 53, Folder 4, Wisconsin
Farmers Union Papers; James G. Patton to Kenneth W. Hones, October 24,
1950, Box 53, Folder 4, Wisconsin Farmers Union Papers.
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of October, 1950, was "being taken by local people." There admittedly were
national organization figures occasionally in the state, but they were there
merely "to check on the nature of the situation and report to me." When it
was suggested that perhaps he should meet with Fred Stover to clear the
air, Patton responded that he saw "no point in having a conference with Fred
Stover or, for that matter, anyone else in lowa until some decision is made
in the courts."19
Try as he might to paint an image of ideological impartiality and
physical non-interference, Patton could pull neither off. His statement to
the Executive Committee that the fight in lowa featured two factions, one
"composed of supporters of National Farmers Union policy" and the other
"behind Fred Stover," demonstrated a decided preference for the anti-Stover
forces of Leonard Hoffman. Even more revealing was his comment to M.W.
Thatcher that "the Commie crowd which keeps fluttering around Fred is
merely trying to stir up trouble

m20

Patton’s pronouncement that neither he nor any other National Farmers
Union officials interfered in lowa was as transparent as his claims of
1^Report of James G. Patton to Executive Committee, October 31, 1950,
Denver, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers; James G. Patton to
Glenn Talbott, January 19, 1951, Box 10, Folder 3, Talbott Family Papers.
20Report of James G Patton to Executive Committee, October 31, 1950,
Denver, Series I, Box 4, National Farmers Union Papers; James G. Patton to
M.W. Thatcher, January 2, 1951, Box 10, Folder 3, Talbott Family Papers.
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ideological objectivity.

In addition to the threat to revoke the state's

charter, however weakly denied, Farmers Union officials visited lowa on a
number of occasions in more than a purely observational capacity. Refusing
to meet with Stover, Farmers Union lobbyist Benton Stong nevertheless
frequently visited with Leonard Hoffman and other anti-Stover forces, and
Jim Patton himself met with Hoffman shortly after the lowa convention.
Far from forwarding all commentary about the lowa situation directly to
Fred Stover, as he claimed he had In January, 1951, Patton instead discussed
the events at length, and in terms derogatory to the lowa leader, in
correspondence with 61enn Talbott, M.W. Thatcher, and Ken Hones. In fact,
when at the end of 1950, Stover wrote Thatcher praising a recent speech,
but criticizing other farm leaders for their lack of courage, Thatcher
forwarded the letter to Patton, who In turn forwarded 1t to Talbott, with
the note that It was "some interesting correspondence." Citing the praise
that stover had given Thatcher, Patton wrote Talbott that. "MWT can get
mixed up in some of the strangest concoctions. Apparently he has not been
very close in."21
2 1Fred Stover to M.W. Thatcher, December 22, 1950, M.W. Thatcher to
Fred Stover, December 29, 1950, M.W. Thatcher to James G. Patton,
December 29, 1950, James G. Patton to M.W. Thatcher, January 2, 1951,
James G. Patton to Glenn Talbott, January 2, 1951, and James G. Patton to
Glenn Talbott, undated handwritten note, all in Box 10, Folder 3, Talbott
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Being "very close in" implied an awareness of events and a willingness to
take steps to Isolate Stover and his supporters. While Thatcher apparently
had not been in the loop in late 1950, by October, 1951, he was much “closer
in." The organization he headed, the Grain Terminal Association, distributed
the Farmers Union’s educational funds, and In that month It refused to
disburse shares to the lowa affiliate.

Explaining the reasoning for the

move, Thatcher wrote the lowa leadership that, "the educational work now
being carried on by the lowa Farmers Union is not In the best interests of
agriculture, and particularly of the Farmers Union programs." Four months
later, prominent figures in the Farmers Union dented that the funds had ever
been withheld. The dental struck Fred Stover as another attempt by the
national leadership to unfairly and inaccurately "brand Ihim] as a trouble
maker and rumor-monger."

The withholding of educational funds, Stover

wrote to Montana Farmers Union member Peter Bokma, was "not a rumor,"
but was part of the national organization’s effort “to compel conformity to
the war program."22
Jim Patton and Glenn Talbott attempted to further Isolate lowa by
Family Papers.
22m .W. Thatcher to Edna Untiedt, October 10, 1951, quoted in “Is This
the GTA Way?," Stover Papers; Peter Bokma to Fred Stover, February 1,
1952, and Fred Stover to Peter Bokma, February 9, 1952, both in the Stover
Papers.
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questioning the intent and origins of pro-Stover materials mailed to Union
members.

Sharing with the Union membership copies of "Whither the

Farmers Union," a publication put out by a Farmers Union Rank and File
Committee headquartered in lowa, Patton suggested impropriety with his
accompanying remark that "the mailings originated in New York City."23
Talbott added to the suggestion of subversion when he wrote a Minnesota
Farmers Union member that Stover materials:
being distributed out of New York with a New York postmark would
seem to be some indication that forces outside the Farmers Union are
doing what they believe w ill be effective in creating dissention [sic]
and division within the ranks of the organization 24
The implication was clear. Fred Stover was either a willing or unwilling
tool of outside forces, meaning, of course, the Communist Party.
There can be no doubt, despite the denials, that the National Farmers
Union played an active role in events in lowa. The debatable point in all of
this, however, has been whether Jim Patton and national figures initiated
and orchestrated the anti-Stover coup, or whether, as one pro-Hoffman
supporter later argued, the move began with Iowa's membership who
eventually "had no recourse except to ask help from the National."25
23James G. Patton to "Dear Co-Workers," June 30, 1952, Box 10, Folder
7, Talbott Family Papers.
24Glenn Talbott to F.F. Frater, February 26, 1952, Box 9, Folder 55,
Talbott Family Papers.
25Lee Fryer interview of Paul Schwitters, no date, Stover Papers.
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Although Stover advocates persistently argued that the national leadership
was completely behind the attempted purge, the truth seems to be that the
effort was a joint venture, initiated neither exclusively by Patton nor
totally by Hoffman's adherents.

It was instead a combined effort,

orchestrated by state and national figures together In the hope of ridding
the organization of the embarrassing Fred Stover.
Despite this united effort, the purge attempt failed when In April, 1951,
the lowa courts ruled In favor of Fred Stover as the legitimate president of
the lowa Farmers Union.

Almost simultaneously, Jim Patton wrote Ken

Hones that the national Board of Directors would “have to take specific
action in relation to low a

"26 The "specific action" Patton had in mind

was the standby tactic of charter revocation. Having failed in the bid to
isolate Stover from the lowa Farmers Union, the national leadership now
shifted strategies and sought to remove the lowa affiliate completely from
the national organization. The new strategy masked the same old goal - the
elimination of Stover.

Jim Patton and the national leadership had no

intention of permanently banning lowa from membership, but worked Instead
toward cancelling the charter of the Stover-led lowa Farmers Union and,
26James G. Patton to K.W. Hones, May 25, 1951, Box 53, Folder 5,
Wisconsin Farmers Union Papers.
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once he was out of the way, reviving the state group under more cooperative
leadership. Dwight Anderson, who In 1948 had unsuccessfully challenged
Stover for the lowa presidency, put the objective in black and white in a
July, 1951, letter to Patton in which he asked the national organization to
“revoke or suspend the charter of the lowa Farmers Union as soon as
possible, and then come In and set up a new organization

“27

Working In tandem with a group of members primarily from Hardin
County, the home of Leonard Hoffman, the national leadership used as a
vehicle for charter revocation the charge that stover systematically was
denying organizational affiliation to local areas populated by anti-Stover
elements and was establishing what amounted to dictatorial control over
the state. In a lengthy September, 1951, letter to Glenn Talbott, Crystal
Lake's Leo Paulson spoke of his increasing disappointment with Stover's
leadership and of the lowa president's unwillingness to

listen

to

suggestions for change. Paulson wrote of numerous local affiliates whose
memberships were rapidly declining and argued that lowa could "never build
an effective organization . . . under the present leadership.-

lowa Falls

member Paul Schwitters, in a February, 1952, letter to Patton, wrote of
running into "many obstacles" in trying to organize local affiliates and
27Dwight L. Anderson to James Patton, July 2, 1951, Box 9, Folder 31,
Talbott Family Papers.
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suggested that the Stover forces were deliberately "stalling" in an attempt
to maintain control of the state.28
The claims of dictatorial designs were as desperately contrived as the
charges of unconstitutional political affiliations.

Rejected by Stover

supporters as a "cowardly attack" by a “Farm Bureau-minded, charterlifting, pro-war . . . group," the charges were interpreted as nothing more
than a continuation in the long line of "inuendoes and insinuations’ that
masqueraded for substantive fact.

In truth, as Glenn Talbott admitted in

responding to Leo Paulson's letter, neither the National Farmers Union nor
its supporters in lowa had any "sound, legal grounds for revocation or
cancellation of the lowa Farmers Union Charter."29

The admission,

however, did not stop the national leadership and the pro-Hoffman forces
from pursuing the goal of somehow ridding the organization of Stover. As
the Farmers Union’s historical fiftieth anniversary convention approached in
1952, the organization's brains trust at last concocted what turned out to
be a successful plan.
28Leo Paulson to Glenn Talbott, September 5, 1951, Box 9, Folder 31,
and Paul Schwitters to James G. Patton, February 4, 1952, Box 10, Folder 3,
Talbott Family Papers.

29"cowardly Attack by 'Waterloo Group' Met By Members," undated
pamphlet, Box 4, Folder 1, U.S. Farmers Association Records; Glenn J. Talbott
to Leo Paulson, October 18, 1951, Box 9, Folder 31, Talbott Family Papers.
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In a fitting tribute to its 1902 Texas roots, the Farmers Union's Golden
Jubilee convention opened In Dallas on March 10, 1952.

Intended as a

positive celebration of fifty successful years, the gathering instead was
embroiled immediately in divisive controversy. Even before its opening, the
selection of Dallas had generated concerns from some delegates that a
convention in a “Jim Crow" city would damage the liberal reputation of the
Union. The Eastern Division was particularly critical of the Dallas location
and passed a February, 1952, resolution urging a change In site to "uphold
the traditional Farmers Union principle of equality for ail.”30
The resolution irritated Jim Patton. Plans for the convention, he wrote
Alabama's Aubrey Williams, had been in the works for two years, and, during
that time, the choice of a southern city (Little Rock and Oklahoma City had
been considered in addition to Dallas) had been opposed by no one, "including
[Eastern Division president] Mr. Christman."

In fact, experience with

previous conventions in non-southern cities had demonstrated that racial
discrimination was not exclusively a southern phenomenon. Farmers Union
secretary-treasurer Tony Dechant suggested that members hoping for a
changed convention site at such a late date were "a trifle naive," but Patton
was more blunt. Christman and the Eastern Division, he wrote Williams,
30"Farmers Union Members Shocked at Patton's Disclosure of 'Jim Crow'
Convention Plans; Eastern Division Demands Shift of Site," undated press
release, Stover Papers.
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were part of the annoying element of the Union "who wish to cause trouble
about anything on which they can stir up trouble."31
Jim Patton and Glenn Talbott arrived in Dallas determined to eliminate
once arid for all the annoying elements that Patton by now derisively
described as the Union's “tadpoles."32 Working closely with C.E. Huff and
other national figures, Patton and Talbott had designed a constitutional
revision, accompanied by an elaborate rationale, that allowed the Farmers
Union to revoke the charter of any affiliate whose membership fell below a
now significantly inflated figure. Whereas a year earlier, Ohio, Alabama,
and the Northeastern Division had fallen victim to the 1,000 member
requirement, the 1952 proposal read:
The charter of any State Union may be revoked, with or without prior
notice, by the majority vote of the Board of Directors of National
Union (a) if at the end of its fiscal year in 1952 the dues paid
membership of a State Union having charter on March 6, 1946, shall be
less than 1,000; or (b) if at the end of its fiscal year in 1952 the dues
paid membership of a State Union whose charter has been issued
subsequent to March 6,1946, shall be less than 2,500; or (c) if at the
3 'Aubrey Williams to James G. Patton, February 14, 1952, Tony T.
Dechant to James G. Patton, February 15, 1952, and James G. Patton to
Aubrey Williams, February 18,1952, Box 32, Williams Papers.
32In a March 28, 1952, letter to Montana's Oscar Hersford, Patton wrote
that Harold Ridenour, Fred Stover, and the editors of Facts for Farmers made
him "feel like the man who said, *1 would not mind being swallowed by a
whale, but I'll be damned if I intend to be irritated to death by tadpoles.'"
(James G. Patton to Oscar Hereford, March 28, 1952, Box 10, Folder 5,
Talbott Family Papers.)
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end of its fiscal year in 1953 the dues paid membership of any
chartered State Union, regardless of the date of its charter, shall be
less than 3,500 or at the end of its fiscal year in 1955 or of any year
thereafter shall be less than 5,000.33
The amendment placed in jeopardy the charters of five organizations: Oregon
(paid membership of 3,407), Michigan (2,919), Texas (2,634), lowa (2,296),
and the Eastern Division (3,213).34 But, as was evident from both pre
convention planning and subsequent actions, the change was aimed
exclusively at lowa and the Eastern Division.
In the weeks leading up to the convention, C.E. Huff and others
laboriously drafted and re-drafted a rationale for the constitutional change
that focused specifically on lowa and the Eastern Division. At one point in
the pre-convention planning, which with its reference to "providlingj the
opposition with ammunition" took on the aura of an all-out battle plan, Huff
and M.W. Thatcher toyed with the idea of naming names and of directly
censuring Fred Stover. In the end, what was decided upon was an Executive
Committee "Statement and Recommendation" which, although it refrained
from citing specific individuals, clearly was directed at

the two

33“The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and By-Laws of the
National Farmers Union; An Analysts of Their Meaning and Effect," series V,
Box 4, Bk 1 (Exhibit File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biennial Convention, Dallas
Texas, March 10-14), National Farmers Union Papers.
3^"Delegates Certified to Golden Jubilee 1952 National Convention,"
Series V, Box 4, File Folder *1 (Minutes and Proceedings - Convention,
1952), National Farmers Union Papers.
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organizational affiliates who most vocally opposed the Farmers Union’s
recent conversion to President Truman’s foreign policy.35
The statement "upheld the right of the individual to his views and of a
minority to be heard and to have its views considered." But, it continued,
"Liberty is not license and the improper and dangerous actions and methods
of a relatively small minority within the organization may no longer be
ignored." Specifically, the statement claimed, a "small group" of Farmers
Union members had participated in a series of ‘wrongful and dangerous
acts." They had adopted the pattern of dictators by attempting "to control,
divide, confuse, [and] conquer;" they had distributed publications, “financed
by unknown sources," that were “deliberately misleading as to facts;" they
had held "their own state boundaries to be inviolable and [had cried] out
against any contact by National Farmers Union with members and ex
members who disagree with them within their own states," and they had
used educational funds "in violation of the rights of . . . other states and of
National Farmers Union."36

In concise form, the Executive Committee’s

statement reviewed the charges that had been levelled against lowa ever
35Handwrltten and typed drafts and redrafts
correspondence in Box 9, Folder 44, Talbott Family Papers.

and

related

^"Statement and Recommendation," February, 1952, Box 9, Folder 44,
Talbott Family Papers.
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since the start of the Korean War.
It is unclear from the record whether the Executive Committee's
statement was ever presented to the convention or whether it was merely in
place as a potential backup should the need arise.

The organizational

structure of the convention, in which plural voting allowed Glenn Talbott's
North Dakota delegation, with the support of one or two other states, to
dominate decisions, precluded the possibility of meaningful discussion of
the issues. Knowing that they could attain their objective even without
debate, the Talbott-Patton forces sat mutely, but confidently, by as the
constitutional change calling for a minimum membership of 3,500 by the end
of 1953 was introduced.
Michigan's Simeon Martin, whose state organization's existence was
threatened by the amendment, was the first of many speakers opposing the
change. His reminder of the difficulties involved in organizing in a section
of the nation "sewed up tight with the reactionary Farm Bureau" was
followed by Fred Stover's reiteration of the same point and by the lowa farm
leader's alarmed observation that the constitutional change represented a
denunciation of “the very things we stand for." Eastern Division executive
secretary Louis Slocum followed with the claim that it made no sense to
"adopt a proposal that w ill not make you bigger and not more powerful."
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After further comments from Stover, a Washington state delegate argued
that he would be unable to face the membership in his state if the
amendment passed, and Oklahoma's Roscoe Beale, asking that unnecessary
hardships not be placed on the smaller states, pleaded for rejection of the
amendment.
Prior to the vote, not one delegate spoke in support of the proposed
change. Yet when it came time to vote, the measure passed overwhelmingly.
The threatened affiliates in Oregon, Michigan, lowa, and the Eastern Division
were joined in opposition to the amendment by Minnesota and by dissenting
individuals in Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma.

Their combined vote,

however, was overpowered by individual votes in Kansas, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma, and by the unanimous votes from Arkansas, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, the Rocky Mountain Division, and,
surprisingly, the threatened state of Texas. Only after the balloting did a
Dakota delegate speak in favor of the action, naively expressing the view
that, although the measure had passed, no affiliate would actually face
charter revocation.

Iowa's Merle Hansen, a close friend of Fred Stover,

offered a more realistic assessment when he described the convention
action as being driven by "the substance of hysteria" and predicted that the
delegates had just authored "the articles of suicide" for the National
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Farmers Union.37
The lack of verbal defense of their actions by the Patton-Talbott
contingent gave the convention an air of conspiratorial pre-planning.

In

addition to the extensive pre-convention work on the Executive Committee's
"Statement and Recommendation," the national leadership arrived in Dallas
with a "file of letters" from Iowa’s pro-Hoffman forces that they suspected
would be "extremely helpful" in obtaining converts.

It was, however, a

matter of overpreparation. Holding the necessary votes to defeat any effort
at dissent and manning the key positions in the parliamentary regulation of
the proceedings, Patton’s supporters merely had to show up, cast their
votes, and quietly listen to, or even ignore, the futile objections of their
opponents. When constitutional amendments radically altering the workings
or the Union and tightening the controlling grip of the national leadership
were introduced, they were passed in the same fashion as the change in
membership requirements - without one word being offered In support.
When Marie Holte, who had introduced a peace resolution at the November,
1951, North Dakota Farmers Union convention, was nominated for national
vice president, she was resoundingly defeated by Herb Rolph, the incumbent
37Transcript of convention debate, pp. 164-191, Series V, Box 4, Bk 2
(Master Proceedings File), National Farmers Union Papers.
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who, after listening to Holte's ten-minute election address, declined the
invitation to speak in favor of his own candidacy. And when Simeon Martin
Introduced a resolution renouncing colonialism and calling for the
withdrawal of U.S. armed forces “from foreign soil," resolution committee
members listened "in silence,’ gave It scant consideration, and then voted
down a proposal to present It to the convention for discussion.38
Despite the Dallas Morning News’ banner headline announcing "Farmers
Union Defeats Issue on Cease-Fire," there was no "bitter floor fight" over
the Korean War. Following the resolution committee's model in dealing with
Simeon Martin’s peace resolution, the carefully orchestrated convention
muzzled the efforts by Fred Stovers supporters to Initiate debate on
American foreign policy. A "Statement of Principles" circulated by a Rank
and File Committee co-chalred by Marie Holte and whose executive
committee Included Nebraska's Merle Hansen and Montana’s Harold Ridenour,
objected to the endorsement by "some Farmers Union leaders . . . of the
gigantic. . . war mobilization program

" Those leaders, the Statement's

authors argued, had "capitulated to the fantastic and fatal delusion that
38Glenn J. Talbott to James G. Patton, February 26, 1952, Box 10,
Folder 3, Talbott Family Papers; Transcript of convention debate, pp. 70-71
and164-l91, Series V, Box 4, Bk 2 (Master Proceedings File), National
Farmers Union Papers; lowa Union Farmer. November, 1951, p. 2 and April,
1952, p. 4.
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farm prosperity can be attained through a gigantic warspending program"
and had accepted “the fiction that the present foreign policy is the road to
peace and prosperity." Dismissing Russian imperialism from the program
committee's list of "major threats to true world brotherhood and peace," the
Rank and File Committee asked the convention instead to recognize but one
significant danger: "the existence in the world of uncorrected and
indefensible evils," including “starvation, exploitation, feudalism, and
dictatorships," of which the "so-called Korean police action" was but one
example. The Committee also pushed for recognition of an American agenda
that rejected as an instrument of foreign policy the "threat of political and
economic penetration." These strongly worded denunciations of U.S. policy,
which at previous Farmers Union conventions had echoed through every
address, were heard in 1952 only in hallways and hotel rooms.

Besides

Marie Holte's references to "farm boys . . . in some far off place shooting
people and being shot for something they know not what," the only podiumdelivered commentary that even remotely suggested criticism of American
policy was the observation of Scotland’s Lord Boyd Orr, the former head of
the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization, that there was "a mass uprising
against imperialism of the white man in the Far East."39
39Dallas Morning News. March 15, 1952, part 1, p. I and March 11,
1952, part 1, p. 3; Farmers Union National Rank and File Committee,
"Statement of Principles" and "To All Delegates and Members," Series V, Box
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Instead, as Facts for Farmers reported, the "top officers" of the Farmers
Union struck "a heavy pro-Truman note" at Dallas. Jim Patton, in a complete
about-face from his earlier criticisms of American unilateralism, argued
that events in Korea left the United States "no choice but to maintain a
protective shield of military strength to protect free nations against
possible military aggression by would-be totalitarian world rulers."
Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan, invited by Patton to address the
convention, spoke in similar terms. The United States, he said, was "willing
to spend billions on defense - because we clearly must," and, he concluded,
"We cannot afford to allow a billion people to fall under the domination of
the Kremlin if aid from us w ill prevent it." Perhaps the most appropriate
individual missing from this celebration of American strength was
President Truman himself who, although invited by Patton, could not attend.
He did, nevertheless, send his regrets in which he praised the "forwardlooking policies" of the Farmers Union and spoke of his certainty that the
organization would "continue to support a strong, forward-looking foreign
4, File Folder l (Minutes and Proceedings, Convention 1952), National
Farmers Union Papers; "Program Committee Policy Statement," Series V, Box
4, Bk 1 (Exhibit File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biennial Convention, Dallas,
Texas, March 10-14), National Farmers Union Papers;
Transcript of
convention debate, pp. 70-71, Series V, Box 4, Bk 2 (Master Proceedings
File), National Farmers Union Papers.
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policy."40
How long into the future the Farmers Union would pursue its new-found
support for Truman’s policies could not easily be predicted in 1952. What
was obvious, however, was that in addition to accepting a more aggressive
and active American role in world affairs, the Farmers Union at Dallas also
compromised a number of the other views that for years had defined the
organization. Policy statements calling for the "encouragement of private
enterprise,"

opposing

“governmental

agricultural

collectives,"

and

cautiously avoiding both a condemnation of Farm Bureau proposals to move
poorer farmers off the land and a recommendation for an accelerated price
support program for agriculture represented, as the Rank and File
Committee observed, "a complete violation of the traditions of the National
Farmers Union.

Never before," the Committee argued, "has the National

Farmers Union identified itself with exploiting business interests, placed
limitations on the cooperative movement, [or] advocated a program of
scarcity

"41

4 °Facts for Farmers. April, 1952, p. 1; Dallas Morning News. March 13,
1952, part 3, p. 11; “Report of James G. Patton, President, National Farmers
Union, 1952 Convention, Dallas, Texas, March 10, 1952," and Harry Truman to
James Patton, March 8,1952, Box 17, Folder “National Farmers Union, Dallas
Conference 3/52," Waters Papers.
41-program Committee Policy Statement," Series V, Box 4, Bk 1
(Exhibit File: NFU Convention, 1952 Biennial Convention, Dallas, Texas,
March 10-14), National Farmers Union Papers; Farmers Union National Rank
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!n addressing the convention, M.W. Thatcher spoke derisively and
accurately of "the mirage of prosperity which [had] made this cold war
against American farmers possible . . . Z’42

But despite this nostalgic

allusion to the spirit of agrarian protest, it was clear that, with the Dallas
convention in 1952, the National Farmers Union had changed. Not only had it
publicly relinquished its role as foreign policy critic, but it had also
abandoned the premise that American unilateralism damaged the domestic
welfare of the nation’s farmers. Discarding their old articles of faith, the
national leadership of the Farmers Union adopted new policy positions that
supported American

strength

abroad,

minimized

direct

government

assistance to farmers, and, reflecting the insecure temper of the times,
allowed no room for organizational dissent.
In the wake of the convention, Jim Patton remarked that opponents of the
organization’s new direction had put on a ‘very shady and shabby
performance" at Dallas.43

The truth, however, was that the national

president and his backers were the ones guilty of underhanded tactics,
and File Committee, "To All Delegates and Members," Series V, Box 4, File
Folder 1 (Minutes and Proceedings, Convention 1952), National Farmers
Union Papers;
March 14, 1952, part 1, p. 11.
43James G. Patton to Aubrey Williams, April 20, 1952, Box 7, File
Folder 16, Patton Papers.
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particularly in their drive for constitutional restructuring to purge Fred
Stover and other “heretics" from the Farmers Union.

As the new 3,500

minimum membership requirement took effect

1953,

in

it

became

pathetically obvious that the restructuring had been instituted for no other
reason than to fashion an organization untainted by the presence of Cold War
critics.
The controversy generated by the Farmers Union’s public brawl hurt the
membership drives in each of the five states that was a potential victim of
charter revocation. Perhaps because the quarrel had taken place in its own
backyard, the Texas affiliate was the most severely damaged; by 1953 its
membership had dropped fifty-nine percent, from 2,634 to 1,069.

lowa,

because of its position at the center of the controversy and because antiStover forces urged members to boycott the affiliate, suffered a fortythree percent decline, falling from 2,296 to 1.311. Michigan, the Eastern
division, and Oregon experienced, respectively, membership drops of thirtytwo (2,919 to 1,980), twenty-eight (3,213 to 2,329), and twenty (3,407 to
2,711) percent.44 Despite the deterioration in membership, each of the
Report of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of
Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America to the Full Board
Regarding the Future Status of Those State Organizations of the Farmers
Union Which Had Failed to Reach a Membership of 3500 by the End of the
1953 Fiscal Year," Series XIV, Box 2, File Folder 1, National Farmers Union
Papers.
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five still had the 1,000 minimum originally prescribed by the Farmers Union
constitution.

It was only the Dallas revision that made each of them a

potential victim.
When the national Board of Directors met in Denver on March 13, 1954, it
was presented with

an Executive

Committee

report

detailing

the

membership situations in each of the five affiliates and containing a
recommendation for action regarding possible charter revocation.

The

report was a remarkable document, not only because of its obvious bias
against lowa and the Eastern Division, but also because in forwarding its
recommendations the Executive Committee offered a series of rationales
that said much about the true interests of the Union.
The report dealt firs t with Texas, the state that not only had lost the
greatest percentage of members between 1952 and 1953, but which also
now had the lowest membership total of any of the organization's fifteen
affiliates. Texas, however, the Executive Committee reminded the Board of
Directors, was "the original home of the Farmers Union" and was directed by
officers who were "capable, conscientious and hard working." In addition,
the Texas affiliate had in place a Farmers Union insurance program that was
"soundly developing and expanding."

For these reasons, the Executive

Committee recommended that "the charter status of the state organization
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remain undisturbed."45
The same recommendation was made for Oregon, and for at least one
reason that it shared with Texas. While the official state membership was
2,711, the number of people in Oregon who were Farmers Union automobile
insurance policy holders, but not necessarily Farmers Union members,
exceeded 3,000.

The newly elected state president, a Mr. Libby, had

promised to carefully develop this potential membership pool, and so the
Executive Committee judged it "a real possibility" that the “activities and
energies" of Oregon could be "properly marshalled and guided."46
The Executive Committee similarly recommended that Michigan retain its
charter, although its reasons for doing so were more

obscure than in the

cases of Texas and Oregon. Vague references to the successful overcoming
of "existing obstacles," the recent improvement of the "public attitude
toward [the] Farmers Union," and "several organizational changes" that had
“already borne considerable fruit," produced the conclusion that there were
"few, if any [negative factors] with respect to our future in this state."47
The aura of optimism ended, but the obscurantist approach evident in the
45"A Report of the Executive Committee," pp. 1-2.
^ " A Report of the Executive Committee," p. 2.
47“A Report of the Executive Committee," p. 2.
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Michigan rationale continued, when the Executive Committee report turned
to the Eastern Division. Dredging up a rationale for charter revocation that,
to this point in time, had not seen the light of day, the report described ”a
material dissimilarity” in the population make-up of Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, the two states comprising the Eastern Division, and argued that it
perhaps had been a mistake originally to have combined the two into one
unit.

Since "conscientious officers have failed to achieve a coordinated

effort" between the two states, and since farmers in Pennsylvania had
declined, "for reasons of their own . . . to join or participate as long as the
present charter situation prevails," the Executive Committee report
suggested "the revocation of the charter of {the] Eastern Division" and the
pursuit of an "independent charter status" for Pennsylvania. "Further study
and discussion" would be necessary “before entering upon an aggressive
membership campaign in New Jersey . . . ,"48

The recommendation

deliberately avoided any discussion of the differences of opinion between
the state and national leaderships over U.S. foreign policy. It also failed to
mention that Alvin Christman and Louis Slocum, the two vocal critics of
American foreign policy who headed the Eastern division, managed the
affiliate from their home base in New Jersey.
4®"A Report of the Executive Committee," pp. 2-3.
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The Executive Committee's recommendation for lowa called for the
revocation of that state's charter as well. The report praised the strength
of the affiliate in “the early history of [the] National Farmers Union,- but
noted that, much like the case in Pennsylvania, farmers in lowa “for
whatever reasons they may have. . . will not join [the] Farmers Union in that
state as It is presently constituted." The "continuing deterioration in the
effectiveness" of the state organization stood in stark contrast, the report
read, to the "abundant evidence that a new and fresh organizational start in
lowa would receive wide and effective farmer support.'49

Like the

analysis of the Eastern Division, the Executive Committee’s recommendation
for lowa made no reference to foreign policy differences, presenting the
case for charter revocation instead under the fabricated claim of
organizational ineffectiveness.
Not surprisingly, the Board of Directors adopted the recommendations of
the Executive Committee, and the charters of lowa and the Eastern Division
were revoked that March 13th.

Tellingly, three days before the final

decision was made, Fred Stover was summoned to Chicago to meet with
Farmers Union organizer Gus Geisler and with Charles Brannan, the former
Secretary of Agriculture who, with the end of the Truman administration,
had accepted an advisory position with the National Farmers Union.
49"A Repcrt of the Executive Committee," p. 3.
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purpose of the meeting, as later reported by Stover, was to give the Iowa
leader one last chance to save the state’s charter by agreeing to step down
as president.

By doing so, and by allowing the national organization to

hand-pick as new state leader "someone who never had any connections or
associations with the Iowa Farmers Union," Stover conceivably could save
embarrassment for himself personally, for his state membership, and for
the Farmers Union as a whole.50
Stover declined the offer and instead issued a "fact sheet" summarizing
the events leading up to the charter revocation. He also joined with Alvin
Christman in publishing a March 16, 1954, statement describing the Farmers
Union action as "a shortsighted decision" that would "comfort only our
enemies." Unlike the national leadership, which followed Patton’s lead in
remaining either tight-lipped or purposely vague about the decision, Stover,
Christman, and Iowa member Lee Harthan developed thorough summaries
that questioned the wisdom of reducing the organization's membership at a
time when “jointing] together for mutual protection" seemed to be the more
logical goal. It was, Harthan urged Patton in a March 10th letter, a time "to
heal all the sores that exist in the Union."51
50“Fact Sheet: Statement by the Iowa Farmers Union," Stover Papers.
51 "Fact Sheet," Stover Papers; "Statement of Iowa Farmers Union and
Eastern Division of the National Farmers Union," March 16, 1954, Stover
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The time for healing, however, had passed, at least in the mind of Jim
Patton. As the curtain came down on the Korean War, the event that had
sparked the organization’s public dispute in 1950, the president of the
National Farmers Union could take comfort in the fact that his effort to
purge the Union of Cold War critics had at last succeeded. What he could not
rest comfortably with was the reality that his efforts had made casualties
not only of the dissenters but also of the Farmers Union itself. Certainly he
had cleansed the organization of its most vocal Cold War critics, but in
doing so he had created widespread organizational disruption. Coupled with
the abandonment of principle evident in his about-face on American
unilateralism, Patton's misguided efforts diminished for the immediate
future the effectiveness of the National Farmers Union as a voice in the
formulation of American foreign policy.

Papers; Lee Harthan to James G. Patton, March 10, 1954, Series XIV, Box 2,
File Folder 1, National Farmers Union Papers.
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Cold War Casualties
In a 1993 commentary on Melvyn Lefler's A Preponderance of Power.
Bruce Cumings reminded his colleague that, the writings of the historical
profession to the contrary, there was significant domestic opposition to
America’s early Cold War foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan, N.A.T.O., and the decision to go to war in Korea, Cumings wrote, faced
considerable resistance from a vast number of sources, including "remnant
isolationism, a restive right wing, strong and recalcitrant labor, [and]
Republicans out of power for a generation. . .."

Although his list did not

specifically include America's farmers, it did cite as a generic category
groups adopting "conflicting strategies for dealing with communism at home
and abroad."1
The National Farmers Union was one such group. Between 1945 and 1950,
the organization embraced a contentious foreign policy strategy that
rejected what Albert Einstein called America’s “Great Illusion," the belief
that because of its post-World War II position of unparalleled strength, its
1Bruce Cumings, "'Revising Postrevisionism,’ or, The Poverty of Theory
in Diplomatic History." Diplomatic History XVI1 (Fall, 1993), pp. 563-5S6.
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“preponderance of power,” the United States could impose Its w ill upon the
world. Arguing that the struggle pitting democracy versus communism was
an oversimplification that minimized the more important issues of
worldwide poverty and national self-determination, the leadership of the
Farmers Union charged both the United States and the Soviet Union with
bearing partial responsibility for the beginnings of the Cold War. Able to
directly influence only the American side of the equation, Jim Patton's
organization challenged the Truman administration to alter its course and to
resurrect the spirit of international cooperation that it associated with the
memory of Franklin Roosevelt.
Tragically, 1945 to 1950 were not opportune years for critics of
American policies.

Administration officials bluntly labelled the Soviet

Union as this nation's number one enemy and just as forthrightly called on
the American people to support the Cold War as a way of life.

Individuals

and groups who challenged this agenda were rewarded with public ridicule,
often at the hands of what Stanley Kutler has appropriately described as an
"American Inquisition" practicing “official repression on an unprecedented
scale."2 For the Farmers Union, this translated into perpetual scrutiny of
2Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in
the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. xii.
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its loyalty by the F.B.I., the State Department, the House Un-American
Activities Committee, and the American Legion. Eager to adopt the politics
of fear generated by Joseph McCarthy and other apostles of conformity, rival
farm organizations joined the attack, hoping to increase their political
leverage at the expense of the Farmers Union.
From 1950 to 1953, U.S. involvement in Korea simultaneously increased
both the Farmers Union's displeasure with American foreign policy and the
public's disapproval of the organization's stand. For many in the Union, the
war particularly highlighted the intimate relationship between government
policies abroad and those at home, for the three years of fighting produced a
series of negative consequences for American agriculture that principally
impacted on small family farmers. Farmers Union complaints about these
effects, which included cuts in agricultural programs such as the Brannan
Plan, the siphoning off of farm labor to both the draft and to war-related
industries, and the importation of often unskilled foreign labor to replenish
the labor pool, added to the organization's claim that American foreign
policy, in addition to unnecessarily supporting repressive, undemocratic
regimes, contributed as well to an increased polarization of American
agriculture. The complaints also added fuel to the charge, now most vocally
expressed by Senator Styles Bridges, that the Farmers Union was anti-
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American and a threat to the safety and security of the nation.
Confronting this seemingly constant criticism, the leaders of the
Farmers Union faced two choices: either remain steadfast in their views and
continue to experience public disgrace, or abandon their criticisms of
American foreign policy and acquiesce in the spirit and message of the
times. In an age when, as President Truman himself once remarked, "the
Cold War began to overshadow our lives," these choices were common,
particularly so for groups and individuals who aspired to an intelligent and
informed discussion of the issues facing the American people.

As

commonplace as they were, however, the choices were not easy and, as the
leadership of the Farmers Union discovered in the years following Korea,
neither choice either guaranteed relief from public scrutiny or, in the case
of those who shifted with the times, secured a continued role in the
discussion and formulation of American policy.
For Fred Stover, as well as for Archie Wright and others who had vocally
spearheaded Farmers Union opposition to President Truman's policies, the
choice was far less difficult than for others who, under the pressure of
conformity, had waffled in their views.

Asked by Peace Reporter editor

John Darr in August, 1953, to comment "on the meaning of the Korean truce,"
Stover replied that the end of the war offered the opportunity for "a return
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to the one world concepts of Roosevelt and W illkie,. . . for uniting the world
for peace instead of dividing it for war.“ His assessment of Korea was a
clear indication of Stover's choice to stick closely to his view, expressed
consistently in the early years of the Cold War, that international
cooperation was the only route to world peace and that Harry Truman's
heralding of American unilateralism and his drive for conformity, as he told
Darr, made it difficult “to avoid other Koreas."3
Stover's disavowal of Harry Truman's foreign policy led not only to his
Iowa affiliate's expulsion from the National Farmers Union, but to other
charges and investigations that in the aftermath of Korea further branded
the lowa farmer as a dangerous radical.

In a February 21, 1954, radio

broadcast entitled "Last Man Out,” a mysterious woman named Helen Wood
Birnie claimed that she had once attended a Communist Party steering
committee meeting with Stover, and that she knew for a fact that he was a
member of the Communist Party. Although Stover denied the allegations as
"utterly and entirely false," the F.B.I. used the charges to pursue its own
investigation of Stover and the lowa Farmers Union.4
3John W. Darr, Jr. to Fred Stover, August 1, 1953, and Fred Stover to
John W. Darr, Jr., August 10, 1953, both in the Stover Papers.
^"Report of F.W. Stover to 38th State Convention of lowa Farmers
Union," September 17, 1954, pp. 5-6, Box 6, Folder “Convention Reports,
1947-1976," U.S. Farmers Association Records; Undated press release from
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In a series of 1956 reports, the F.B.I. claimed that the iowa organization
was "dominated or controlled by the Communist Party, USA," and that it had
sought "implementation of the CP line." The reasons the F.B.I. cited for its
conclusions included a litany of charges that Stover’s critics had used for
years: his involvement with the Progressive Party, his opposition to the
Korean War, his support for worldwide nuclear disarmament, his supposed
refusal to directly criticize the Soviet Union, and, more recently, his
organization's call for the repeal of anti-communist legislation 3nd for the
enforcement of anti-segregation, anti-poll tax, and anti-lynching laws.
Stover’s optimistic 1955 report that "the settlement of the Indo-China War,
the avoidance of war with China, the Bandoeng Conference, the Geneva
Conference," and a host of other positive events had "helped to improve the
political climate over the world" was also cited as proof of his
organization's Communist ties. So, too, was a 1952 Christmas card sent by
lowa Farmers Union member George Wharam to then President-elect Dwight
Eisenhower. "Dear President-elect Eisenhower," the card began. "I sincerely
hope you will bring an end to the shooting and killing in Korea by Christmas.
Then the whole world can say: ’And on earth peace, good w ill toward
F.W. Stover "To All the United States Senators and Congressmen from lowa,"
Stover Papers.
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men.'"5
What is intriguing about the F.B.I. investigation, in addition to the
uniformly weak and, in some cases, truly absurd, nature of its evidence, was
its estimate of precisely when Stover and the lowa Farmers Union began
“promoting the objectives of the Communist Party, USA"

The agency’s

August 18, 1956, report cited as the starting point for Iowa's subversion
September 23, 1950, the final day of the lowa Farmers Union's annual
convention at which Jim Patton had announced his total "disagreement with
Fred Stover's present position on international policy’ and Leonard Hoffman
and his Hardin County supporters had initiated the move to dump Stover for
his "slavish following of the Moscow line." The timing of the F.B.I. report,
which included as fact the never proven Hardin County charges that Stover
deliberately denied charters to locals opposed to his positions, raises
interesting questions about the informants used by the F.B.I. in reaching its
conclusions. Whatever its sources and despite the weakness of its case, the
F.B.I. investigation, along with Helen Birnie’s radio broadcast and the
National Farmers Union's campaign to cleanse the organization of its
dissident elements, were, with their tactics of lies, innuendoes, and half
5F.B.I. reports of January 24, 1956 (pp. 7-9), August 18, 1956 (pp. 1516, 44, and 50), and October 1, 1956 (pp. 7-10), Box 48, Folder 1 ("F.B.I.
Records re: IFU"), lowa Farmers Union Records.
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truths, typical of the times. The case against Fred Stover and other Farmers
Union members who chose to remain steadfast in their criticisms of U.S.
foreign policy never made the "American Inquisition" headlines earned by
such figures as Owen Lattimore, Ezra Pound, and Harry Bridges, but their
persecution was no less typical of an age dominated by the politics of
fear.6
Banished from the Farmers Union in S55 4, Stover and his lowa supporters
established in 1957 what eventually came to be known as the U.S. Farmers
Association.7

The motto of the new organization, "Peace and Parity,"

reflected Stover's long-held view that the nation's foreign policy went
hand-in-hand with its domestic program, and that equity for farmers at
home was the by-product of a well thought out and equally equitable policy
abroad. It was not something, Stover charged, that could be accomplished by
promoting American unilateralism or by “parroting the old phrases about the
'American way of life' or ‘rolling back the tide of imperialistic world
communism.’"8 Believing it essential to reverse American policies, Stover
6F.B.I. report, August 18, 1956, pp. 15-16, lowa Farmers Union
Records. These reports, which I accidentally, but fortuitously, came across
at lowa State University, include the blackouts typical of F.B.I. reports,
thereby obliterating the names of the approximately five informants.
7The new organization was known as the U.S. Farm Union and as the
lowa Farmers Association before settling on U.S. Farmers Association.
^“Report of F.W. Stover to 38th State Convention of lowa Farmers
Union," September 17, 1954, p. 9.
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spent the last forty years of his life, much of it under the watchful eye of
the F.B.I.,9 working for peace abroad and for economic parity at home.
Branded a subversive, he died in 1990, a casualty of Cold War paranoia who
nevertheless insisted, as he had told John Darr in 1953, that "peace workers
in America still have a lot of work to do."10
While Fred Stover's life in the aftermath of Korea showed what happened
to individuals who continued their dissent from American foreign policy,
Jim Patton's tale signified a more complex, but equally discouraging, aspect
of Cold War conformity. Unlike Stover, who chose to persist in his role of
administration critic, Patton opted to acquiesce in the mentality of the age.
Having in 1946 accused the United States of "imperialist adventures backed
to the hilt by American diplomacy and American arms," Patton in 1953 told
the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association in St. Paul, in an echoing of
Henry Luce’s call for an "American Century," that "this is the United States'
day in civilization's time."

A year later, in addressing a conference

sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Patton spoke of the nation's
responsibility to build "integrated free world military and economic
strength."

The same man who earlier in his career had lambasted Farm

^Tom Knudson, "Seeking Communist Ties, FBI Trailed Farm Leader
Stover," Des Moines Register. August 7, 1983, p. IB.
10pred Stover to John W. Darr, Jr., August 10, 1953.
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Bureau head Allan Kline for his support of an "unholy alliance" between
business and government, now marched in near lock-step with Kline in a
joint advocacy of free enterprise at home and American military might
abroad.n

In doing so, Patton lost sight of the tenets that had steered

organizational policy since at least the end of World War II: that domestic
and foreign

policies

were

irrevocably

linked,

and

that

American

unilateralism and a narrow-minded focus on national security limited the
prospects for International cooperation and world peace.
Jim Patton's conversion to the mentality of the Cold War was a result of
what his biographer, Charles Livermore, accurately labelled as Patton's
"power-conscious" nature. But Livermore was wrong when he argued that
the "less naive" Patton, the one eager to cooperate with President Truman,
emerged with the 1948 presidential election.

Instead, it was the events

leading up to and into the Korean War, particularly the image of American
boys dying once again on foreign soil, that produced Patton's about-face on
America’s role in world affairs. Privy, in all likelihood, to the re-evaluation
of U.S. foreign policy that produced NSC-68, and recognizing on the horizon
the changes In American society that document would produce, Jim Patton
11 Arkansas Union Farmer. January, 1953, p. 8; "Report of F.W. Stover to
38th State Convention of lowa Farmers Union," September 17, 1954, pp. 910.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

344
sought to preserve both his own personal and his organization's role in the
making of U.S. policy. To do so, in the temper of the times, demanded a
cleansing of the Farmers Union of those elements that served as an
embarrassing reminder of the organization's outspoken criticism

of

American policy in the earliest years of the Cold War. And so Jim Patton,
assisted by Glenn Talbott and others of like mind, staged their own
"inquisition." Adopting the tactics of repression, they successfully purged
from the Union a host of outspoken critics, including Alvin Christman, Louis
Slocum, Archie Wright, and, of course, Fred Stover.
In the years between the Korean War and his death in 1985, Jim Patton
insisted, on the very rare occasions when he spoke about it, that Farmers
Union actions against Fred Stover had nothing to do with differences of
opinion over Korea in particular or over American foreign policy in general.
Instead, Patton claimed, the fight against Stover had been necessary
because of the lowa leader's inability to build membership in his state. This
argument presented Stover not as a subversive, nor as a Communist, but as a
"total non-conformist" who was so “cantankerous" and "goddamn crazy" that
he had to be removed for the sake of organizational unity. Although Farmers
Union officials defend the argument to this day, the facts speak otherwise.
Fred Stover was not removed from the Farmers Union for membership
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deficiencies, but because his challenge to President Truman's foreign
policies represented a threat to the continued existence of the Union, the
preservation of which, for Jim Patton, overrode all other concerns.12
It is ironic that despite his maneuvering for political position, Jim
Patton failed to attain his goals.

Having abandoned the traditions and

policies of the Farmers Union in order to preserve its role in Coid War
America, Patton witnessed instead, in the years after Korea, a declining
status both for himself personally and for the organization as a whole.
Impeded in part by the return of the Republicans who had been "out of power
for a generation," and in particular by a less than satisfactory relationship
with Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, the Farmers Union fell
further out of favor with the powers in Washington than it had ever been
,2 Charles Livermore, Columbia Oral History interview with Jim Patton,
August, 1978, pp. 93-96, Box 1, Patton Papers. Farmers Union officials who
maintain the "deteriorating membership" argument include: South Dakota's
Kenny Schuman (phone conversation with author, November 11, 1991), Milt
Hakel (interview with author, National Farmers Union Office, Washington,
D.C., August 20, 1992), and Dave Carter (interview with author, National
Farmers Union Office, Denver, Colorado, October 11, 1991). The interview
with Livermore is one of the rare places where Patton referred either to
Stover or the issue of the Korean War. In a 289-page Columbia Oral History
interview conducted by Ed Edwin in September, 1979, there is no mention at
all of Stover and cfi !y passing references to Korea (Box 1, Patton Papers). A
61-page transcript of a 1981 interview with "Betty," a copy of which this
author obtained from Milt Hakel, has no references to either subject. Much
like his habit of cleansing his organizational records, it appears that Patton
had certain topics about which he would not often go on record.
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during the Truman administration. After peaking in the 1950's, membership
plunged through the next three decades and stood, as of its 1994 annual
convention In Fargo, North Dakota, at less than half of its Korean War era
totals. Writing of that convention, the Associated Press noted the "painfully
obvious" aging of the membership and posed the telling question, "Has [thel
National Farmers Union lost Its clout?’ 13
In truth, whatever clout the Farmers Union once held was lost In the
1950's when the organization, pressured to conform to America's Cold War
agenda, split in two over the issue of U.S. foreign policy. The Fred Stover
forces who continued criticizing the Truman administration fell victim to
the politics of fear, were ostracized as heretics and subversives, and so
joined the ranks of the Cold War casualties destroyed by an "American
Inquisition" that demanded more conformity than they were willing to
accept. The other group, those who believed that by choosing the path of
least resistance and going along with the American agenda they could
somehow retain a position of importance, fared no better.

Unable to

overcome the constant smears directed at the Union between 1945 and
1950, and further inhibited by a change of presidential administrations in
13"Has National Farmers Union lost its clout?," DeKalb Daily Chronicle.
March 8, 1994, p. 7.
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the closing years of the Korean War, the Jim Patton-led forces watched
helplessly as their influence slipped away and as they, too, became
casualties of the Cold War.
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